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ABSTRACT 
Connections between South Africa and Antarctica can be traced as far 
back as the 1700s when European expeditions in search of the southern 
continent used Cape Town (and later Simonstown) as a base of 
operation. This link expanded considerably after formal British 
acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope in 1815, yet it was not until 
1926 that an actual South African policy towards the Antarctic began 
to materialize. Once this policy was established it continued to be 
characterized by procrastination as well as resistance both from 
within and without South Africa. 
The history of South Africa's Antarctic policy can be divided into 
five periods: first, the commencement of the policy (focusing 
primarily on economic interests), 1926-1939; second, the pursuit of 
interests through the policy (focusing on political interests), 1944-
1958; third, the entrenchment of South Africa's interests in the 
Antarctic (by securing South Africa's position within the Antarctic 
Treaty System), 1958-1960; fourth, the expansion of and foreign 
assault on the policy (under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty 
System), 1960-1988; and fifth, the defence of and future prospects for 
the policy (from United Nation's calls for South Africa's exclusion 
from the Antarctic Treaty System), since 1982. 
While resistance from inside and outside the government during the 
first two periods resulted from inadequacies in the South African 
Antarctic policy itself, resistance in the final two periods has 
centred upon non-Antarctic issues. As South Africa has faced ever-
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increasing exclusion from international governmental organizations 
over opposition to Its apartheid policies, organizations such as the 
Antarctic Treaty Organization have inevitably been drawn into the 
debate. As a result, the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty 
(of which South Africa is one of the original twelve) have been forced 
to deal with the following question: to what extent will political 
issues outside the scope of the management policies of the Antarctic 
Treaty Organization be allowed to affect the functioning of the 
Antarctic Treaty System? While the Consultative Parties continue to 
ponder this and the fact that South Africa's Consultative Status has 
become the most divisive factor within the Antarctic Treaty System, no 
final solutions to these issues appear likely before 1991. 
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PREFACE 
When one chooses to write on some aspect of South African foreign 
affairs, it immediately becomes apparent that most topics are, for 
obvious reasons, sensitive issues in government circles. As South 
Africa's foreign and domestic policies have uniquely been intertwined, 
owing to circumstance, selecting some aspect of foreign affairs to 
study where enough information is openly available begins to limit 
one's options. For this reason, after some preliminary research, I 
chose a subject which would allow me to examine a significant foreign 
policy issue which would yield the least number of obstacles but which 
at the same time was relevant to current international developments. 
The topic, South Africa's Antarctic Policy, was one which could pose 
fewer security concerns than others and for that reason afforded me 
access to a wide range of governmental and non-governmental sources of 
information. However , international interest in South Africa's 
domestic policies has inevitably resulted, as in nearly all facets of 
South Africa's foreign affairs, in international pressure being placed 
on its Antarctic policy. In particular, although South Africa has 
been excluded from participating in most international organizations, 
international pressure has remained ineffective in obtaining South 
Africa's exclusion from the Antarctic Treaty Organization, the body 
which currently administers Antarctica. The history of South Africa's 
Antarctic policy goes back long before South Africa's domestic 
policies brought it into the situation it now faces. While historic 
links to Antarctica can be traced as far back as the 1770s, policy 
formulation did not begin until the mid-1920s. Since then, South 
vii 
Africa's Antarctic policy formulation has gone through several 
identifiable phases with changing interests over time directing its 
developments. 
While the topic has not been extensively written upon, large amounts 
of primary government source material do exist, documenting in 
extensive detail the history of the policy, particularly from 1926 
onward. However, it should be noted that because of South African 
government policy on restricting access to most government archival 
sources for thirty years, a number of files are closed. As a result of 
archival rules I was unable to examine any files later than 1959 
although access might be obtained by contacting the South African 
Central Archives in Pretoria. What does exist after 1959 in terms of 
secondary sources is quite extensive and provided much for examining 
the lat est developments. Some sources such as the prominent journal 
Polar Record are not publicly available in South Africa although much 
on the current situation relating to South Africa and the Antarctic is 
discussed in these. But this is not to say that what does exist in 
South Africa is limited; for it is not . The sources available from Jan 
Smuts House at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, were 
extremely useful and the staff was especially co-operative in 
assisting where they could. Again, the archival sources and staff in 
Pretoria were also most useful and helpful. 
There are many individuals I would like to acknowledge for their 
assistance towards making this study a success, but, alas, too many to 
acknowledge here individually. Those who I would like to acknowledge 
personally are the following: Dr A.W.V. Poole, Acting Director of the 
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Hermann Ohlthaver Institute for Aeronomy at Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown; Dr P.R. Condy, Antarctic Programme Co-ordinator at the 
Foundation for Research Development in Pretoria; Mr E. de Montille, Mr 
R. Gangat and Dr C. Liebenberg of the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs; Dr Maarten J. de Wit at the University of Cape Town 
(previously at the University of the Witwatersrand); Professor T.R.H. 
Davenport and Mr A.J. Cook of the Department of History at Rhodes 
University; Professor J.J. Van Wyk of the International Studies Unit 
at Rhodes University; Messrs D.J. Leyshon and J .R. Midgley of the 
Faculty of Law at Rhodes University; Mmes. G.D. Meyer and D.L. Gough 
of the Rhodes University Library; Professor D.J. Geldenhuys of the 
Department of Political Science at the Rand Afrikaans University, 
Johannesburg; Professor P.C.J. Vale; Professor E.G. Phillips, R.D. 
Burns, Dr H Simonowltz, and Mr D Wright of California State 
University, Los Angeles; Mr D.E . Pendleton; Mr R.A. Kehne II; and Mrs 
M.M. Charteris. 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of the development of a South African Antarctic policy could 
be characterized in two ways. First, that although the Cape had been 
used often for exploratory and other types of expeditions to the 
Antarctic since the 1700s, it was not until the 1920s that actual 
policy formulation began. In relation to the other countries in close 
proximity to Antarctica 1 South Africa actually came in late in 
pursuing interests in that region and is in fact the only one which 
did not lay claim to any part of Antarctica. 2 It was not until the 
mid- and late 1950s that South Africa could actually be said to have 
caught up with those states also pursuing interests in the Antarctic. 
The second characterization, in many ways causing South Africa's 
slowness in pursuing its Antarctic policy, was that throughout the 
20th century, the establishment, expansion and maintenance of its 
Antarctic policy could be best described as an uphill battle. 
From the beginning of policy formulation in the 1920s, problems 
appeared through the lack of serious government conSideration, 
shortage of funds, unclear policy directives and bureaucratic apathy. 
Subsequent complications have included problems over the international 
recognition of South African interests in Antarctica and, most 
recently, international unwillingness to accept South African 
interests there. This became linked with moves to isolate South Africa 
internationally. This is not to say that Antarctic policy formulation 
has been wholly problematic, for in many ways it has been quite 
constructive and much co-operation and support has been given from 
people and agencies within and ,in some cases, outside South Africa. 
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Still, the pace at which policy formulation has occurred demonstrates 
that consistent support has not existed all the time. 
Since the 1920s various government departments have assumed 
responsibility for the co-ordination of Antarctic policy according to 
particular interests at any given time. The first department to be 
responsible for developing an Antarctic policy was the Department of 
Commerce and Industries. From the 1920s to the 1950s most attention 
focussed on commercial activities in the oceans south of South Africa 
to the Antarctic coast. Whaling in particular featured quite highly 
until as late as the 1950s. With interest shifting in the late 1940s 
and into the 1950s away from commercial activities towards South 
African meteorological and scientific investigations, Antarctic policy 
co-ord ination was passed on to the Department of Transport. This was 
considered the appropriate department to handle the log istical aspects 
of pursuing investigative activities, not only in Antarctica, but also 
in the various sub-Antarctic islands on which meteorological work was 
being conducted. Later on, as the logistical problems were overcome, 
Antarctic policy was again moved; this time to the Department of 
Environmental Affairs3 which currently co-ordinates Antarctic policy 
in the government. However, other departments such as Defence and 
Foreign Affairs and government bodies such as the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)4 have played ongoing roles 
handling their respective interests under their portfolios. Foreign 
Affairs In particular has continuously been Involved since Its 
creation In 1927 when the Balfour Declaration of 1926 was interpreted 
to allow Dominions to conduct their own external affairs. Before this 
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the Prime Minister's office became involved in the 1920s when the 
issue was first introduced in the British Imperial 
Conference of 1926. 5 Foreign Affairs is currently the central 
department for Antarctic Policy as it is the one directly 
participating in the meetings of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) 
and dealing with the latest pressure from the United Nations calling 
for South Africa's exclusion from the ATS. This then leads to the 
focus of this work. 
South Africa's Antarctic policy consists of various components 
including participation in the ATS and co-operation arising from such; 
a wide range of scientific activities in Antarctica and the 
surrounding oceans; participation in the Scientific Committee for 
Antarctic Research (SCAR); the International Hhaling Commission and 
other international bodies and treaties dealing with the Antarctic 
region. Although South Africa is connect ed to the abovementioned 
areas as well as other activities relating to Antarctica, the focus of 
this work will be confined to the development of the South African 
government's policies towards the Antarctic. More specifically, the 
work will concentrate on the international aspects of the development 
of the policy, beginning with the Imperial Conferences of the 1920s 
and 1930s and moving on eventually to the present international debate 
over South Africa's presence in the Antarctic Treaty System. Certain 
issues, such as whaling and developments in the Antarctic Treaty 
System, have had significant bearing on South Africa's Antarctic 
policies; however, it is not the intention here to examine these 
larger issues in themselves. This is not to say that these issues are 
4 
not important, but each in itself is worthy of extensive stUdy.6 Thus 
this work can be summarised as an investigation of South Africa's 
international involvement in the question of establishing interests in 
Antarctica and later establishing and participating in an organization 
for the international administration of Antarctica. The focus here 
then will remain on issues directly relating to South Africa and the 
Antarctic as opposed to general developments in which South Africa 
shared. 
The history of South Africa's Antarctic policy can arguably be 
divided into five periods: the first period from 1926 (the year South 
Africa participated on the Committee on British Policy ·in the 
Antarctic of the 1926 Imperial Conference) to 1939 (when all 
Commonwealth Antarctic activities ceased effectively for the duration 
of World War II); the second period from 1947 until 195B which is 
characterized by South Africa's moves to identify and establish 
interests in the Antarctic in order to gain international recognition 
of such; the third period from 1958 to 1961 where, following 
acceptance by other states interested in Antarctic, South Africa 
participated in the creation of the Antarctic Treaty which has since 
controlled the continent; the fourth period from 1961, when the 
Antarctic Treaty came into force, to the late 1980s. Although the 
latter period has more to do with general developments in Antarctica, 
the main concern here is the 1980s when pressure has arisen calling 
for South Africa's exclusion from the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Reactions towards calls for exclusion have been mixed and the future 
is not completely certain for South Africa. This effectively is the 
final period, particularly after 1991, when the Antarctic Treaty comes 
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up for review. But, the development of South Africa's policy cannot be 
seen in isolation, for it was connected with a long history of 
assisting expeditions, particularly British, since the first of 
Captain James Cook's voyages in the 1770s in search of the southern 
continent. 
The first specific reference to South Africa, or more appropriately, 
the Cape of Good Hope in connection with Antarctic exploration 
appeared in the early 1770s. In 1771 Captain Cook passed through Cape 
Town during his first voyage on the "Endeavour" (1768-1771) in search 
of the "southern continent".7 Dutch possession of the Cape at this 
time limited its significance mainly to being a servicing stop for 
fresh provisions for passing ships and leave for the crews; there were 
no real direct connections to the expeditions being conducted by the 
British and French. On his second voyage (1772-1775) with the ships 
"Resolution" and "Adventure" Cook again put in at Cape Town on 30 
October 1772. While there Cook learned of Kerguelen's discoveries8 as 
well as those of Marion-Dufresne. 9 From this, Cape Town acted as the 
final staging point for what became Cook's second search for the 
southern continent. 10 
Captain Cook's own comments on his visits to Cape Town can be found in 
the journals of his three voyages. 11 Cook visited Cape Town four times 
and appears ·to have made close personal friendships with the people 
there,12 so much so that when the "Resolution" put in at Simonstown on 
12 April 1780, the people were quite affected by the news of his 
death. 13 These visits, however, marked the beginnings of the use of 
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the port facilities at Cape Town and Simonstown by British expeditions 
to the Antarctic, a use which expanded significantly once the Cape of 
Good Hope fell under British control in 1815. 14 
Subsequent references to Cape Town, the Cape of Good Hope, or 
Simonstown, in connection with exploration of the Antarctic were 
recurrent. During the British Antarctic Expedition of 1839-1843 headed 
by Sir James Clark Ross,15 the naval facilities at Simonstown were 
used in 1840 and 1B43. 16 Captain R F Scott visited South Africa 
during his first voyage (1901-1902) on the "Discovery" and stayed from 
3 October to 14 October 1901. It should be noted that Scott commented 
in his diary on the Anglo-Boer war which was still in progress. 17 The 
"Scotia" expedition (1902-1904) which followed soon afterwards put 
into Cape Town during its return to Britain. 18 The ship "Nimrod" used 
by the British Antarctic Expedition of 1907-1909 stopped at Cape Town 
in 1907 from Britain on its way to New Zealand. 19 Captain R F Scott 
returned to Cape Town in 1910 on his fatal attempt to reach the South 
Pole with the 1910 British Antarctic Expedition. The ship used for the 
1910 expedition was in Simonstown from 15 August20 to 2 September 
1910. 21 A number of people involved in the 1910 British Antarctic 
Expedition wrote about South Africa's connections with it. Specific 
references included the Union's financial contributions to the 
expedition and other assistance, notably the support from the 
Governor-General. 22 The Australian Antarctic Expedition of 1911-1914, 
under the command of Sir Douglas Mawson, made its only intermediate 
port of call, between Britain and Australia, at Cape Town on 24 
September 1911, for loading fresh provisions and coal. 23 On the voyage 
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of the "Quest" (1921-1922) to circumnavigate Antarctica, it was 
intended to visit Cape Town twice. Cape Town was to have acted as the 
base of operation for activities in the ice and the depot of stores 
for that part of the journey.24 Because of changes in the plans , 
however, the "Quest" only made one visit, from 18 June to 13 July 
1922, first stopping at Cape Town and then being laid up for an 
overhaul at Simonstown. 25 
The use of the facilities in Cape Town, and particularly those at the 
naval station in Simonstown, continued on into the 1920s and 1930s by 
not only British Antarctic expeditions26 but also Norwegian 
expeditions such as that of the "Norwegia" in 1927 and later 
expeditions mounted by Lars Christensen. The development of formal 
Antarctic policies by the Commonwealth members in the 1920s resulted 
from the interest shown by an increasing number of other countries in 
the Antarctic (I.e. the United States, Norway, Argentina, Chile and 
Japan) which threatened the near monopoly of British-related research 
carried on up to that time. Of further interest to the British was the 
question of obtaining the maximum territorial claim over the continent 
through the transfer of claims to other Commonwealth members adjacent 
to the Antarctic or the establishment of further territorial claims. 
The latter option came to affect directly the development of a South 
African Antarctic policy when threats were perceived to economic 
interests in the region, particularly as Norwegian and Japanese 
whaling activities expanded in waters south of South Africa. Thus, 
concern over economic interests played a Significant role in 
establishing South African government policy, as will be seen with 
South African partiCipation in the Imperial Conferences of 1926, 1930 
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and 1937, and the internal debate over whether the South African 
government would advance a formal claim to a section of Antarctica. 27 
9 
CHAPTER I 
The Commencement of an Antarctic Policy by the 
Union of South Africa, 1926-1939 
The inter-war period saw the establishment of a South African 
government policy to deal with increasing interest in, and access to, 
the Antarctic. As exploration of the continent, particularly by the 
British Commonwealth, continued to expand,1 South Africa's geographic 
proximity to the region drew it into eventual direct contact. South 
African political activities were specifically tied to four issues: 
these were the development of government structures to deal with an 
Antarctic policy;2 South African participation in the Imperial 
Conferences of 1926, 1930 and 1937 which directly dealt with British 
Commonwealth policy in the Antarctic; development of policy for South 
African exploration of Antarctica; and the debate over whether or not 
to claim the African quadrant as South African as had respectively 
occurred with other Commonwealth members. 
In the realms of South African foreign policy on the Antarctic In the 
1920s the Imperial Conference of 1926 played the first significant 
role. At the conference, South Africa3 participated on the Committee 
on British policy in the Antarctic. This committee's proceedings were 
directed at examining how best to further "British interests in the 
Antarctic in the hope that ultimately it may be found possible to 
assert and to maintain British control over the Antarctic region".4 
The committee report looked at what lands remained In Antarctica which 
were as yet unclaimed5 and what would be the best plan of action to 
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bring the remainder under British control with the least possible 
opposition from other powers. In asserting each claim , the committee 
paid close attention to steps which could be taken to promote 
expansion of British claims. 6 For example, they discussed an 
application from a Norwegian, Mr L Christensen,? for a licence to 
conduct whaling activities in the area east of the Ross Dependency and 
west of the Falkland Islands Dependency.8 The idea of issuing a 
British licence particularly through the New Zealand authorities who 
controlled the Ross Dependency,9 would serve to use discoveries made 
by these whaling expeditions as justification for expanding the 
boundaries of the Ross Dependency eastward. 10 
This particular reference to the issuing of licences for the 
furthering of British claims in the region was directly applied to 
South Africa in 192B. On 4 October of that year, the South African 
government received an application for a whaling licence from the 
Kerguelen Seal and Whaling Company of Cape Town. The company 
specifically applied to conduct whaling activities in the area between 
Enderby Land and the western extremity of Queen Mary's Land . 11 In a 
telegram sent to the South African [Prime Minister and) Minister of 
External Affairs from the British Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, L S Amery, specific reference was made to the 1926 Imperial 
Conference Committee proceedings outlining the procedures laid down 
for asserting title to Antarctic lands . It concluded that the 
(Australian) Commonwealth government 12 "while anxious that the licence 
should be issued, intimated that there would be difficulties in 
issuing it themselves before administration of areas in Question had 
been vested in Commonwealth government". 13 It was thus recommended 
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that the issuing of the licence might come from the British 
authorities. In a subsequent correspondence from Mr Amery to the South 
African Minister of External Affairs dated 22 October 1928. Mr Amery 
transmitted copies of the whaling licences issued directly by the 
British government to the South African company to operate in "that 
portion of the Antarctic Continent which lies between Longitude 450 
East and Longitude 900 East and its adjacent islands and territorial 
waters". 14 A final telegram from the British Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs to the South African [Prime Minister and] Minister of 
External Affairs, dated 10 November 1928 made further reference to the 
possibility of the establishment of a South African company to operate 
in the area of two sub-Antarctic islands (Heard and Macdonald. both 
now under Australian sovereignty). The proposal was mainly aimed at 
the transferring of such licencing to South Africa because the company 
which up to that time held the licence to conduct whaling. Messrs 
Irvin and Johnson Ltd was a South African company operating under a 
British licence. 15 
The next area of interest to South African Antarctic policy-makers in 
the inter-war period was the development of Norwegian claims to 
Antarctic and Sub-Antarctic lands in the late 1920s and 1930s . In 
brief, clear ownership over Bouvet Island. a fairly desolate and 
inaccessible island located some 1 800 miles south-west of Cape Town 
was never established. Discovered by a French naval explorer. after 
whom it is named. the island had rarely been seen. Concern arose when 
on 29 November 1927 the Norwegian ship "Norwegia" left via Cape Town 
to explore the Antarctic regions lying south of South Africa. The 
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expedition itself was financed by Mr Lars Christensen , the same man 
whose quest for a licence to conduct whaling activities in West 
Antarctica was discussed in the 1926 Imperial Conference. Contact was 
made with Bouvet Island and the Norwegian flag was hoisted. It was 
decided the following year that a meteorological station would be 
established on the island. This was announced 
newspaper "Tldens Tegn" of 4 September 1928. 16 A 
in the Norwegian 
month later the 
British government responded with some concern as it noted that with 
"the British Dominions of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand 
projecting down towards the Antarctic continent, [this] gave the 
British Empire a very special interest in the political rights over 
those areas, particularly in view of the growing disposition of the 
Dominions to interest themselves in the disposal of Antarctic 
territories.,,17 However the Briti sh did state that "His Majesty's 
Government would have no hesitation in recognising the Norwegi an 
sovereignty of the island . . . ,,18 Concern over the claim did focus on 
the whaling rights gained by such an acquisition and discussion of 
future talks on the issue developed from this. 19 Once a Norwegian 
claim to Bouvet Island was recognised, further developments occurred 
which more directly concerned the South African government. 
The first of these developments was the statement of policy on 
Norwegian claims to Antarctic and Sub-Antarctic territory within 
proximity of South African shores. In response to the Norwegian claim 
to Bouvet Island the British government sought the position of the 
South African government. As it appeared likely to the British from 
this first step that the Norwegian government intended eventually to 
annex the sector between Enderby Land and Coats Land on Antarctica, 
13 
concern arose over whether South Africa would want to lay claim to 
that same area, then known as the South African sector. The response 
of the South African government was: 
His Majesty's Government in the Union of South Africa had agreed 
in 1929, when the attention of Norway was first directed to this 
sector by His Majesty's Minister at Oslo, that, in the event of 
territory there being claimed for Norway, no grounds existed on 
which objection could be taken. (20) 
But this view of sector claims was more clearly stated in 1935 when it 
was explained in a confidential memorandum to the Secretary of Finance 
that: 
So far as the South African Sector is concerned the British 
Government left it free for the activities of the Norwegian 
Government, and upon being asked whether we had any objections if 
Norway proceeded to annex that land the Union Government replied 
that there would be no grounds for raising objections to such a 
course by the Norwegian Government. (21) 
Thus the government's first position on rights to what was now 
identified as the South African Sector was set. By the mid-1930s, 
however, changing circumstances created conditions for a 
reconsideration of the policy. 
Lars Christensen mounted further Antarctic scientific expeditions 
after 1928 in 1930-31 and again in 1933-34. 22 During the latter 
expedition extensive scientific observations were taken, particularly 
along the coast off eastern Antarctica. 23 In addition to this, by the 
end of 1934 Japanese whaling activities in Antarctic waters had come 
to the direct attention of the South African authorities. 24 In the 
confidential memorandum of 26 March 1935 mentioned above, the existing 
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South African position was now being questioned. Specific references 
were made to the Norwegian activities in addition to the statement 
that " it is reported that eager eyes in the East [Japan! are also 
being cast on the South African Sector.,,25 From this the memorandum 
went on to discuss in detail the possibilities available to South 
Africa for annexing the so-called South African Sector of Antarctica. 
Under the section entitled "Justification for annexing the Sector in 
the name of South Africa", the view of the External Trade Relations 
Committee was explained as: 
1. Opportunities for scientific research and meteorological 
observations. 
2. Possibi lities of revenue from the whaling and sealing 
industries. 
3. The land is stated to be rich in minerals, guano and 
phosphates. 
The geographical continuity of the Sector would undoubtedly 
be sufficient justification for annexation by the Union 
Government. 
In vielv of the foregoing it would appear to be a matter of 
some urgency if the Union is to alter its policy with regard to 
the Antarctic. (26) 
Thus a reconsideration of previous policy was in the works. It is 
important to note that at this point discussions were going on amongst 
the bureaucrats of several departments and very few references are 
found in the documents to the relevant Ministers of the departments 
involved. The abovementioned memorandum further goes into detail as 
to the means by which South Africa could gain support for its 
political claims : for example, sending expeditions under the auspices 
of the government;27 conducting whaling activities in the vicinity of 
the South African Sector,28 and direct notification to the Norwegian 
government of proceedings in the South African Sector of concern to 
South Africa, particularly the Norwegians' allowing of Japanese 
15 
whaling activities, which South Africa was not inclined to allow. 29 At 
the end of the memorandum the recommendation read as follows: 
Taking into consideration the various factors involved the 
Department recommends that, in the event of the Union Government 
deciding, as a matter of policy, to annex the land in the South 
African Sector in the name of the Union Government, Captain 
Shannon's suggestion be followed and the Discovery Committee 
approached for the loan of the vessel "Discovery II" and its 
personnel to make an expedition to the Antarctic for this 
purpose. The cost of the expedition is estimated at approximately 
£10,000. 
The whole question is due for discussion by the External 
Relations Committee at their next meeting and in the meantime, 
the Secretary for External Affairs has no doubt taken the 
opportunity afforded by the recent visit to Pretoria by Vice-
Admiral Evans, of discussing the matter with him. (30) 
Following discussions of this issue in the External Trade Relations 
Committee of the Department of Commerce and Industries, the matter 
passed to the Department of External Affairs. Serious interest from 
then on appeared to be developing in the departments involved, as was 
a sense of urgency. For example, in light of the recommendation from 
the memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary for 
External Affairs, Dr H 0 J Bodenstein, was given seven copies of the 
Commerce memorandum as well as information that the research vessel 
'Discovery II' would vi sit Cape Town en route to the Antarctic. 31 
Although by 1935 British policy continued to do all that was possible 
to resist an encroachment on the three sectors formally claimed by 
Commonwealth nations,32 Britain also continued to forestall other 
claims on the two remaining unclaimed sectors of Antarctica. This 
point was made in a memorandum circulated in the Department of 
External Affairs dated 30 January 1935. 33 In response, discussion 
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again occurred which recommended a possible review by the Union of its 
policy and that geographical contiguity would "undoubtedly be 
sufficient justification,,34 to annex the South African Sector. 
However, while it was argued that existing policy on annexing 
Antarctic territory should be reconsidered, the emphasis for such was 
targeted specifically on a "purely economic basis". 35 
Further concerns over economic possibilities in the Antarctic appear 
to have been the main source of interest in the development of policy. 
Japanese and Norwegian whaling activities were continually being 
referred to the Department of External Affairs as well as directly to 
the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs}6 though the 
responsibility of such fell under the portfolio of Commerce and 
Industries. 3? At the first comrrittee discussion on reconsideration of 
the existing policy held by the External Trade Relations Committee on 
20 June 1935, concern again rose over Norwegian, but particularly 
Japanese, whaling activities in the seas south of South Africa. 
However, from this same meeting, the Secretary of External Affairs 
pOinted out that, up to then, the government did not feel inclined to 
do anything about the existing policy but there was increased interest 
in the matter by the Prime Minister (who was also Minister of External 
Affairs). Consideration was also given to the progress of other 
Commonwealth claims in Antarctica. The minutes concluded: 
The Chairman then stated that the Committee seemed to be of the 
opinion that the Union should take steps to establish itself in 
the Antarctic, someone should be asked to explore the possibility 
of making use of some whaling boat proceeding to the Antarctic. 
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Dr Rossouw undertook to do this and stated that he would get in 
touch with Dr C von Bonde, Director of Fisheries Survey, in 
regard to this matter. (38) 
The Fisheries Survey Division responded on 14 August 1935 stating that 
a whaling vessel could not be obtained, that the Naval Commander-in-
Chief at Simonstown was returning to Britain and that an answer would 
be needed from his successor. 39 This response does mention that the 
Admiral had discussed sending a ship to the Antarctic previOusly.40 
Furthermore, continued concern over Norwegian acceptance of Japanese 
whaling activities in the Antarctic was viewed as a growing potential 
problem. Most important, however, was the recommendation in the 
Fisheries Survey response: 
It seems as if the time has arrived for South Africa to establish 
herself as the Falkland Islands, Australia and New Zealand have 
done. The Falkland Islands government derives a handsome revenue 
from whaling paid by Norwegians even although it may be argued 
that it is an "ex gratia" payment. (41) 
However, the Fisheries Survey still had doubts on South African rights 
to the "South African Sector" in light of the extensive Norwegian 
activities in that area as well as economic repercussions from 
assertions of claims over the sector. 
There is no doubt that something in the nature of placation may 
be necessary with the Norwegians who must not be antagonized 
owing to the advantageous commercial activities of their whalers 
in South African Ports. (42) 
In the final recommendations, then, the Director of Fisheries Survey . 
stated: 
I am of the oplnlon that the government should make a strong 
effort to establish itself in the "South African Sector". (43) 
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By 3 September 1935 the sense of urgency had increased amongst the 
government departments, as the issue was to come up before the cabinet 
soon. 44 On 12 September the captain of the research ship R.S 
"Africana", although not well aware of the political developments on 
the South African Sector, sent recommendations on the feasibility of 
planting a South African flag in the sector. 45 The third 
recommendation looked at the possibilities of using the British 
research vessel "Discovery II" particularly in light of what was 
viewed as the inadequacies of South African vessels. The following 
month, the government took a serious interest in this option as it was 
notified that the "Discovery II" was scheduled to arrive in Cape Town 
around the 3 November en route to the Antarctic. 46 The other research 
ship, "William Scoresby", whose use was suggested in previous 
, 
memoranda discussing South African expeditions to the Antarctic, left 
Britain on 22 October 1935 and was scheduled to reach Cape Town "on or 
about the 22nd November".47 Both ships, it should be noted, were going 
specifically to conduct experiments in whale marking and counting and 
no mention of landing on Antarctica was made in any of the dispatches 
to the South African government. As correspondences in early 1936 
within the government show, the South African government did not make 
any decision on using either ship to institute any claims. 48 
In 1936 the government's position on the Antarctic Sector remained 
ambiguous49 though it learned that the two research vessels would 
again be returning to the Antarctic towards the end of the year. 50 The 
only action documented for 1936 is the request for arrangements to be 
made to meet the ships on their arrival in Cape Town. 
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In 1937 the Antarctic issue was brought up before the Committee on 
Polar Questions in the Imperial Conference held that year. South 
Africa, along with the delegations of four other Commonwealth members, 
discussed a series of issues concerning British Commonwealth claims to 
Antarctic territory, research activity conducted under the auspices of 
the Discovery Committee, and meteorological studies for weather 
forecasting developments. 51 In respect of the Discovery Committee, two 
recommendations appeared: 
(1) in the meantime the Dominions concerned should be kept in as 
close touch as possible with the work of the Discovery 
Committee and should for that purpose be invited to appoint 
representatives from their permanent staffs in London to 
attend meetings of the Committee. 
(2) the United Kingdom government should explore the possibility 
of inviting the interested Dominion governments to select a 
few scientific or other workers to accompany the "Discovery 
II" during her next cruise. (52) 
In response to the fi rst recommendation, the Department of External 
Affairs decided that the Acting Political Secretary from South 
Africa's permanent staff in London would attend the Discovery 
Committee meeting as the representative for the Union government. 53 
The government was informed by its High Commissioner in London on 7 
September 1937 that, if it intended sending a man on the next voyage 
of "Discovery II", the ship would leave Cape Town to the Antarctic on 
or about 14 November 1937.54 Furthermore, it was desired that the man 
should be a marine biologist, oceanologist, oceanographer or a 
meteorologist, although an observer could be sent instead to "assess 
probable value of the work for His Majesty's government in the Union 
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of South Africa". 55 The selection of a man eventually fell to the 
Department of Commerce and Industries, whose representative at the 
1937 Imperial Conference, A J Stals, stressed the benefits which could 
be gained by sending a man on the "Discovery 11".55 Significantly, 
Stals made an interesting point in his concluding paragraph when he 
stated : 
You will notice that I have not touched on the question raised 
some years ago in regard to territorial sovereignty. (57) 
The issue of setting a formal claim then appeared to have been shelved 
for a while, in his view, in late 1937. 
In September 1937 the search for a meteorologist by the Department of 
Commerce and Industries58 came to a quick conclusion when in response 
to such inquiries the Director and Chief Meteorologist of the 
Department of Irrigation suggested that a marine biologist would be 
more useful. 59 
The next person sought then was a marine bioiogist50 but this too was 
dropped almost immediately when it was agreed that there were no 
qualified marine biologists suitable for the expedition. 51 Thus, in 
early October the Department of Commerce and Industries, not having 
found suitable candidates to join the "Discovery II" expedition, asked 
the Department of External Affairs to thank the Discovery Committee 
for its invitation and inform them of the circumstances52 which was 
promptly done. 53 
A year later the Department of Commerce and Industries decided to send 
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an observer on the following "Discovery II" expedition of 1938. 64 A 
junior technical officer in the division of fisheries, Mr R R Charter, 
was chosen to join the 28-day "Discovery II" expedition to the 
Antarctic scheduled to leave Cape Town on 18 October. 65 The purpose of 
this cruise was aimed at further collection of information on whales, 
which the Union government found to be potentially useful. 66 Approval 
from the Minister of Commerce and Industries was announced to the 
Discovery Committee on 30 September 1938 for Charter to go as an 
observer on 18 October. 67 
On 11 October 1938 correspondence was sent to the Director of 
Irrigation from the office of the Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries which sought to look again for a qualified meteorologist 
to be sent in the future. 68 The view appears then that South African 
involvement in Antarctic research would continue beyond Charter's 
appointment. By 25 October the Director of Irrigation initiated his 
own inquiries to the Discovery Committee in London into the 
participation of a South African meteorologist in the 1939 
expedition. 69 
Charter returned to Cape Town in mid-November 1938, and a written 
report was submitted by him to the Division of Fisheries and forwarded 
to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries on 18 November. 70 Further 
South African Antarctic research through participation in Discovery 
Committee expeditions hit a snag at this pOint, however. The South 
African government was informed by its political secretary71 on 15 
November 1938 that owing to financial problems further expeditions 
could not be carried on without outside funds, specifically from the 
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Dominion governments in the southern hemisphere. 72 The response from 
the Department of Commerce and Industries after consideration of what 
had been gained by the Discovery Committee expeditions overall was : 
From the whaling aspect I hardly feel that there is any call to 
render financial aid as desired. Furthermore, it is hardly 
appropriate that this department should have to decide upon the 
desirability of future expeditions to study hydrographical, 
meteorological and geological problems in Antarctica. I 
understand from External Affairs that they have not approached 
any other department; I consider that the Hydrological Survey 
Section of Defence and the Chief Meteorologist should have been 
approached direct. (73) 
What became evident here, more than commercial interests, was that 
the Department of Commerce and Industries, although the main 
department concerned with developing Antarctic policy, felt that it 
should not be the sole department handling the issue . The Department 
of Commerce and Industries, however, pursued the matter further with 
the whaling companies which had received information from the 
Discovery Committee expeditions. Their responses, specifically to 
whaling activities, were reported by the Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries to the Secretary for External Affairs as: 
The tenor of the replies I have received is to the effect that, 
while the reports of the Discovery Committee have always been 
perused with great interest, the companies can hardly make the 
statement that these reports have always been of any appreciable 
benefit to them in the conduct of their whaling operations in the 
Antarctic. (74) 
From this information the Secretary for Commerce and Industries 
concluded: 
I am under the circumstances not able to recommend that 
financial aid should be rendered by the Union government to 
retain the "Discovery II" in commission, i.e., not from the 
pelagic whaling point of view. (75) 
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The Secretary for Commerce and Industries did however seriously 
qualify his recommendation earlier in the letter by stating: 
I am in a position to furnish you with a recommendation only in 
regard to the whaling aspect , but I would suggest that the 
Hydrological Survey ·Section of the Department of Defence , and 
also the Chief Meteorologist, be approached by you with a view to 
obtaining their comments. (76) 
Hence, from the interest point of view of the department coordinating 
Antarctic policy, Antarctic scientific research was seen as 
immaterial. From the viewpoint of the other two groups listed in 
the above letter, the situation was significantly different. In the 
statement by the Secretary for External Affairs to the South African 
High Commissioner in London regarding the funding of the Discovery 
Committee's future expeditions, the position of the Chief 
Meteorologist was put forward: 
also, 
The Chief Meteorologist states, however, that the meteorological 
data received from the Discovery II during her voyages is of 
great value in drawing up the daily weather forecasts in the 
Union . . . (77) 
Of greater and more permanent value, however, are the studies 
that the ship has made of drift ice and pack ice in the far south 
little doubt can exist as to the assistance these 
observations of the ice will provide in making long term weather 
forecasts, and it is felt that it would indeed be a great pity if 
the observation work in this sphere should now have to be 
discontinued. (78) 
The Chief Meteorologist further went on to discuss the idea of the 
establishment of a meteorological station on the South Atlantic island 
of Tristan da Cunha. This is significant as it is one of the earliest 
references to the establishment of a research station in Sub-Antarctic 
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areas. South Africa itself would eventually establish not only such 
stations but claims to Sub-Antarctic islands on which extensive 
research in a wide range of areas of research would develop on into 
the present. 
Along with other information on the ties to the Meteorological 
Department79 and Antarctic activities. the Union government asked the 
High Commissioner in London to 
ascertain from the appropriate authorities the amount of the 
contribution that would be expected from the Union of South 
Africa to ensure a continuation of the ordinary services rendered 
by the Discovery. together with an estimate of any additional sum 
that may be required to provide for a regular service to Tristan 
da Cunha of the nature indicated above. (80) 
The opinions of the Defence Department's Hydrological Survey Section 
did not appear in this or other correspondence. 81 In the end. a 
definite answer was not given in respect of what South Africa was 
expected to contribute. This was in part due to the Australian 
government's temporary withdrawal from the 1940/41 "Discovery" 
expedition in early 1939 and logistical delays in organizing the 
purpose of that expedition.82 
At the same time as the South African government was still discussing 
funding further "Discovery" expeditions. the opportunity of 
establishing an unchallenged claim to the South African sector of 
Antarctica disappeared. By Royal Decree. dated 14 January 1939. the 
Norwegian government placed the coastal areas between the British and 
Australian Antarctic territories under their control. In brief. the 
claim was based on the principle of discovery and occupation. 
Furthermore. concern was developing over German activities in that 
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part of the Antarctic. The South African government did not receive 
formal announcement of the Norwegian annexation until 30 March 1939.83 
Response to the claim was slow and questions over past notions of a 
possible South African annexation appeared unenthusiastic. 84 By 18 
April, the chances of pressing any claim effectively ended with an 
internal memorandum to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries to be 
passed to the Minister which read: 
In brief the position is that the Norwegian government has by 
Royal Decree acquired sovereignty over the South African Sector 
of the Antarctic. This claim is being formally recognised by the 
United Kingdom government. The opportunity offering to the Union 
government to acquire this terri tory therefore no longer 
exists. (85) 
Furthermore, the British government interpreted the Union government's 
position earlier in the 1934 Imperial Conference as follows: 
His Majesty's government in the Union of Sout h Africa had agreed 
in 1929, when the attention of Norway was first directed to this 
sector by His Majesty's minister at Oslo, that, in the event of 
territory there being claimed for Norway, no grounds existed on 
which objection could be taken. (86) 
It thus immediately recognized the Norwegian annexation of the South 
African Sector. 87 It should be noted, however, that this was not the 
end of South African interest in staking a claim to the South African 
Sector. A top secret 1958 South African government memorandum entitled 
The Union and Antarctic made the following note: 
Union's desire to state claim. On 27 December 1946 the Union 
speclfically raised with the United Kingdom the question of the 
possibility of our staking a claim in that portion of Antarctica 
lying immediately south of the Cape. As it happened, this lay 
within the territory claimed by Norway, whose annexation had been 
tacitly agreed to by the Union in 1928-29. There was no reaction 
to our query, and although the proposal was examined 
departmentally at irregular intervals (vide e.g. Minister Louw's 
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office note of 27th February 1955 - Inspired apparently by Dr 
Schumann - in which he mooted a Norwegian surrender of part of 
that sector to the Union) the matter has been officially dormant 
to this day. (88) 
From this pOint on the South African government concentrated on the 
development of policy focussing on South African involvement in 
research in the southern ocean and Antarctic. South African concern 
and interest in the Discovery Committee was met with appreciation89 
but the future of the RRS "Discovery II" remained uncertain into 1939. 
In a letter from the chairman of the Discovery Committee to the 
Political Secretary for the Union of South Africa in London, a 
detailed analysis of South Africa's interests in the Discovery 
Committee expeditions was discussed90 but future expeditions were 
effectively put on indefinite hold. 91 
In communications from the Discovery Committee to the South African 
government in 1939, most discussion focussed on the different options 
available for study related to South African interests in Antarctic 
waters. On 14 October 1939 the South African government was Informed 
that because of the circumstances facing the Discovery Committee, its 
activities were suspended for the time being. As things turned out, the 
Discovery Committee remained suspended for most of the duration of 
World War I I. 
Here therefore ended the first phase of the establishment and hesitant 
development of South Africa's policy toward the Antarctic. While the 
period was dominated by questions over pursuing economic interests 
such as whaling, potentially laying claim to the "South African" 
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sector of Antarctica. and sending scientific personnel to the 
Antarctic. very few tangible results were evident in the end. This 
period of policy development was dominated by bureaucrats mainly in 
the departments of Commerce and Industries and External Affairs. 
Little ever reached the attention of the responsible ministers for 
decisions. which were left to the discretion of the department 
secretaries. At best. Antarctic policy was a minor issue during this 
period. with the protection of economic interests in the southern 
oceans dominating the policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Pursuit of Interests in an Antarctic Policy by the 
Union of South Africa. 1945-1958 
For most of World War II. South Africa's Antarctic policy formulation 
activities were effectively suspended. It was not until the next 
Discovery Committee meeting held on 6 June 1944. that its members 
concluded that Antarctic research should continue. Funding then became 
the main concern. as it was noted that: 
The sources from which funds were previously obtained no longer 
exist and the question of contributions by the United Kingdom and 
Dominion governments would now have to be considered. (1) 
On 21 September 1944 the Discovery Committee was informed of the 
formation of the South African Antarctic Research Committee (SAARC) by 
the Geological Society of South Africa (GSSA) although it was not. at 
first. recognised nor assisted by the government. 2 Along with the 
objectives of sending a South African expedition to Antarctica after 
the war and establishing a base on the Antarctic continent. the SAARC 
also sought to establish weather stations on Bouvet Island and Gough 
Island. 3 
The response of the government was at first to encourage the SAARC's 
activities but no actual recognition came until after the war. 4 As for 
the proposed South African expedition to Antarctica. the SAARC showed 
interest in sending it to the Weddell Sea. 5 Interest for such an 
expedition came from the Discovery Committee on 6 December 1944 and 
further information was sought from the South African Geological 
Society.6 In terms of government interest in the expedition. most 
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government departments felt that the expedition could contribute 
little or nothing to their needs. 7 
At the meeting of 16 January 1945, the "Discovery" Committee agreed 
that it could make the ship "Discovery II" available for the proposed 
South African expedition. However, a recommendation was made that 
geology and meteorology would be the main areas of research under such 
an expedition . Other recommendations were proposed by the Discovery 
Committee but the idea of the establishment of a meteorological base 
at Bouvet Island was viewed pessimistically.8 
By 23 February 1945 the GSSA stated that it would initiate the steps 
for actual sponsorship of the expedition and for it to take place some 
time in the years 1946 to 1948 . In line with the recommendations of 
the Discovery Committee, the GSSA agreed that the focus of the 
expedition would be geological and meteorological studies but also 
include geographic studies. 9 However, less than two months later, the 
South African government changed its attitude towards the idea of a 
South African Antarctic expedition. Following cost studies, the 
government stated on 16 April 1945 that 
... the Union Government is unlikely to support this proposal 
unless it can be co-ordinated with expeditions from other 
countries with interests in the Antarctic. The cost to South 
Africa would be quite considerable and would not warrant an 
expedition for geological purposes only while to extend the 
expedition to cover meteorological information would necessitate 
international co-operation so that the meteorological information 
obtained is not restricted to a small portion of the Antarctic 
continent . (10) 
Thus it appeared that the South African government found the financial 
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burdens too costly to justify mounting a national expedition for the 
time being. Joint expeditions, however, were seriously recommended to 
the "Discovery" Committee's scientific subcommittee at its meeting on 
15 May 1945. 11 Furthermcre, the South African government was informed 
by its High Commission in London that 
the investigations of the Discovery Committee have hitherto been 
financed from the Falkland Islands Research and Development Fund 
but the funds available to the Committee from this source will 
be fully absorbed in the completion of the present programme of 
work. Dominion governments will, therefore, be expected to make a 
financial contribution commensurate with the importance to them 
of the Discovery's Research programme. (12) 
Although the government appears to have made a definite statement on 
postponement of a South African expedition, the South African 
Antarctic Research Committee was apparently not informed of the 
situation. On 29 May 1945 the chairman of the SAARC, L C King, 
solicited the government to obtain a 1000-ton whaling ship so that an 
expedition could depart from South Africa around December 1946. 13 This 
solicitation itself was made to the Prime Minister's adviser who also 
appeared unaware of the change of POlicy.14 
Nevertheless, the decision to suspend the expedition remained. Talk of 
sending an expedition to the Antarctic persisted, however, and efforts 
continued to be made for joint ventures. By 1946 a number of proposals 
were being pursued by the GSSA as possible ventures for South Africa 
to organize or consider. Attention was first placed on conducting a 
feasibility study on the previously proposed South African expedition 
to the Weddell Sea (1944). At this stage, however, the direction of 
the proposed Weddell Sea expedition began to move away from the 
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concept of a "national" expedition. The SAARC completed its study into 
the proposed South African Antarctic expedition and put forward a 
series of recommendations. In particular, references were made to 
the geological connections to the area of the Weddell Sea and South 
Africa in relation to the Continental Drift theories. Because of these 
theories, geology ranked highest in priority of areas of research. 
Geography, geophysics, meteorology and oceanography were the other 
areas put forward as being worthy of study. Details concerning the 
duration and conduct of the expedition were also given in relation to 
the Antarctic mainland and Bouvet Island. The size of the expedition, 
equipment, ship, cost, sources of revenue, and procedures to execute 
the expedition were also set down. 15 Df particular note is the setting 
of preliminary estimates for the proposed expedition at £ 79 600 in 
1946 along with an itemized breakdown of the costs. 16 However, in July 
1946 South Africa became the first country to propose 
internationalizing research in the Antarctic by expanding its proposal 
for an expedition. 
A change of attitude from the South African government was recorded by 
the GSSA as: 
At the conclusion of (World War III hostilities, the further 
proposal emanated from Field-Marshal Smuts that the scope of the 
research should be extended to embrace a "Southern Polar Mass" 
with participation by a number of nations interested in research 
problems of the Southern Hemisphere. This was the proposal to be 
submitted to the Empire Scientific Conference in July 1946. (17) 
That proposal was then elaborated : 
that countries with scientific interests in the Antarctic: Great 
Britain, United States of America, Norway, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Chile and the Argentine, 
should be Invited to co-operate by establishing one or more land-
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bases each in sectors which they control, or in which they may be 
permitted to participate. (18) 
Thus, South Africa in effect became the first country to make an open 
formal proposal for international co-operation in Antarctic research. 
The proposal submitted by the South African delegation to the Empire 
Scientific Conference went into considerable detail as to dates, 
control by governments, proposed base sites, an outline of scientific 
research programmes and the size of land-station parties. 19 From the 
proposed South African expedition a memorandum was also drawn up on a 
proposed International (United Nations) Antarctic Expedition, in which 
credit for the idea was identified as follows: 
The idea arose out of, and is complementary to, the "Proposed 
South African Antarctic Research Expedition to Weddell Sea", of 
which Dr L C King is the originator. (20) 
The details of this proposed expedition, however, aimed at the use of 
eight aircraft carriers or more from which such an expedition would be 
conducted. The significance of this is that it showed that South 
Africa advanced the idea of broader international co-operation in 
Antarctic research from the immediate post-war period. 
As for the idea of the "International Polar Year" proposed by the 
GSSA, the SAARC minutes of 13 September 1946 noted the report of Dr 
B F J Schonland on the proposal as follows: 
Dr B F J Schonland stated that he had asked that the Question of 
holding an International Polar Year be placed on the agenda of 
the recent Commonwealth Scientific Conference, but on reaching 
London, had discovered this item had been omitted from the 
agenda. He had, therefore, arranged that a meeting on this 
subject be held at the Scott Polar Research Institute which had 
been attended by all available experts from Great Britain ... it 
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appeared that two undertakings were considered at present more 
important than a Polar Year. (21) 
Although these two other undertakings, namely the setting up of 
permanent stations in the British Antarctic Sector and a proposed 
Anglo-Scandinavian expedition to the Atlantic Sector (New 
Schwabenland) of Antarctica, took precedence, the minutes stated 
further that 
While the meeting had agreed that the question of a Polar Year 
would have to be left to the meteorologists, it was thought that 
it could not take place before 1950. It would be useful if, in 
the meantime, South Africa were to consider: 
(i) sending some young scientists to the Falkland Island 
Dependencies for training in Antarctic work and possibly 
later to undertake the staffing of one Antarctic station; 
(ii) participating in the Schwabenland proposal. (22) 
As for the proposed South African expedition, it was recommended that: 
Plans for a purely South African expedition to the Antarctic be 
held in abeyance. (23) 
Thus, from this meeting came the end of the idea of sending a South 
African expedition for the time being, but South Africa was encouraged 
to participate in jOint ventures with Great Britain and the proposed 
New Schwabenland expedition. The idea of setting up a permanent 
station at Bouvet Island was also scrapped at this time. 24 
The GSSA responded on 24 September 1946 by approaching the CSIR to 
investigate the possibilities of South African participation in the 
proposed British-Scandinavian expedition to Coats Land and New 
Schwabenland. 25 In early October the office of the British High 
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Commission in Pretoria requested the use of one or two South African 
geologists and a meteorologist to send to the Falkland Island 
Dependencies at the end of the month. 26 Owing to the short notice and 
personnel problems South Africa was unable to send a meteorologist27 • 
but a geologist. Mr Raymond J Adie. was sent. 28 
Participation in the New Schwabenland expedition appeared less 
hopeful. however . when the President of the CSIR stated that his 
Council had 
decided that it could not recommend that the government should 
bear any of the expenses involved in an expedition of this kind. 
(29) 
Talk of an "Empire Expedition to Antarctica" also appeared and the 
SAARC showed keen interest in becoming involved. 3D The SAARC finally 
nominated two of its members - a geologist (Dr L C King. the SAARC 
Chairman) and a meteorologist (Mr D L Niddrie) - to participate in the 
British-Scandinavian Expedition at the end of 1948. 31 
South African activities in the Sub-Antarctic regions took off at this 
time also. Of greatest importance were the instructions by Prime 
Minister J C Smuts after World War II to annex and occupy Marion and 
Prince Edward Islands. 32 As a result. landing parties from the 
H.M.S.A.S. "Transvaal" formally annexed the two islands. Marion Island 
on 29 December 1947 and Prince Edward Island on 4 January 1948. The 
establishment of a weather station on Marion Island soon followed. 
which has been maintained ever since. 33 The move to establishing South 
African bases had begun and would expand to Gough Island and. finally. 
the Antarctic mainland. 
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The first mention of sending expeditions to Gough Island and the 
Antarctic mainland appeared in March 1951 but the problems of costs 
continued to bedevil their realization. 34 Links to other Sub-Antarctic 
islands such as Tristan da Cunha were also expanded through shipping 
services linking them to Cape Town,35 although South Africa had 
maintained a weather station there since 1942. 36 South African 
operation of the weather station on Gough Island began in May 1956 
when it took over from the British-backed Gough Island Survey of 
1955/56. 37 It was not until the 1960s, however, that South Africa 
finally established its own foothold on the' continent with the 
acquisition of a weather station from the Norwegians on the Queen Maud 
Land coast. Hence, the period of the late 1940s through the 1950s not 
only saw South Africa making direct contacts with the Antarctic in 
terms of its own scientific expeditions but also saw its involvement 
in moves to internationalize Antarctic research. 
While South Africa had considered and made some motions to 
internationalizing Antarctic research as early as 1946, other 
countries soon followed with similar ideas. Argentina, for example, 
proposed on 8 February 1948 an international conference on the 
Antarctic. 38 Later that same year South Africa was informed of an 
official proposal for an international conference by the United 
States: 
In July 1948 the United Kingdom advised us that the Americans had 
informed them of a deciSion to put forward officially the 
countries interested in Antarctica (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, 
Argentina, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom) a plan 
for international trusteeship of Antarctica wgich would cover the 
continent itself and all islands south of 60 except the South 
Shetland and South Orkney groups (claimed by the United Kingdom). 
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The U.N. would jOin this group of countries as an administering 
authority of the trust territory. Each state in turn would act as 
spokesman in the Trusteeship Council. A commission would be 
created to co-operate with the U.N. specialized agencies etc. 
(39) 
Two pOints were significant here. First, that an official approach was 
made to certain governments identified as having vested interests in 
Antarctica and second, that it would act in co-operation with the 
United Nations. Both points would eventually be incorporated into a 
working plan which would include and affect South Africa in different 
ways over time. 
The issue at the time of the American proposal centred on the 
situation of territorial claims in Antarctica, but the American 
proposal also sought to promote international co-operation in 
scientific investigation and research. 40 As regards territorial claims 
in the Antarctic, South Africa put forward its views thus: 
Per circular telegram of 9th March, 1948, the Union explicitly 
stated that "the continent itself is unoccupied res nullius and 
as such can be made the subject of special ad hoc international 
arrangements which could be altered from time to time ••• British 
claims should be distinguished from this continental aspect. 
Again in similar notes dated 5th November, 1948 to Australians, 
Norwegians, French, Argentines and Chileans we stated: "As you 
are aware, the Union has never advanced any claim to Antarctic 
territory most of which, in default of effective occupation can 
only be regarded as terra nullius." (41) 
The South Africans interpreted the British attitude towards the 
concept of the trusteeship as unfavourable in that 
The United Kingdom immediately referred the Americans to the 
grave dangers inherent in any trusteeship scheme for Antarctica 
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I.e. the intrusion of many countries including Russia in the 
area, and put forward a counter-proposal (previously vaguely 
mooted) for an 8-power condominium. (42) 
The response by the United States was a revised scheme for an 8-member 
condominium to operate over the same area as the trusteeship but with 
all claims merged and costs to be shared equally among the eight 
members. The United Kingdom did comment to the American government 
that there was some concern regarding South Africa's interests in 
Antarctica and its exclusion from the proposals. 43 
On the substance of the new American proposals, the South African 
government went along with the British attitude44 but " ... raised 
strong arguments against the Union's exclusion from the proposed 
authority,,45 as the Americans felt that It had, up to that pOint, 
shown insignificant interest In the Antarctic. The South African 
government approached the British government to see If it would 
support South African claims to participate In the discussions on the 
proposals. The South African government interpreted the British 
response thus: 
In August 1948 our High Commission in London reported that the 
United Kingdom government, while willing in principle to support 
the Union's claim to a say in the special regime proposed by the 
U.S. and while "fully recognising" the Union's interest in 
Antarctic matters, nevertheless felt that they could not support 
the Union's arguments for the following reasons: 
(i) The proposals were purely American and were not the result 
of prior consultation 
(ii) The Americans expressly limited the powers concerned to 
those with actual claims in Antarctica 
(Iii) Without having first had an opportunity to study the 
proposals in detail they felt it would be inopportune to 
raise the question of the Union's participation 
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(iv) The U.S. proposals were expressly framed to exclude the 
possibility of certain other powers, notably Russia, from 
claiming association with the "special regime" through the 
Securi ty Counci 1. (45) 
In response to the British position, the South African government 
directly approached the United States government using the following 
points to support its claims for participation: 
(i) As the U.S. proposals stood, the Union would be the only 
major power in the Southern Hemisphere which would have no 
say in the future administration of the Antarctic, whose 
character and scope was of vital interest to us 
(ii) our whaling interests 
(iii) the importance of meteorological stations 
(iv) our geographic situation, which made the Union a natural 
base for operations, commercial and otherwise in Antarctica 
and 
(v) our strategic interests. 
The embassy was requested not to press for formal inclusion and 
merely to stress our interest In developments. (46) 
On 5 October 1948, the South African Embassy in Washington reported 
that the United States government's position was as follows: 
(i) Americans looked on SA Interest with a good deal of sympathy 
and our approach was not unexpected. 
(ii) The Americans had originally raised the question of 
trusteeship over Antarctica when the Russians were refusing 
to co-operate in the Trusteeship Council. Russia had since 
taken her seat on the Trusteeship Council and the 
trusteeship proposal was accordingly dropped. 
(iii) The agreement had to be restricted to the 8-powers to 
exclude claims of outside powers such as Russia but it was 
the American intention to have a clause Inserted in the 
Constitution allowing for accession by other powers whom all 
the signatories felt had a definite interest in true 
Antarctic. This ought to take care of the Union's case. (47) 
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As to the attitude of the Antarctic territorial claimants towards 
South Africa's rights in the Antarctic, it was noted in a telegram 
dated 11 December 1948 to the South African government on the 
claimant's views on South African rights in the Antarctic that 
. .. the reactions of Australia, New Zealand, Argentine , Chile and 
Norway were favourable and the Union's claim to recognition of 
our interests generally accepted. The French intimated 
informally that they could see no reason why the Union should be 
excluded , but were not prepared to make a firm statement until 
such time as the matter of the "regime" was carried further. In 
essence the attitude of all could well be summed up as being 
sympathetic but non-committal. (48) 
But at the end of 1948, relations amongst the eight countries 
approached had changed regarding this and other issues. 
Like the South African proposal, the United States proposal failed to 
gain sufficient support, experiencing rejection from at least one of 
the countries approached. 49 Other attempts were made to bring about 
some form of international co-operation but it would not be until 
nearly a decade later that the first international effort in Antarctic 
research would materialise. 
In the 1950s, research expeditions to the Antarctic expanded as did 
South Africa's participation in them. As noted earlier, in its quest 
to expand meteorological research, South Africa took over operations 
on Gough Island in 1956. South Africa also participated in the 
Commonweal th Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 1955-58. As well as 
contributing £20,000 to the costs of the expedition,50 South Africa 
also sent a meteorologist, Mr J J "Hannes" Ie Grange, from the Weather 
Bureau in Pretoria. 51 Le Grange, in fact, became the first South 
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African ever to reach the South Pole. 52 These accomplishments aside, 
however, it was the International Geophysical Year which was to have 
the most far-reaching impact on the future of scientific and political 
developments in the Antarctic. 
In the planning stages of the Third International Polar Year, or the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-58 it was decided by its 
organisers to include Antarctica for international co-operation. South 
Africa became one of the twelve countries which participated in the 
Antarctic, placing its weather stations at Marion Island, Gough 
Island, and Tristan da Cunha under the auspices of the IGY effort. 
South Africa also participated, along with a number of other countries 
at the invitation of the United States, in the establishment and 
manning of the Little America V research station. The knowledge 
gained from the IGY was enormous and proved beneficial to a number of 
countries. For South Africa it set the foundations for its 
understanding of meteorological patterns directly affecting its 
western and southern coasts. In terms of its significance in 
international co-operation, the IGY was one of the largest scientific 
undertakings of all times. The study of Antarctica in the IGY itself 
was the impetus for yet further developments in international co-
operation in the Antarctic region. 
While it should be noted that the IGY offered a great opportunity for 
extensive international co-operation, this did not occur free of 
reservations. Throughout the 1950s extensive suspicions existed of 
Soviet interests and participation In Antarctic research and the 
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IGy.53 Attempts by other countries outside of those recognised to have 
interests in the Antarctic were also viewed with distrust, as was seen 
when India attempted to introduce the issue at the 11th .Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly.54 Any attempt to bring it into the 
sphere of the United Nations was opposed by a majority of countries at 
the time and the issue was withdrawn from the agenda. 55 
At this same time, to increase South African involvement in 
developments in Antarctica, some of the government departments began 
re-examining the idea of staking a territorial claim. It was agreed 
that a claim could only be established if it was assented to by 
bilateral agreement with those two countries (Australia and Norway) 
which controlled territory to which South Africa could hope to have 
any justifiable claim. Considerable discussion over what constituted 
sufficient foundation for acquisiti on of sovereignty developed in the 
1950s, particularly as the United States was itself in a quandary over 
whether or not to stake a claim. The threat that the staking of a 
claim in 1957 by the United States could lead to the same by the 
Soviet Union together with the possibility of the cessation of 
exchange of Antarctic geophysical information from the Soviets caused 
enough concern to have left both countries not pressing individual 
rights. But a number of people in the South African government felt 
that if it was going to acquire territorial rights in Antarctica it 
should do so before the Americans as it was feared that the United 
States would be less likely to accept new claims after its own 
interests had been met. 56 
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On 25 July 1957 the South African government was informed of British 
moves to push the idea of the establishment of an international 
authority to govern Antarctica. 57 In brief, the British proposal 
sought an authority based on those states with established claims58 
along with the United States which could act to curtail further 
possible claims from such countries as the Soviet Union. To formulate 
the British proposal, the views of the 'old' Commonwealth59 were 
obtained, although the positions of Canada and South Africa were not 
to be included in the authority.60 The attitude in the Commonwealth 
remained at the time of the proposal that there was insufficient 
justification for direct South African participation in the authority. 
The Union government, however, felt otherwise. 
The concern most eVident remained the urge to keep out Soviet 
participation from any proposed authority. To allow South Africa to 
participate in such an authority with less active Antarctic research 
participation than the Soviet Union was an obvious problem . Bringing 
in the involvement of other countries outside of those with claims but 
with varying degrees of interest (such as Belgium and Japan) also 
became a point of concern. The 'old' Commonwealth members saw the 
situation thus: 
The clear meteorological and strategic importance of the area to 
the Union was not disputed, but it was felt that to admit the 
Union would be to open the door to other countries which had not 
attempted to establish interests in Antarctica. (61) 
The South African Departments of Defence and Transport, on the other 
hand, responded to this viewpoint with the attitude that 
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it was of the utmost importance that the Union be associated with 
any future control and administration of Antarctica. (62) 
Thus the government departments concerned, particularly Transport 
which took over Antarctic interests from Commerce and Industries in 
the 1950s, began the co-ordination of policy to push South African 
rights in Antarctica. But objections to South African participation 
not only came from other 'old' Commonwealth members but continued from 
the United States government. 
On 7 September 1954 the South African government directly approached 
the British government as to their their willingness or otherwise to 
support South African claims to participate in the Antarctic authority 
discussions, either British or American. 63 The British response went 
along the lines that South Africa would have to state whether it 
supported the British proposal and was willing to submit to the 
financial requirements of those to be involved in the authority. The 
South African government responded that it could in principle support 
the British proposal so long as the British government formally 
accepted South African participation in the proposed authority. The 
South African attitude towards the American proposal was not 
supportive as it emphasized the amalgamation of Antarctic claims and 
the major role such would play, particularly should the United States 
advance its own territorial claim. As a South African territorial 
claim did not appear forthcoming, it felt it would obviously be 
excluded from the American plan. 64 
The British and Australian governments both agreed that South Africa 
had legitimate claims to partiCipate and agreed to make this point 
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known to the United States government. As for actual South African 
participation in the talks schedule for the end of September 1957, 
Austra l ia and New Zealand remained reluctant to push t he issue with 
the United States. In October South Africa interpreted the American 
view as follows: 
In October 1957 our Ambassador in Washington reported on the 
result of his conversations at the State Department, and 
indicated that, in effect, though the Americas were "sympathetic" 
and understood our arguments, they were nevertheless not 
convinced that they were of sufficient force to warrant the 
Union's inclusion in the discussion. The State Department 
spokesman also made a remark to the Ambassador which the latter 
had construed as indicating that one or more Commonwealth 
countries had not shown themselves enthusiastic about the Union's 
participation . (65) 
However, the South African government received confirmation from 
London that there was no reluctance from the Commonwealth members and 
that all supported South African rights to participate. The talks 
actually held in Washington in October 1957, however, only included 
representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand. The results of these talks were inconclUSive . 
In December 1957 these same countries again convened at the invitation 
of the American government to discuss new proposals for the 
establishment of an Antarctic Authority. Under these proposals South 
Africa would have probably participated only in an advisory 
capacity.66 Enquiries in early 1958 by the South African government to 
the British on their attitude toward South African participation 
revealed that South Africa's weakness lay in "the fact that the Union 
had no claim based on past performance in the region.,,67 By 10 March 
1958, the United States was again reconSidering its view on the issue. 
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The United States government informed South Africa that it was looking 
at the idea of a multilateral treaty outside the United Nations and 
consisting of countries with "direct substantial interests in the 
continent.,,58 Though South African interests were accepted by some as 
substantial, the lack of a record of discovery or exploration in 
Antarctica remained the main obstacle. But by 25 March the United 
States' government was seen by the South African authorities 
apparently to have 
discarded their previous doubts as to the eligibility of the 
Union (and Belgium and Japan) for incluSion at least amongst 
those countries whose comments are desired . IGY performance in 
Antarctica has been the decisive factor. (59) 
Thus, after a long process of trying to gain acceptability of its 
interests in Antarctica, South Africa firmly gained the right to 
participate in the proposed talks . The fact that the United States 
realised that the partiCipation of the Soviet Union was inevitable was 
seen by the South African government as one of the main reasons for 
the acceptance of South African participation. 70 In the end it was the 
twelve nations which co-operated in the IGY programme in the Antarctic 
to which the United States sent Aide Memoires for proposed talks on 
the future of Antarctica. 71 
In terms of the specifics of the Aide Memoires from the United States 
dated 25 March 1958, a number of pOints were brought up as to 
Antarctica's future scientific and political status. The United 
States government sought to establish a consensus agreed among the 
twelve governments approached for continued scientific investigation 
and co-operation in a free and peaceful atmosphere, and the 
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establishment of an international agreement to ensure such. The 
international agreement identified at that pOint as "a multilateral 
treaty among the countries having a direct interest in Antarctica" 
raised some concern with the South African authorities. 72 Questions 
over the general acceptance of South Africa "having a direct interest 
in Antarctica" had resulted in its non-invitation to previous 
Antarctic talks. 73 The use of the phrase "countries having a direct 
interest in Antarctica", coming from the United States government, 
therefore cast doubts about South Africa's status even though it had 
been formally invited to participate. 
The focus of the proposed Antarctic Treaty74 was said to include the 
following: the giving of legal effect to the principles set out in the 
treaty; the provision of some co-ordinating instrument for those 
principles set in the treaty; the desire that politics would not 
endanger the then existing situation in Antarctica ; and the linking of 
this to some co-operative interaction with the United Nations. 75 
Furthermore, a conference for the formalizing of such a multilateral 
treaty was discussed. Emphasis was laid on a long term solution to the 
questions surrounding Antarctica as well as upon the need to maintain 
strict secrecy on the subject. This last point was interpreted by the 
South African authorities to mean "to avoid unwelcome initiatives 
from other sources.,,76 
South Africa immediately responded to the American Aide Memoire with 
inquiries on 31 March 1958 to the other Commonwealth governments 
approached. 77 Responses were received the next day from London and 
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Canberra. 78 Since there had been previous official-level discussions 
on such proposals with the other Commonwealth members the American 
proposals were generally accepted. 79 However, the details in the 
response from Australia made a number of notable points. Firstly, 
South Africa was again reassured that Australia fully agreed to the 
inclusion of the Union In the consultations on Antarctica. Secondly, 
the inevitable fact that the Soviet Union could not, and would not, be 
excluded was spelt out clearly.80 Also both Australia and South Africa 
would strongly push non-militarization in Antarctica as both countries 
displayed concern over the threat of missile bases located within 
striking range of their territories. 81 With this information at hand 
South Africa began the process of formulating its reaction to the 
United States proposals, but, because a General Election was pending 
in 1958, it was felt that ministerial direction would likely be 
delayed.82 
By 2 June, the South African embassy appeared to have made some 
progress with the United States State Department. By conducting 
informal consultations which appeared to benefit the South African 
position, the embassy was able to obtain information on the reactions 
of other governments in response to the American proposals. The South 
African response had already been received by the embassy from 
Pretoria but any new information on the proposals was requested as 
early as possible. 83 Of particular interest to the Union government in 
relation to the informal consultation conducted by Mr J G Stewart, 
counsellor in the South African embassy, with Ambassador Daniels of 
the United States State Department was: 
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My /Mr Stewart's! observations lead me to the conclusion that in 
this procedure of his /Ambassadors Daniels! he has been almost as 
frank with us as he has been with the three other Commonwealth 
governments and, I think, franker than with most of the other 
governments. (84) 
Furthermore, in the light of such views 
I mention the foregoing because Mr Daniels has let me gain the 
impression that he thinks the United States and the Union may 
think similarly on many of the principles at issue; and that he 
hopes we shall find ourselves in a position to support the United 
States viewpoint. (85) 
With this position known, South Africa in effect was able to ensure 
its role in the consultations, as the United States would obviously 
have sought as much support for its proposals as possible. Along with 
these points a number of other issues were discussed by Messrs Stewart 
and Daniels. Firstly, that the conference should be held before the 
next United Nations General Assembly session. Secondly, it was 
expected that Washington would most likely be the venue of the 
consultations with slight possibilities of these being held in London 
or Argentina, but that the Chilean and Australian venues were 
unlikely. Thirdly, that the Soviet Union, the only country by then 
which had not yet responded, appeared to be likely to co-operate 
although the formal consultations would go ahead whether they or any 
other country responded unfavourably. Fourthly, details were given for 
a brief and direct treaty covering a number of issues including 
scientific research, territorial claims, peaceful use of Antarctica, 
freedom of access to Antarctica, establishment of an administrative 
instrument for Antarctica, voting rights and procedures within the 
administrative instrument for the 12 countries involved, duration of 
the treaty and the idea of a provision for withdrawal.86 The issue of 
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accession by other countries outside of the original twelve was also 
examined. This issue is of particular current interest in light of 
what has developed in the 1980s. In response to Mr Stewart's question 
on future rights of accession by other countries who did not co-
operate in the IGY in Antarctica, Ambassador Daniels was reported to 
have responded that 
... it might not be polite to exclude the possibilities of 
accessions given the principle of freedom of access for 
scientific co-operation. Looking at the question practically, 
however, he doubted whether any other countries would be able to 
show sufficient real and direct interest to qualify for 
accession. (87) 
However, Mr Stewart continued: 
He seemed to be hopeful that the Indians would accept the 
position (he implied also that it had not been without difficulty 
or argument that the State Department had arrived at their 
proposals which would exclude India). From his remarks I gained 
the impression that the United States position, at least on 
available data, is that India has no part to play in 
Antarctica . (88) 
This point was to change with time, however, and at present has become 
one of the major issues facing South Africa in the Antarctic Treaty 
system. 
On 2 June 1958 the Soviet Union transmitted its favourable response to 
the American proposals, together with a list of its own proposals. It 
was the last of the eleven recipients of an Aide Memoire to respond. 
Recognizing its minority pOSition in relation to the other 11 
countries involved , the Soviet Union put forward the idea of the 
inclusion of all interested countries, making particular reference to 
India in light of its 1956 proposal to include Antarctica on the 
United Nations agenda. 89 This the South Africans found "somewhat 
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disturbing" and deduced that: 
The Soviet suggestion is perhaps not entirely unexpected because 
in a conference as at present envisaged they would stand alone 
whereas if they are able to expand its membership somewhat to 
include some of the Soviet bloc and neutralist countries who 
would follow their lead they would, if necessary, be in a more 
favourable bargaining position. 
It is, however, not clear from the wording of the Soviet note 
whether they are making the participation of additional countries 
a condition for their participation in the proposed conference. 
From the way the note is worded it would appear that they are not 
doing so, and in this way the State Department intends to read it 
until it appears to the contrary. (90) 
It later transpired that this was not a condition for participation. 
On 13 June 1958 the first meeting of the twelve nations was he ld. 
Attending for South Africa were Mr J G Stewart, then Charge d'Affaires 
at the South Afr ican Embassy in Washington D.C., and a colleague from 
the embassy (identified as Mr Franklin). Several issues were discussed 
at this preliminary meeting. In brief, they included setting the date 
of the first official meeting for 24 June to allow for delegations to 
receive instructions from their governments and to set up a tentative 
schedule of meetings; the establishment of a rotating chairmanship; 
and that there would not be a pre-set agenda other than that the focus 
of discussions would be the creation of the proposed treaty.91 Also 
presented at these discussions was an informal list of articles 
proposed by the Australians, outlining nine possible points to be 
included. It was also agreed that no formal record would be kept of 
the initial discussions; that as little publicity as possible would be 
generated; and that a decision on the place and time of the proposed 
Antarctic Conference would be postponed until some headway had been 
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made in the preliminary talks. The Soviet Union did. however. bring up 
the issue of informing other countries who might wish to express an 
opinion on the issue of the Antarctic Conference. This was immediately 
opposed by the Chilean and Argentinean delegations on the grounds that 
they felt that the conference was to carryon with the work and co-
operation begun by the IGY and only the twelve countries who 
participated should be involved in the Antarctic Conference. An actual 
decision on this issue was postponed for discussion "at the first 
normal meeting of the preparatory group. ,,92 
The South African delegation received its instructions the next day on 
14 June. The main points put forward were that South Africa was not to 
"rubber stamp" whatever the conference produced; that South Africa 
would send a number of officials to join the delegation; that the 
government favoured that the treaty be finalised before the next 
United Nations General Assembly session; and that South Africa would 
be flexible on any venue chosen for the Antarctic Conference. In 
response to the proposals put forward by Ambassador Daniels. 93 the 
South African officials were in general agreement with most. The 
exceptions included concern over freezing claims to sovereignty. in 
that the Soviet position remained unclear. Should the issue need a 
firm decision the delegation was to contact Pretoria in good time with 
knowledge of the Australian and British position on the issue. Also. 
in terms of the voting procedure. South Africa preferred the 
unanimity principle over the two-thirds majority concept. Reservations 
did exist. however. on this. and further information was sought on 
th is point from the delegation. As for the idea of an indefinite 
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duration for the treaty the authorities in Pretoria expressed no 
opinion and awaited further direction from the delegation on this 
point. 94 
Concern was evident over the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal. While 
the South Africans preferred not to allow such action, they realised 
that, in the light of the Soviet withdrawal from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in the past, even though no such provisions existed 
in its constitution, sovereign entities should have the right of 
withdrawal. Against this, it was pOinted out that a fixed period 
treaty would act to discourage what was termed "irresponsible 
withdrawals" for the duration of the treaty. Thus either a withdrawal 
provision could be included or a fixed period treaty could be 
considered in dealing with withdrawals. In conclusion on this point, 
the South African government's attitude was: 
Whatever is decided at the conference about duration, a procedure 
for withdrawal could possibly be incorporated into the treaty to 
discourage irresponsible withdrawals - say a fairly lengthy 
period of notice, plus the approval of the controlling body. (95) 
It is unclear why such a detailed concern on this issue was made. In 
particular this could have reflected concern not so much over the 
possibilities of a Soviet withdrawal but over the future of South 
African participation. Only two years earlier South Africa 
"voluntarily" withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for reasons connected with 
interference in its domestic situation. 96 South Africa also withdrew 
from participation in the United Nations General Assembly for 3 years 
from 1955 to 1957 for similar reasons. Furthermore, within the next 
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decade South Africa would withdraw or be expelled from a number of 
other international bodies. As to whether the South African government 
was solely concerned over potential Soviet intentions or if there were 
other ulterior motives behind such a concern remains unknown. 
The last point discussed of Ambassador Daniels' preliminary 
views was accession to the treaty by other countries outside of the 
"twelve". The Department of External Affairs put its views thus: 
It must be stated again that it is our primary concern that the 
control body should not be expanded beyond the twelve countries 
directly interested, and we are opposed to any increase in this 
number being invited to the conference. We realize though in time 
other countries may establish an interest through their 
scientific activities and it is conceivable that we might wish to 
agree to others acceding and subscribing to the principles of the 
treaty. Provision should be made for such an eventuality. But we 
must do our utmost to secure that any provision for accession in 
the treaty ensures that accession is on our terms viz that 
acceding states do not become members of the control body. (97) 
Furthermore, information obtained from the Australian government on 
the attitude of the Indian government towards its exclusion from the 
meetings and conference was to the effect that 
[Indian Foreign Minister] Krishna Menon is apparently unconcerned 
about the exclusion of India from the twelve, and that it is 
chiefly the Permanent· Representative at the United Nations who 
has been upset. (98) 
In the period between this first gathering and the beginning of the 
first normal meeting on 24 June 1958, South Africa's representatives 
continued talks with other countries99 for preparatory information as . 
well as for further instructions to and from Pretoria. Once the normal 
meetings began, full details were reported back to Pretoria with 
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extensive exchanges continuing throughout the duration of the talks. 
The informal discussions themselves carried on from June 1958 until 
October 1959, whereupon the actual conference was convened from 15 
October until December, when the treaty was signed. An extensive 
list of issues concerned the participating states generally but a 
number had special significance for South Africa, in view of the 
rising condemnation of apartheid in other international bodies as well 
as later developments going on Into the 1980s. 
Amongst the general issues which were looked at during the period of 
the preparatory talks was whether such talks would include substantive 
issues instead of just focusing on Questions concerning procedure and 
principles. More specific Issues included access to the informal talks 
and the conference by other states outSide of the "twelve" 
participants; the Question of freezing the status QUo (territorial 
claims) and the positions of the states involved in the treaty; a 
definition of Antarctica ; discussions around the proposed list of 
articles and later the draft treaty prepared by the Australian 
government; and the two principles of "peaceful uses of Antarctica" 
and "scientific research and co-operation in Antarctica" to be 
incorporated in the treaty. There were several issues which directly 
concerned South Africa for political reasons somewhat removed from the 
Antarctic issue . 
The Question of access to the Informal talks and the actual conference 
by other states outside of the "twelve" had the interest of the 
government. Furthermore, accession to the actual treaty and the rights 
of non-signatories in the treaty system were also of concern. India 
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was also posing a problem in its renewed moves to include Antarctica 
on the 1958 United Nations agenda, moves which most of the "twelve" 
openly opposed. South Africa was particularly antagonistic to this in 
light of developments at the United Nations in relation to its own 
domestic policies,101 some of which were directly connected to Indian 
actions. This mistrust not only extended to the discussion of 
Antarctica in the United Nations but also to the rejection of Geneva 
(the European headquarters of the United Nations) as a possible venue 
for the actual conference so as to ensure no possible links to the 
United Nations. As mentioned earlier {pp.52-3} the subject of the 
treaty's duration and rights of withdrawal were looked at with 
interest. Lastly , 'the voting procedure could have significant 
implications on how the treaty system would function, particularly if 
other states were to be allowed into the treaty system in the future. 
Thus, the post-World War II (1945-1958) period could be characterized 
as the interest-building era in South African Antarctic Policy. 
Beginning with practically no tangible interests in the 1940s, this 
period saw the development of a number of South African 
accomplishments in the Antarctic by 1958. These accomplishments 
included the establishment of a number of sub-Antarctic weather 
stations; the first serious investigations into sending a South 
African Antarctic expedition; involvement in international co-
operation aimed at exploring and studying the Antarctic region as well 
as sending the first South Africans to Antarctica; initiating the 
proposal of establishing an international authority to govern 
Antarctica; and the annexation of sub-Antarctic territory followed by 
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the revival of the potential South African claim to a sector of 
Antarctica. By the end of this period South Africa, after a 
considerable period of effective rejection, obtained international 
recognition for its interests in the Antarctic. However, even with 
this development, insecurity continued to influence policy, 
particularly when South Africa went into the negotiations to create 
what would become the Antarctic Treaty System, as will he shown in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Entrenchment of South Africa's Interests in the Antarctic: 
South Africa's role in the 
Antarctic Treaty Talks and Conference, 1958-1959 
To understand South Africa's position at the preparatory talks and the 
actual Antarctic conference (15 October - 30 November 1959), one needs 
to understand the context in which South Africa found itself at the 
time. Internationally, South Africa was facing ever-increasing 
animosity and pressure in relation to its domestic policies and what 
appeared to be its intransigence on South West Africa. 1 Social 
sanctions, particularly forced withdrawal from or suspension of South 
African diplomatic representation in international organisations had 
begun but not become common practice. 2 However, as the Antarctic 
Treaty system would entail the development of an administrative organ, 
the threat of antagonistic governments ever getting into it remained a 
significant concern to the South African government throughout the 
negotiating period. 3 Noteworthy is the attitude of certain states 
participating in the Antarctic talks in relation to their attitudes at 
the United Nations. The United States, for example, jOined in 
criticizing South Africa on a number of questions during the height of 
the Cold War in the 1950s, even though South Africa, like the United 
States, had shown itself to have a staunch anti-communist government. 
These contradictions concerned the South African authorities, more so 
by the late 1950s. 4 Nonetheless , more direct issues also affected 
South Africa's position in the Antarctic talks. 
As a member of the Commonwealth, South Africa saw its position 
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significantly influenced by the attitudes of the other three 
participating Commonwealth members (the United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand) .5 Furthermore, it was felt by the United States' 
delegate, Ambassador Daniels, that it would be advantageous if the US 
and the four Commonwealth representatives exchanged and possibly co-
ordinated viewpoints,6 which eventually did occur. But no factor 
concerned South Africa's representatives as much as the question over 
the acceptance of South Africa's interests in the Antarctic by the 
other participating states. 
As noted earlier in Chapter II (pp.37-39) the South African 
government was concerned over the initial moves by the United States 
in 1948 to organise a meeting of those states with territorial claims 
in Antarctica and itself to create an international trusteeship for 
the continent. Because South Africa had never put forward a claim it 
was not considered for involvement. 7 This left the South African 
government distressed that it would be excluded from involvement in an 
area it felt that it was geographically and strategically tied to. 
Fearing this, South Africa's representatives in Washington as well as 
in London and Canberra were instructed to push its case .8 Although the 
Union received some sympathy, this became irrelevant as the 1948 
proposals fell through. Even with this the South African government 
continued to examine ways in Which it could increase its claims to 
interests in Antarctica. It even considered declaring a formal 
territorial claim over part of that area claimed by Norway. 9 
Diplomatic contacts with the claimant governments became the chief 
means of putting forward its case, and sympathetic responses were 
received by December 1948 from most. 10 Interest again was revived in 
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the mid-1950s for international activities in the Antarctic. The most 
significant was the International Geophysical Year (IGY), 1957-58 in 
which South Africa participated, thus furthering its interests and 
visibility there. When talks of the development of an administering 
authority were revived by the British in 1954, South Africa received 
some recognition of its interests in Antarctica from the other 
Commonwealth members, but not from the United States. 11 The attitude 
against South Africa seemed to be based on its non-claimant position. 
By March 1958, however, a change of attitude had apparently developed 
in Washington in which it was felt that a multilateral treaty should 
be created by the twelve states involved in the IGY's Antarctic 
activities. 12 In the end South Africa was formally invited to 
participate in discussions to create this Antarctic Treaty.13 However, 
the South African authorities remained uneasy over their position in 
the talks held in Washington . 
When the first preparatory meetings began, doubts remained in the mind 
of J G Stewart, South Africa's Charge d'Affaires in Washington and 
representative at the preparatory talks. On 30 June 1958 he noted in 
relation to informal exchanges with the representatives of the other 
Commonwealth participants and the United States that: 
Apart from the question of the acquisition of territory, any co-
operation which the Union may give its friends in Antarctica 
should serve to emphasize the Union's real interest in the area, 
an interest whose recognition has been achieved only with 
difficulty and which, it is not impossible, might yet be disputed 
at some stage. (14) 
This unease continued until Mr Stewart and Ambassador Daniels had an 
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informal talk at the end of June. After putting South Africa's case 
quite frankly to Ambassador Daniels, Mr Stewart noted that 
Mr Daniels' reaction to this was very satisfactory. He said that 
he had been convinced of the Union's interest (he seemed more 
impressed with the strategic than the scientific interest); and 
that I could quote him to you as being satisfied that the Union 
should have "equal rights with the United States" on the 
administrative organ." (15) 
It was from this point onward that South Africa might have started to 
feel more assured of its position in the preparatory talks and 
conference and that most of the participants to the talks would not 
pose a serious threat to its participation. However, some sense of 
doubt did persist throughout, even after the treaty was signed. 16 
During the preparatory talks several issues came up which affected the 
preparations for the actual conference. A number of these concerned 
all the participants but a few of them were of particular interest to 
the South African authorities. Those general issues which appear in 
the diplomatic correspondences between Washington and Pretoria can be 
identified as the following: the right of participation in the initial 
talks and conference by other states beyond the "twelve"; 17 the 
question of freezing the status quo on claims; the definition of 
"Antarctica" for the purposes of the treaty; the handling of the 
Australian proposed list of articles and draft treaty; and the 
incorporation of the principle of "peaceful uses of Antarctica" and 
"scientific research and co-operation" in Antarctica. 
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On the question of the discussion of substantive issues instead of 
only procedural and principle questions, this had much to do with the 
original position of the Soviet delegation during the preparatory 
talks. 18 Nevertheless the South African government itself had several 
reservations on what the preparatory talks should accomplish. In its 
instructions to Mr Stewart of 14 June 1958 in relation to the first 
preparatory meeting, the Department for External Affairs stated that: 
In the first place, we are not in favour of the preparatory talks 
taking matters so far that the conference will, in fact, be no 
more than a rubber stamp. We consider that issues are involved 
which may require the presence of officials from the home 
countries and that since most of the participating countries 
would presumably not be able to arrange for such attendance at 
the preparatory talks, these countries will be at a decided 
disadvantage. Although the broad lines of a treaty are likely to 
emerge from the preparatory talks, the conference proper should 
be of such a nature as to allow exchanges of opinions by fully 
briefed delegates. (19) 
This response was specifically aimed at comments made on what was 
discussed at the procedural meeting (13 June 1958) on the conduct of 
the preparatory talks. 20 The Soviet position was made known at the 
first of the preparatory meetings on 24 June when it was observed 
that: 
The Russian representative today also expressed opposition to 
discussing draft articles for a treaty at the informal talks. The 
talks, he said, should be confined to the time and place for 
conference (sic), procedural questions and agreement on the 
general principles underlying the treaty. (21) 
The other representatives all disagreed with this viewpoint. It was 
generally felt the preparatory talks offered a good opportunity to 
accomplish much of the work before the conference. All of the final 
decisions, however, would be made at the conference, but these, it was 
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generally felt, should not be just rubber stamps of agreements reached 
at the preparatory talks. By doing most of the work at the preparatory 
talks, the time of the conference could be cut down especially as most 
delegations wanted the treaty completed before the next session of the 
United Nations. 22 At the end of the first preparatory meeting it was 
agreed by consensus that the participants would discuss the Australian 
proposed list of treaty articles (substantive issues) to which no 
Soviet opposition was raised. 23 
An unofficial meeting (27 June) held between the first and second 
preparatory meetings amongst the four Commonwealth representatives and 
the United States representative agreed that 
It was uncertain whether the Russians would continue to 
participate in preparatory talks if these talks embraced matters 
of substance regarding the proposed treaty. (24) 
In response the five representatives decided that it would be best to 
keep the Soviet Union in. To accomplish this, the preparatory talks 
would be conducted in such a way that some substantive issues would be 
discussed which would not bring about a walkout . Several issues for 
discussion were then considered, including the position of non-
signatories to the treaty, freedom of access to Antarctica for 
peaceful purposes, and the definition of Antarctica. 25 
By the second preparatory meeting there were new developments. Whereas 
the Soviets again stressed that these talks should not include issues 
of substance, oPPosite sentiments were voiced by the representatives 
of Chile, Argentina, Norway and, to a lesser extent, South Africa and 
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the United States. Chile, Argentina and Norway stressed the need to 
exchange viewpoints before the conference but the two Latin American 
states expected further detailed discussions of the agenda, 
regulations on the conduct of the conference and technical details. 26 
For Norway, the concern was over practicalities relating to financial 
and staff requirements. For these reasons the Norwegians wanted the 
conference to conclude its task as quickly as possible with most of 
the work having been done at the preparatory talks. Furthermore, it 
was felt that the exchange of views at the preliminary talks would 
give the participants the chance of analysing the issues fully before 
gOing to the conference, and thus of being ready to make the important 
decisions unhesitatingly. South Africa emphasized the need to know one 
another's views on the principles to be considered for the treaty, 
while the United States agreed but pOinted out that nothing at these 
talks would be construed as binding. 27 Following the discussions on 
this issue the meeting then turned to address the substantive issue of 
territorial claims in Antarctica. 
Irrespective of his objections to discussing substantive issues the 
Soviet representative, as Mr Stewart noted, did get involved in the 
discussion on the freezing of the status quo (territorial claims): 
There was some discussion of this and in spite of his stand on 
not discussing substance, the Soviet representative was drawn 
into it. In the circumstances one wonders if the procedure to 
follow in order to get the talks going is simply to ignore the 
Russian objections to discussing particular articles and to 
proceed to talk about these matters in the hopes that without 
precipitating a walkout, the Russians would be drawn willy-nilly 
into the discussions. (28) 
However, at the end of the second preparatory meeting the South 
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African delegates, along with other delegations, were pessimistic as 
to the prospects of continuing with the Soviet Union. 29 The eleven 
other delegations were in fact considering speeding up the talks in 
relation to a draft treaty. The Australian draft treaty was expected 
soon and plans were even made to conduct discussions on this. 30 The 
first positive development from the Soviet representative came at the 
third meeting (18 July) but it was also noted that the Chileans were 
pushing for the opposite, namely quite formal talks during the 
preparatory meetings. 31 The Chilean stance was not generally accepted 
although it was agreed that working papers to encapsulate viewpoints 
would be prepared. The Soviet response was observed as "mild" in 
relation to preparing papers and no real objections were made. 32 The 
talks at the third meeting then went on to discuss at some length the 
freezing of the status quo and the definition of Antarctica, with no 
objections from the Soviet representative. 33 At the conclus ion of the 
third meeting Stewart expressed his optimism on meaningful progress 
being made since the previous meeting and on the future. Stewart 
construed this in the following manner: 
That this has proved possible is due in the main to a slightly 
more co-operative attitude adopted by the Soviet representative, 
and the repeated efforts by other members of the group to steer 
the discussions along more positive lines without at the same 
time perhaps scaring the Russians off. The change in the attitude 
of the Soviet representative to the talks was the more marked in 
that it manifested itself also in his very form of address to the 
Committee which was far more affable and subdued than it had been 
in the past. It is therefore to be hoped that better progress in 
the talks will be made at the next few meetings. In fact, 
Ambassador Daniels expressed the hope at the meeting that it 
would not be necessary for the group to meet more than a few more 
times . (34) 
In fact the preparatory talks continued for fifteen months and the 
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conference lasted only six weeks, a testimony to the willingness of 
the Soviet Union to participate and the extent to which all 
substantive issues were discussed during the preparatory meetings.35 
The next major issue to concern the twelve participants was the 
question of giving access to the preparatory talks and/or the 
conference to other countries. Again, this was an issue initiated by 
the Soviet Union. This view was first made known in the Soviet 
Union's official reply of 2 June 1958 to the proposed talks on 
Antarctica. In particular the Soviet Union stated that: 
While agreeing to take part in the aforementioned conference, the 
Soviet government considers it necessary to point out that the 
conference and the projected international treaty on the 
Antarctic would be much more effective if all states wishing to 
do so would take part in the discussion of this question. (36) 
Furthermore the Soviet Union proposed: 
Participation by a sufficiently wide range of states in the 
discussion of the question regarding the Antarctic could, in the 
opinion of the Soviet government, be ensured by convening a 
conference of all states expressing a desire to take part in 
it. (37) 
The South African reaction was one of recognizing why such a proposal 
would be made, namely the isolated position in which the Soviet Union 
would find itself at the preparatory talks and actual conference. What 
was not known at first was whether the Soviet Union would insist on 
open participation as a precondition to its participation. 38 The 
South African government's response to such a proposal in its 
instructions to its representative to the preparatory talks was: 
It must be stated again that it is our primary concern that 
we are opposed to any increase in the numter being invited to the 
conference. (39) 
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The Soviet representative brought up the issue at the procedural 
meeting (13 June) held before the start of the preparatory talks. The 
representatives of Chile and Argentina voiced their opposition to this 
on the grounds that the conference was to further what the IGY had 
accomplished and only the twelve states invited had participated . This 
issue was then passed on to be discussed at the first preparatory 
meeting. 40 There the Soviet representative again mooted the proposal 
for expanding the number of participants. All the other states, with 
the exception of Japan, generally rejected the proposal although ideas 
of giving other countries access to the treaty once it was in place 
were considered. The Japanese delegation suggested limiting the 
preparatory talks to the original twelve but possibly opening the 
conference to other countries. 41 
At the first talks between the four Commonwealth and United States 
representatives held at the South African Embassy on 29 June, the 
issues of freedom of access to Antarctica and rights of non-
signatories were discussed. These issues later developed into the 
issue of accession to the treaty by other countries. But, the 
intention at this time was to divert interest from inviting other 
states to participate in the development of the Treaty.42 Agreement 
was also reached at this meeting to dissuade the Japanese from the 
idea of opening up the conference to other countries and to explain 
Why.43 
The issue again came up at the second preparatory meeting where a 
number of the other countries voiced their opposition to inviting 
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further countries. Japan then proposed that a decision on this be 
postponed. New Zealand, in particular, threw out ideas to the Soviet 
representative on principles determining the rights of non-signatories 
and the idea of an accession clause within the treaty, to which there 
was no response. 44 At the third preparatory meeting the Soviet 
representative again brought up the question. The response to this 
issue became evident ard effectively established two days later (10 
July) when the Australian draft treaty was presented to the other 
Commonwealth and United States representatives. Participation was not 
envisaged beyond the twelve participating in the talks, but procedures 
for accession to the treaty were incorporated into the draft. Hence, 
in moves to circumvent Soviet proposals to include more countries in 
the Antarctic preparatory talks and conference, the concept of 
accession to the Antarctic Treaty was developed . Furthermore, as 
things turned out, the membership was not expanded beyond the original 
twelve until after the treaty came into force. 
The questions of the freezing of the status quo in relation to 
territorial claims in Antarctica and the definition of Antarctica were 
the first substantive issues to be specifically addressed in the 
preparatory talks. The principles of "peaceful uses of Antarctica" and 
"scientific research and co-operation" in Antarctica were also 
examined. These issues were recognized as worthy of discussion before 
the talks themselves had commenced in that several were of concern 
during the IGY activities in the Antarctic. 45 At the procedural 
meeting held before the preparatory talks on 13 June they were 
summarized in the list of articles proposed by Australia for the draft 
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treaty.46 This list of proposed articles effectively acted as a list 
of issues to address within the preparatory talks until the 
Australians presented for comment their copy of a draft treaty at the 
meeting of the Commonwealth and United States representatives of 10 
JUly.47 This draft was then introduced to the preparatory talks at the 
fourth preparatory meeting of 22 July.48 Although discussion of these 
issues can be found from before the actual circulation of the 
Australian proposed articles, it was not until the third preparatory 
meeting of 8 July that they were specifically addressed in terms of 
work i ng papers. 
As noted earlier over Soviet opposition to substantive discussion in 
the preparatory talks (pp.61-62), Chile's proposal to formalize the 
preparatory talks had met with a negative response from most other 
states. 49 The exception was that some states felt a number of issues 
should be formalized in writing in terms of the general viewpoint 
amongst the members. From this the consensus (including the Soviet 
Union) was that individual states would be asked to draw up working 
papers which the twelve could then discuss so as to reach some general 
agreement~O In terms of the abovementioned issues the following 
countries were invited to prepare the following papers: the United 
Kingdom on the "Definition of Antarctica"; New Zealand on the 
principles of "Peaceful use of Antarctica" and "Scientific research 
and co-operation"; and the United States on settlement of disputes 
referred to the International Court of Justice. 51 As was first seen 
with the Australian proposal of a draft treaty, the practice was 
continued with draft proposals of further articles to be added to the 
Australian draft. The United States, for example, submitted the first 
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draft article spelling out the functions of what would become the 
administrative organ of the treaty.52 Thus, from early on in the 
preparatory talks extensive procedural progress was made which 
encouraged the participation and input of a number of states. It 
should be noted, however, that much of what was presented to the 
preparatory meetings from the Commonwealth and United States 
representatives did undergo considerable scrutiny from them as a group 
beforehand. 53 
Besides these general issues there were a number of issues which had 
the particular attention of the South African authorities. These were 
identified earlier as access by other states to the preparatory talks 
and/or conference ; the question of accession to the treaty and 
relations with non-signatory states; Indian moves to include 
Antarctica on the United Nations agenda; the question over the venue 
and time of the conference; the voting procedure to be used in the 
Antarctic Treaty administrative organ; the duration of the treaty; and 
developments centering on Norway's scientific station on the coast of 
Queen Maud Land. Though most issues did become part of the preparatory 
talks, concern over the Indian action and the Norwegian station were 
mainly dealt with in the unofficial meetings amongst the Commonwealth 
and United States representatives. 
Access by other states to the talks and/or the conference was, as 
discussed above (pp .65-67). initiated by the Soviets in their response 
to the American invitation to attend talks on Antarctica. 54 South 
Africa's authorities and representative were openly opposed to such an 
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idea from the beginning55 but again this was discussed before and 
there is no need to expand on it. However. during the talks references 
were made to the possibility of including India in order to co-opt it 
and keep it from trying to get Antarctica on to the United Nations 
agenda. 56 Italy also appears to have made inquiries on its own 
inclusion in the conference "on the grounds that an Italian scientist 
had accompanied a recent New Zealand expedition to Antarctica.,,57 
South African differences with India and distrust over the likely 
manner of its participation in the conference. ensured that the South 
Africans remained opposed to bringing in other states to the talks or 
conference. 58 Stewart expressed the South African opposition to 
allowing India to participate in the talks and conference by stating 
that 
indeed it was disturbing to note how ready some of the other 
parties were to even giving consideration to this possibility. 
For once a country which cannot claim any direct interest In 
Antarctica is admitted. there would appear to be no grounds for 
failing to open the gates to all comers. (59) 
He also linked the question of Italian participation to the likely 
consequences of admitting countries like India. 60 
South Africa remained adamant on this issue and received general 
support for this view from most of the other participants. However. 
this stance could be said not to have been based solely on its 
interests in Antarctica. 
As for accession to the treaty once it came into force. South African 
resistance to this was particularly strong from the beginning. The 
pre-preparatory meeting discussions with United States authorities 
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revealed possible problems in achieving a reconciliation between the 
principle of "freedom of access for scientific co-operation" and 
exclusive access to the treaty.61 In its first instructions to its 
representative the South African government clearly spelled out its 
views thus: 
We are also in favour of the suggestion ((e)) that the treaty 
should contain a statement on freedom of access to Antarctica for 
scientific purposes. We think it is essential though, that any 
country desiring access for scientific purposes should have to 
subscribe to the principles of the treaty and accept the 
administrative and control arrangements established by the 
treaty. We feel most strongly that no such country should thereby 
be entitled to membership of the administrative or control group, 
which should be confined to the original twelve participants.(62) 
Yet in this same set of instructions the government proved to be 
slightly flexible in dealing with long term possibilities: 
We realise, though, that in time other countries may establish an 
interest through their scientific activities, and it is 
conceivable that we may wish to agree to others acceding and 
subscribing to the principles of the treaty. Provision should 
perhaps be made for such an eventuality. But we must do our 
utmost to secure that any provision for accession in the treaty 
ensures that accession is on our terms viz. that acceding states 
do not become members of the control body. (63) 
At the first of the Commonwealth and United States representatives 
informal talks (30 June) the issues of the position of non-signatories 
and the principle of "freedom of access to Antarctica for peaceful 
purposes" were suggested as alternative subjects of discussion to 
counter Soviet calls for extending participation in the conference. 54 
The connection between access to the talks, the continent, and the 
treaty became clear here. As to their attitude towards the position of 
non-signatories and accession to the treaty, the South Africans were 
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apparently reassured of their stand by the United States delegate 
(Ambassador Daniels) as it was noted that: 
His response was satisfactory to our point of view. He thought 
that if the treaty made suitable provision for peaceful access 
for scientific purposes there would be no need to make provision 
for accession to the treaty. (65) 
The question of an accession clause to the treaty was then proposed at 
the second preparatory meeting by New Zealand to defuse Soviet demands 
on participant expansion. No Soviet response to this suggestion was 
forthcoming at this time however. 66 The end of trying to block 
accession to the treaty came at the second Commonwealth and United 
States representatives' informal meeting of 10th July. At that 
meeting the Australians presented their draft treaty which included 
provisions for accession. In the opinion of South Africa's 
representative these accession proposals marked the "fundamental 
difference of approach to the treaty between the Australians on the 
one 
on 
hand and the United States" and also South Africa and New Zealand 
the other. 57 The Australians argued that their draft was 
restrictive as it was "framed on the basis that every State 
participating in scientific investigation in Antarctica [would] be 
dOing so as a signatory of, or an accessory to, the Treaty, and 
(would] have the obI igations imposed by the Treaty. ,,58 Furthermore, 
that by allowing accession the Soviet Union would feel compelled to 
stay as some of their allies could then potentially come in. The 
Australians also felt that under the restrictive nature of their draft 
the benefits of controlling other states' activities in Antarctica 
would be preferable to having states conducting activities beyond the 
control of the treaty. In contrast, the United States, South Africa 
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and New Zealand opposed accession as such, as it would make it 
difficult to keep other states off the administrative organ. It was 
recognized at this stage that these three states could find themselves 
standing alone. South Africa's representative in particular noted the 
possibility that the Americans could probably agree to concessions on 
this point .69 If such were to occur it was felt that South Africa 
would be compelled to follow the American lead. 70 This view was 
confirmed by the Secretary for External Affairs in his instructions 
of 21 July 1958: 
your minute 11th July you have correctly interpreted our 
views on accession. In the light of Union's clearly defined 
policy regarding Antarctica we regard present developments with 
considerable concern and Minister feels we cannot depart from our 
consistent attitude especially as United States continues to 
oppose right of accession. Should United States decide to support 
Australia we will have to follow suit as we cannot weaken our 
general position by standing virtually alone. (71) 
In brief, the view to accept accession to the treaty carried through 
and was incorporated in Article XIII of the treaty. In the treaty 
itself, however, a clear distinction was created between what was 
termed "Contracting Parties" and what may be called acceding states. 
Contracting Parties are those states which participate as decision-
makers in the administrative organ of the treaty as spelled out in 
Article IX of the treaty while acceding states have becorr.e only 
observers in the Antarctic Treaty system. 72 However, a significant 
number of acceding states have been elevated from observers to full 
Contracting Parties (also referred to as "Consultative Parties,,)73 
with the approval of all Contracting Parties as set out in Article XII 
of the treaty. The consequences of this for South Africa have not yet 
been clearly made known, but this will be discussed later in chapter 
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5. As to relations with non-signatories nothing was specifically 
included in the treaty but policies on relations with non-signatories 
have been developed through the consultative meetings referred to in 
Article IX in the treaty. 
Two issues which came up together in the minds of the South African 
government were the voting procedure to be used in an Antarctic Treaty 
administrative organ and the question of the duration of the treaty. 
First references to these two issues appeared during informal talks 
with Ambassador Daniels. 74 On the voting question Ambassador Daniels 
expressed support for the two-thirds majority principle for all 
substantive decisions and on duration favoured an indefinite period 
treaty.75 Furthermore, it was felt that a withdrawal clause would not 
be encouraged but that it would probably be necessary. In its response 
to these viewpoints in its first set of instructions to its 
representative, the South African government generally agreed, though 
with certain reservations. 
The South African government favoured a unanimity/consensual system 
over a two-thirds majority system, but if the treaty were to run on 
majorities it would settle for a two-thirds over a simple majority 
system. On the question of duration the South African view was that 
two options were available. First, that if an indefinite period were 
considered, procedures for a legal withdrawal should be incorporated. 
The alternative was a fixed period treaty with no withdrawal 
provision. The concern over these was that the interest focussed on 
keeping the Soviet Union from pulling out of the treaty and conducting 
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Antarctic activities beyond the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty 
system. Under an indefinite period treaty it was felt that states 
could not be bound indefinitely should certain circumstances change 
with time. Hence, should states desire to leave the obligations of the 
treaty, provision should be made with certain safeguards to protect 
the treaty. The fixed period option on the other hand, was felt to 
compel members to comply at least for the duration of the treaty with 
the knowledge that it was not permanent, thus relieving pressure on 
the need for a withdrawal procedure. 76 
In the process of discussions during the preparatory meetings the two 
issues underwent considerable examination. Amongst the Commcnwealth 
and United States representatives a unanimity/consensual system was 
not thought likely, particularly in the light of early Soviet 
attitudes as reflected in the Soviet use of the veto in the United 
Nations Security Ccuncil. 77 As things evolved, probably much because 
of the co-operative nature of the Soviet delegation as well as the 
wish to keep them participating in the treaty, the principle of 
unanimous/consensual voting was incorporated under Article XII. 78 On 
the question of duration both fixed period and indefinite period 
elements were embodied in the treaty, also under Article XII. In 
brief, the treaty was designed to last indefinitely in its current 
form so long as no Contracting Party requested a review of the treaty 
after thirty years in force. Should a review be convened it would only 
take a simple majority to institute changes in the treaty system. 79 
Finally, as for withdrawals, provision was made under Article XII for 
a lengthy (two years) procedure connected to failure to ratify 
decisions agreed upon at meetings of the Contracting Parties. Thus the 
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issues of voting, duration and withdrawal were all eventually 
incorporated into the treaty. 
At the time the abovementioned subjects were being addressed a number 
of issues developed outside the direct scope of the treaty's contents 
which also gained the attention of the South African government. The 
first focused on Indian moves to have the issue of Antarctica included 
on the United Nations agenda. Corresponding to this was a general 
concern over any links of the Antarctic talks, conference, or treaty 
to the United Nations system. Concern over these links in themselves 
then raised questions over the venue and time of the conference, 
particularly at the suggestion of the conference being held in Geneva 
(at the United Nations European headquarters). But, it is important to 
understand how these issues developed, particularly in light of the 
ongoing deterioration in relations between South Africa and the United 
Nations. 
The earliest consideration of United Nations involve~ent in Antarctica 
came in July 1948 when the United States government proposed that a 
trusteeship arrangement be established for Antarctica. This, of 
course, came to nothing, but the willingness of the United States to 
link Antarctica with the United Nations is worth noting, particularly 
as it would hold the oPPosite opinion a decade later. 80 
India first made moves to introduce the question of Antarctica into 
the United Nations as early as 1956. This action was perceived by the 
South African government in the following manner: 
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This Indian move caught all concerned by surprise. It was felt 
that Krishna Menon and possibly Nehru had possibly thought up the 
idea to further their favourite pose of "peace-makers" between 
West and East. All Commc·nweal th countries expressed resentment 
and concern at the move. A spokesman of the United States State 
Department, in conversation with a member of our Washington 
Embassy, said that he did not see how the Indians could believe 
that they were being helpful. Latin-American countries were 
expected to oppose inscription . (In the event, the Indians 
withdrew the item.) (81) 
India was not the only country to consider United Nations involvement 
in Antarctica however. New Zealand Prime Minister Nash announced on 18 
February 1958 that his government would support international control 
of Antarctica under United Nations dlrection. 82 However, by 1 April 
1958 Mr Nash had changed his attitude towards the relation with the 
United Nations, downplaying it to "under United Nations auspices".83 
Apart from this incident India remained the main protagonist for 
United Nations involvement. 
Questions over India ' s position continued on into 1958 not only in 
its United Nations activities but also its relationship to the 
conference. American affirmation of India's exclusion was made known 
to the South Africans in early June but the issue was not yet 
resolved. 84 Participants in the preparatory talks were noticeably 
anxious to get the negotiations completed before the next United 
Nations General Assembly session in September. Reasons for this 
impatience were never clearly defined in South African documentation, 
but it is likely that any developments in the United Nations would 
have made the South Africans apprehensive, particularly in light of 
the Indian connections. 85 The South African government confirmed its 
support for the conference being "held and the treaty finalised" 
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before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly to its 
representative in Washington in mid-June. 86 By the second preparatory 
meeting an element of haste developed with the news that the Indian 
government had sent its United Nations delegation instructions to get 
the question of Antarctica onto the United Nations agenda of the 
upcoming General Assembly session. 87 At the second Commonwealth-United 
States representatives' informal meeting the issue of dealing with 
India was addressed. The idea that India be co-opted to get it to 
withdraw its item in the United Nations was anathema to South Africa. 
Not only were its relations with that country at issue but India's 
interests in Antarctica were debatable as mentioned earlier. 88 In the 
end the question of Antarctica was not placed on the United Nations 
agenda and the Indians were not invited to participate in the 
conference. India did, however, accede to the treaty and became a full 
Contracting Party in 1983 with the approval of all Contracting 
Parties. But this did not resolve all questions relating to ties to 
the United Nations. 89 
During the course of the preparatory talks on time and venue of the 
conference, the Soviet delegate proposed the European Headquarters of 
the United Nations at Geneva as a possible site. 90 At this stage (at 
the second preparatory meeting of July 1958) all were agreed that 
the conference should be held by September and be completed 
before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly; but 
the venue remained in question. Early references from the participants 
had evolved to where a number of states considered Washington to be 
the likely site of the conference as the preparatory talks were being 
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held there. 91 What became evident here then was that the Soviet 
suggestion contradicted the general view that the conference be 
completed before the next United Nations session. It was soon pointed 
out that, since the Geneva venue was already booked for other 
conferences for the targeted time, other venues would need to be 
considered. 92 The South African government itself had no particular 
preference at first, although it wished it to be in a country in which 
it maintained a significant enough representation to handle the 
requirements of such a conference. 93 
The preparatory talks in Washington extended far beyond the originally 
intended time span and the conference was eventually also held in 
. Washington DC the next year. The preparatory talks themselves 
eventually lasted long enough to work out most of the details and to 
justify Washington as the conference venue. 94 The co-operation amongst 
the twelve governments ultimately provided a climate where the issues 
of the conference venue and Indian activities at the United Nations 
did not stall the process. 95 The United Nations itself was kept 
clearly at a distance during the preparatory talks and conference 
although Article X held that all Antarctic activities be "consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations." This clause was not clearly 
defined and like other issues has become a focus of the United Nations 
debate during the 1980s. 
The last issue which interested the South African government during 
the period of the preparatory talks was the situation of the future of 
the Norwegian continental bases. In particular the United States 
informed the four Commonwealth representatives at the end of June 1958 
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that owing to financial considerations the Norwegian base on Queen 
Maud Land (in the Norwegian sector directly south of South Africa) 
would have to be closed down at the end of the IGY in 1958. The United 
States approach to the Commonwealth members was made without the 
knowledge of the Norwegian government, and it was thought unlikely the 
Norwegians would make approaches to other governments on this. Whereas 
the representatives of New Zealand, Britain and Australia felt their 
governments were not able to help out financially, logistical support 
was a possibility. The South African representative did not commit his 
government to anything but reported back to Pretoria that this 
offered opportunities for further substantiation of interests in 
Antarctica. 96 The first moves within the government began on 23 July 
1958 in consultations between the Departments of External Affairs, 
Transport, Defence, Commerce and Industries and the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research. 97 Norway's official notification 
of withdrawal came in 1959 whereupon the South African Weather Bureau 
initiated the interest for a South African takeover of the "Norway 
Station" base. Keesing's described the process of the establishment of 
South Africa's first continental base in the following manner: 
At the opening of the Antarctic Conference in Washington on 
Oct. 15, 1959, the Union Minister for External Affairs (Mr 
Louw) announced that an agreement had been reached between 
South Africa and Norway whereby the NorwegIan base at 
Maudheim would be loaned to a South African Antarctic 
Ex~edition for an indefinite period. The Norwegian delegate 
(Mr Paul Koht) explained that Maudheim would no longer be 
used by Norwegian scientists after the end of the I.G.Y. and 
that his Government had offered to lend the station to the 
Union of South Africa. 
An agreement to this effect was signed on Oct. 30 by the 
Norwegian and South African Governments. It provided (1) 
that South Africa would have the use of the Maudheim base 
for as long as she required it; (2) that tractors, sledges, 
sledge dogs, and equipment would be bought from Norway; (3) 
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that the South African expedition would take over the 
scientific instruments hitherto used by Norwegian scientists 
at the base. It was made clear in Oslo and Pretoria that the 
lease would be on a temporary though indefinite basis, and 
that the base would remain Norwegian property. 
The South African Antarctic Expedition - the first to be 
sent out from the Union to the Antarctic - will comprise 10 
or 11 men headed by Mr Johannes La Grange (a meteorologist), 
who was a member of the Commonwealth Trans-Antarcti c 
Expedition led by Sir Vivian Fuchs. Maudheim is in the 
Norwegian Antarctic Territory (Queen Maud Land). (98) 
However, it should be noted that Keesing's incorrectly stated that it 
was the "Maudheim" station when it was the "Norway" station which was 
transferred to South Africa. 99 South Africa sent its first expedition 
in 1960 and has since maintained a permanent presence on the 
continent. 
Consequently, in terms of the conference and treaty, South Africa was 
represented by a high level delegation and the final treaty itself was 
signed by the South African Minister of External Affairs, Mr Eric 
Louw. The preparatory talks had lasted from June 1958 to October 1959 
and the conference from 15 October to 30 November 1959. During the 
period of preparations and the conference a large number of issues 
were worked out to the consensual agreement of all involved. This 
effectively created the first international multilateral treaty and 
organization governing a region of the earth under consensual 
procedures. Furthermore, this eotablished the first nuclear test ban 
and nuclear-free area treaty in history, and one to which both the 
United States and the Soviet Union agreed. 100 As for South Africa, a 
number of issues which directly concerned it were addressed and 
resolved, though not necessarily to its original liking. South Africa 
became the second country, after Britain, to ratify the Antarctic 
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Treaty on 21 June 1960 under procedures set dowo in Article III of the 
South Africa Act, 1909. 101 
South Africa's role in the conference was viewed positively and South 
Africa's Minister of External Affairs, Mr Eric Louw, was optimistic 
about developments: 
South Africa was represented at the conference at Washington last 
year. We had a strong delegation consisting of our ambassador at 
Washington, Mr du Plessis, the Councillor of the Embassy (102), a 
member of Head Office here, a member of the Embassy staff and the 
Scientific Attache, Dr Shuttleworth. I can tell the committee 
that our delegation did exceptionally good work. After the 
conclusion of the conference they were complimented for their 
contribution towards the discussions. South Africa has. shown its 
interest in what is happening in Antarctica. There is also 
another organization which is known by its initials S.C.A.R. We 
have also been co-operating with them. A South African 
exploratory team went to Antarctica recently. We are dOing what 
we can also in that sector. (103) 
As for the establishment of South Africa's presence on the Antarctic 
continent, the Minister of Transport also presented an optimistic 
picture when he stated in Parliament: 
The hon. member for Yeoville [Mr S J M Steyn! has asked for 
information regarding the expedition to the South Pole area. All 
I can tell him he has probably read in the newspapers, namely, 
that the expedition has arrived safely. They have taken over the 
Norwegian base and according to the reports we have received 
everything is gOing reasonably well. The base was in a somewhat 
neglected state. Many of the tunnels had collapsed but they have 
opened them up again. According to the most recent reports they 
are fair ly happy and have put everything in order where 
necessary. (104) 
Furthermore, total expenditure including purchasing most of the 
equipment for operations and transport for the establishment of the 
South African station cost £56 300. 105 This was considerably less than 
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the original estimate of £97 000 106 and even the £79 600 107 and 
£100000 envisaged in 1946. 108 Thus, South Africa had finally gotten 
off to a good start as a full member of the Antarctic Treaty system; 
it had also established a permanent continental scientific station by 
1960. Questions over its presence there would not be raised again for 
nearly two and half decades and, when they were, they would be for 
different reasons and come from a fairly different group of countries. 
The treaty itself came into force on 23 June 1961. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Expansion of and Assault on the Antarctic Policy of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1961-1988 
Since 1960 there have been two streams of diplomatic developments 
concerning South Africa and the issue of Antarctica. These two streams 
can be summarised as the expansion of the Antarctic Treaty system and 
the unfolding of South Africa's diplomatic isolation in international 
organizations. These two sets of developments were essentially 
separate until the 1980s when interest in the Antarctic expanded 
beyond the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty. 
In the period since the Antarctic Treaty came into force, South Africa 
has participated not only in all of the activities and Consultative 
meetings of the Antarctic Treaty Organization but also in related 
bodies such as the Scientific Comwittee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)l 
and the much older International Whaling Commission. The Antarctic 
Treaty system itself has expanded now to consist of five components 
with a sixth in the developing stages. These can be identified as the 
Antarctic Treaty, recommendations of the biennial conference of t he 
Contracting Parties, the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of the 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources,2 and the Scientific Committee on 
Antarctic Research (SCAR) which co-ordinates the scientific activities 
of the states active in Antarctic research. 3 It should be noted that 
the recommendations of the biennial conferences are reached by the 
consensus of all Contracting or Consultative Parties4 (full members), 
hence they have received the support of the South African government. 
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In particular, these have included administrative arrangements, the 
acceptance of acceding states and the elevation of some to full 
ccnsultative status, and the expansion of the treaty system. The sixth 
potential component is the establishment of a minerals regime in 
Antarctica which finally materialized in draft form in 1988. 5 This, 
however, has not been completed and questions remain over its future, 
particularly from states outside the Antarctic Treaty system. As the 
treaty nears thirty years in force it has been viewed by its 
participants as an example of international co-operation unmatched 
anywhere else, especially in light of its very diverse membership 
since its inception. Much has been written on this but it is not the 
focus of this work to examine the functions and accomplishments of the 
Antarctic Treaty itself. 6 In the view of the treaty members, the 
Antarctic Treaty system has fulfilled its role effectively, has 
expanded considerably since 1961 and the co-operation it has afforded 
its members has been interpreted positively to the present.? However, 
a number of points are worth expanding on. 
During the preparatory talks to the Antarctic Conference questions 
were raised over whether states beyond the original twelve signatories 
could potentially become members of the administrative organ of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Developments since 1961 have brought about some far-
reaching results in relation to this issue. The number of states 
signatory to the treaty has grown from the original twelve to the 
current thirty-seven8 with other states considering accession. More 
importantly the number of full "Contracting" or "Consultative" Parties 
has increased from the original twelve states to around twenty. 
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Included in this expansion of Consultative members are India, the 
German Democratic Republic, China and Brazil, all of which, although 
accepted by South Africa for this status, have presented a threat to 
South Africa's own status within the treaty system. This will be 
examined in further detail below. As for the relationship between the 
treaty system and non-signatories, this has also flared up in the 
1980s in a somewhat confrontational atmosphere. States outside the 
system currently view the treaty system as an "exclusive club" of the 
most developed states which have been able to afford Antarctic 
research to the exclusion of most Third-World countries. The 
particular point of contention has been the practice of the treaty 
members to recognize only individual states' activities in Antarctica 
but not the recognition of joint ventures for consideration of full 
membership in the treaty's decision-making organ. As most Third-World 
countr ies have found themselves unable to contend with the costs of 
mounting Antarctic expeditions , many have sought a more equitable 
system in which the interests of these states could be included. It 
has thus been the relationships between the states signatory to the 
treaty, both original and new, and to those outside the Antarctic 
Treaty system that have resulted in the question of Antarctica and the 
existing treaty being addressed at the United Nations in the 1980s. 9 
While Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty system issues have undergone 
changes in the international relations forum since 1960, South Africa 
has at the same time faced a protracted campaign to isolate it in the 
international community . Specific reference here is made to its 
withdrawal, suspension, exclusion and expulsion from participating in 
international organizations. Since 1955, when it first withdrew from 
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participating in the United Nations General Assembly for three years 
over opposition to international governmental organizations (IGOs) 
discussing its domestic policies. specifically apartheid, South Africa 
has faced banishment from most international bodies. both governmental 
and non-governmental, as well as general international ostracism such 
as no other country has ever experienced. 10 The United Nations system 
has. for example, effectively excluded South Africa from participating 
in nearly all of its activities by rejecting the current government's 
credentials although it unquestionably maintains full membership in 
the United Nations system. 11 The notable exceptions to successful 
exclusion moves have been in certain scientific related organizations 
(such as the Antarctic Treaty Organization and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA) and organizations where the Non-Aligned 
countries have not dominated in terms of the decision-making 
procedures. 
Bissell states that diplomatically the prime target of those leading 
the campaign to isolate South Africa was to effect the expulsion of 
the South African government from as many international organizations 
as Possible. 12 By the mid-1970s South Africa had been expelled from 
only one international governmental organization rIGO} (the Economic 
Commission for Africa of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council) and. to date. from less than half a dozen. 13 What has 
happened then is that South Africa has faced exclusion in the 
following ways: exclusion from participation by means of credentials 
rejection; 14 exclusion by means of the numerical majority of a given 
organization disregarding or violating organizational charters. 
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constitutions or statutes to achieve specific ends;15 exclusion of 
participation by means of not extending invitations to functions of an 
organization to which South Africa was a member; 16 exclusion by means 
of termination of membership by other memters of the organization 
concerned, in some cases where no provision allowed for such;17 
exclusion by means of curtailment of participatory rights of access, 
such as limits on voting and/or speaking rights, or non-access to 
meeting venues through non-issuance of visas to attend;18 "after the 
fact" loss of rights of participation following South African response 
to exclusion or withdrawal such as loss of voting rights for refusal 
to pay its allotted financial contributions; 19 and effecting South 
African withdrawals by antagonising the South African government or 
its diplomatic representatives. 20 From the first suspension in 1962 
the African countries in particular have maintained constant pressure 
in most IGOs but it should be noted that the decision-making 
procedures in some have not made complete exclusion from all 
organizations possible. 
Harold Jacobson identifies two decision making subsystems based on 
qualifications of states' votes in any given IGO's administrative 
organ: 
we distinguished between those international governmental 
organizations in which the representative subsystems dominate 
decision making and those in which the participant subsystem 
dominates. If the decisions of an IGO have consequences that have 
immediate importance for its member states, particularly the more 
powerful ones, it will tend to be in the first category, while 
IGOs that take decisions of lesser importance or with more remote 
consequences will tend to be in the second. Thus decision making 
in the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, and the International Atomic Energy Agency is 
dominated by their representative subsystems, while decision 
making in the World Health Organization, the International Labour 
Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
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Cultural Organization is dominated by their participant 
subsystems. Small, weak, and poor states have a greater 
opportunity for influence in the organizations in the second 
category than they do in those in the first, but even 
organizations in the first category provide them with greater 
influence than they would have if decisions were taken outside of 
the structural framework. This is why such states press to have 
decisions made in IGOs. (21) 
Because of this we see that the pressure exerted in most organizations 
by the African and/or Third World blocs has resulted in the exclusion 
of South Africa from nearly all bodies where a participant subsystem 
or "one state, one vote" system is used. But, in the representative 
subsystem organizations listed above (IMF, GATT and IAEA) South Africa 
still enjoys most membership rights of participation. The Antarctic 
Treaty Organization (ATO) also qualifies as a "representative 
subsystem" organization with decision making based on consensus. Thus, 
although South Africa has faced considerable diplomatic Isolation 
since the 1950s especially in international organizations, the type of 
decision making procedures of organizations has affected their ability 
to exclude South African participation. 
As a final note, South Africa has had to deal with political realities 
affecting its participation in organizations relating to Antarctic 
regional issues. While South Africa did host the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research (SCAR) meeting VII at Cape Town in September 
196322 none of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) have 
been held in South Africa (nor in the Soviet Union) for "political 
reasons" while some countries have hosted them more than once. 23 In 
more recent developments, general participation at the thirty-fifth 
annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission in July 1983 
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was described in the following manner: 
The total membership is now 40 nations, Jamaica, Kenya , Mauritius 
and Uruguay were not represented at the meeting; South Africa was 
represented but did not take part in discussion or in voting.(24) 
Thus South Africa's vulnerability has been extended to very diverse 
numbers and types of IGOs including the operation of the Antarctic 
Treaty Organization. This then leads to the current international 
debate over South African participation in the Antarctic Treaty 
system. 
The first reference to place focus on Antarctica by non-members of the 
Antarctic Treaty was at the 1982 signing ceremony of the United 
Nations Conference. on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Kingston, 
Jamaica. This was specifically made by the Malaysian representative, 
Ghazali Shafie, based on remarks by the Tanzanian representative on 
the exclusion of Antarctica from the Law of the Sea Convention. Mr 
Shafie said: 
It is time now to focus our attention on another area of common 
interest ... I refer to Ar.tarctica, whose immense potentialities 
exist for the benefit of all mankind . (25) 
Essentially this comment by Shafie was the beginning of what has been 
interpreted as the attack on the Antarctic Treaty system from 
outside. 26 What has then been advocated from this is an United Nations 
controlled alternative to the more exclusive Antarctic Treaty system 
(ATS). Malaysian motives for this move, particularly those of 
Malaysian Prime Minister Or Mahathir Mohammad, have raised questions 
since he first publicly rejected the existence of the ATS at the 
United Nations in September 1982. What has resulted is a challenge by 
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the poorer states outside of the ATS or. the ATS with the objective of 
inducing the change of control from what Jacobson identifies as a 
representative subsystem institution dominated by most of the 
world's powerful states to a participant subsystem institution 
dominated by smaller and poorer states which have not had any direct 
interests in Antarctica to present. 27 
The debate on South African participation in the ATS originated from a 
number of states which up to the time of Malaysian references had 
shown no interest in the Antarctic region. 28 Antigua and Barbuda first 
publicly discussed the issue at the June 1983 Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM) meeting where its deputy Prime Mi nister, Mr 
Lester Bi rd, stated " ... what is monstrous is that South Africa is an 
accepted partner in these deliberations" 29 in relation to South 
Africa being not only a full Contracting Party but also the only 
African country in the ATS. This particular move brought in the 
support of most African countries for the Malaysian initlative. 30 
Peter J Beck, in particular, refers to peripheral issues influencing 
the discussion of South African participation in the ATS in the 
following manner: 
One of the by-products of the recent international debate about 
the Antarctic Treaty System has been the enhanced intrusion of 
political considerations, and during 1983 Caribbean and African 
governments combined to introduce a new dimension into the 
discussion in the form of an attack upon the participation of 
South Africa, a founder member of the system. This element 
permitted not only a further development of the anti-treaty 
argument but also an aspect capable of attracting the support of 
other governments more concerned to condemn South Africa than to 
consider the future interests of Antarctica. (31) 
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By September 1983, through the leading actions of the Malaysian and 
Antigua and Barbudan governments, the Antarctica issue was finally 
placed on the United Nations Agenda. 32 
The agenda item "Question of Antarctica" was finally discussed in the 
United Nations General Assembly First Committee in November 1983. The 
Antigua and Barbudan representative briefly brought up the issue of 
South African participation during the course of the debate. He 
specifically called for the immediate expulsion of South Africa as a 
full consultative state, but no reference to South Africa was made in 
the resulting resolution (38/77 of 15 December, 1983) calling for a 
study on Antarctica to be carried out by the United Nations Secretary-
General. 33 As part of the study conducted by the Secretary-General, 
states were invited to send reports or statements on their opinions, 
knowledge, and/or activities within the ATS and on Antarctica. South 
Africa itself sent a comprehensive statement documenting its 
activities and support for the ATS.34 Fifty-three other states sent in 
comments to the Secretariat of which a few made direct references to 
South Africa. 35 Some of those references demonstrated that not all had 
a clear understanding of how the treaty operated, especially those 
asking for the exclusion or expulsion of South Africa. 36 In the 
ensuing report of the Secretary General the issue was interpreted in 
the following manner: 
It was, however, noted that no African State, except South 
Africa, was a party to the Antarctic Treaty. Moreover, some 
States found that one of the major flaws of the Treaty was the 
presence of South Africa among the signatory countries. They 
expressed serious doubts that a Treaty which provided for the 
incl usion of a State that practised the policy of apartheid could 
be an ideal legal regime for an area of global concern. They 
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expressed the view that it would be in the interest of the 
international community to exclude South Africa from the Treaty 
and not allow it to participate in any future co-operative effort 
in the region, because, they argued, the apartheid regime of 
South Africa could not be relied upon to uphold the purposes and 
objectives of the present Treaty or any future treaty that might 
emerge. (37) 
However, the report further went on to state that: 
Some States opposed the introduction of political elements into 
the discussion that, in their view, had nothing to do either with 
Antarctica or with the Antarctic Treaty. (38) 
These two points, then, demonstrate the views of the two sides in the 
debate over South African participation in the Antarctic Treaty 
System. 
At the first debate in 1983 in the United Nations General Assembly 
First Committee the commitment to maintaining and preserving the 
Antarctic Treaty system as it stood was made clear by the 
representations of the Consultative Parties. In a unanimous stand all 
Consultative States which spoke emphasized the co-operation encouraged 
by the ATS and the unique opportunity it had provided for such amongst 
as diverse a group of countries as that participating in the ATS. 
Furthermore, the stability and peace the treaty had made possible was 
unique and there was no visible need to change a system which worked 
as well as it did. The Consultative States' representatives noted that 
a number of the assumptions mentioned by non-member states were, in 
their opinions, incorrect and that efforts should be made by those 
states to inform themselves further on the facts of the ATS.39 Similar 
stands have been maintained on United Nations discussions on 
Antarctica in subsequent years as noted in the speeches of the 
Consultative Parties' chairman at the United Nations (the Australian 
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representative).40 
The following year (1984), the foc us of debate in the First Committee 
centred on three issues : aspects of participation in the ATS being 
exclusive; the distribution of the potential wealth of Antarctica 
under the ATS and the then developing "minerals regime"; and South 
African participation as a Consultative Party in the ATS.41 In the 
defence from the Consultative Parties' spokesman on pOints raised 
during the debates no mention was mode of objections to South African 
participation in the ATS.42 At the end of the 1984 debates, South 
Africa was again not mentioned in the resolution (39/152 of 17 
December, 1984) adopted .43 The unwillingness of the Consultative 
members to heed the resolutions pertaining to Antarctica was stated by 
them, however .44 
The parti cular references to South African participation were again 
brought up during the debates in 1985. Unlike previous years, however, 
a resolution focusing on South Africa was drafted and adopted. The 
resolution, L85 , was formulated by the African states and submitted by 
Mauritius . The resol ution concentrated on demonstrating concern over 
South Africa's position as a Consultative Party and advocated the 
expulsion of South Africa at the earliest possible date. 45 Strong 
disapproval on this resolution, as well as the other two adopted by 
the First Committee and General Assembly, was demonstrated by the 
Consultative States in their refusal to participate in the debate and 
voting on the Antarctica question. Noteworthy exceptions did exist in 
the way of Indian and Chinese participation in voting only on the 
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South African resolution. However, while both broke rank with the rest 
of the Consultative Parties by voting in favour of resolution L85, 
both felt that such action was based on issues outside of the ATS and 
this did not contradict the position of the Consultative Parties' 
support for the ATS.46 More adamant rejection of the vote on 
resolution L85 was voiced by Australia's representative, Richard 
Wolcott, when he stated that South Africa would not be expelled.47 
During the actual debates Mr Wolcott argued that the general view of 
the Consultative Parties was that "Antarctica was a case where 
fundamental difference over apartheid should not inhibit the ~ursuit 
of objectives which could advance the interests of mankind." 48 
Additional pOints were made that because of the geographic proximity 
and the work done by South Africa in Antarctica, there were 
"advantages in South Africa's continuing to be bound by the Antarctic 
Treaty's provisions.,,49 SInce then the position of the Consultative 
Parties has remained essentially the same in support for the ATS and 
opposing the introduction of South Africa's internal policies into the 
Antarctic debate. In general, the attitude of the Consultative States 
on the United Nations debate has been characterized thus: 
Moreover the opening up of extraneous ques'tions I ike South 
African membership runs the rIsk of taking matters out of 
Malaysia's hands. In any event critics of the Treaty face a group 
of Treaty Parties which is very influential, determined and 
united on the merits of the Treaty. The Treaty system has shown 
itself to be resilient, has consolidated itself organisationally 
and is growing in numbers. Moreover, to judge from debates in the 
United Nations, Antarctica is not a subject of real interest to 
many delegations. (50) 
Still, the final General Assembly vote recorded in favour of 
resolution L8S (100-0-12 and 37 not participating) was noticeably 
higher than those of the other two resolutions, L82 (96-0- 11 and 41 
96 
not participating) calling for an expanded United Nations study of 
Antarcti ca and L83 (92-0-14 and 43 not participating) on request for 
information on the minerals talks. 51 Furthermore, this trend has 
continued to the present. As for the Contracting Parties' position, 
they in general did not and do not foresee any future role for the 
United Nations in Antarct ica, a view which their attitudes have 
demonstrated. 52 
At the 1986, 1987 and 1988 United Nations sessions similar, if not 
identical, resolutions were adopted re-iterating the appeal to the 
other Consultative members to expel South Africa irrespective of the 
consensual limitations existing in the Antarctic Treaty. On 
Consultative Parties voting on these particular resolutions, it was 
stated from them that "the treaty parties would vote according to 
their individual attitudes but in ways which would not affect their 
position on the successful functioning of the Antarctic Treaty.,,53 
Nonetheless, the South African resolution gained further numerical 
support in 1986 as well as in 1987 . Those states which up to 1988 had 
broken rank from the other Consultative Parties and voted on the South 
African resolutions were Argentina, Brazil, China, German Democratic 
Republic, India, Poland and the Soviet Union. 54 However, by 1988 
Pol and and the Soviet Union were again not participating in the vote 
on the South African resolution leaving five states still doing so.55 
As for the arguments put forward to substantiate the need to expel 
South Africa from the ATS, Beck summarized the campaign in the 
following manner: 
Another preoccupation of the critical lobby concerned South 
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Africa's role in the ATS. Several Afro-Asian nations (most 
notably Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and 
Rwanda) recalled recent OAU (UN 1985: 73) and NAM declarations 
(UN 1986: 94-98), when pressing for South Africa's exclusion from 
ATCMs. As in previous years, no delegate provided a coherent 
explanation of how South Africa's exclusion would help the 
Antarctic scene, given its proximity to, and activity within, 
Antarctica. The case was argued only upon the basis of non-
Antarctic criteria (UN 1987g: 54-57), though Ghana did introduce 
a novel element: 'The racist regime does not represent, nor 
extend the benefits of its activities in Antarctica, to the 
overwhelming majority of its citizens, because of the 
unacceptable system of apartheid' (UN 1987c: 46). (56) 
Thus the essential questions raised by the campaign to achieve the 
expulsion of South Africa from the ATS can be Identified as first, 
what purpose would such an expulsion serve in the history of 
diplomatic isolation of that country, and second what benefits would 
be gained in the ATS by effecting the expulsion of South Africa. But, 
as it is argued in the Beck passage above, it is clear that the urge 
to expel South Africa from the ATS has not so much to do with actual 
concern over its involvement in the ATS as it does to political issues 
beyond the scope of the ATS. In particu lar, the specific references in 
the resolutions to justify suspension clearly do not relate to South 
African activities In the ATS but to its apartheid policies practised 
within South Africa. 57 The campaign, then, is to advance the older 
issues of finding ways to put pressure on the South African government 
to effect political changes at home. As has been inferred from the 
general consensus of most Consultative Parties, their concerns over 
South African participation differ from those states seeking South 
Africa's expulsion from the ATS, namely South Africa's regional and 
strategic interests vis a vis political concerns beyond the realm of 
Antarctic co-operation. But with obvious splits developing within the 
Contracting Parties over South Africa's continued presence in the ATS 
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the future of the ATS and South Africa's future role in it, especi ally 
after 1991, remains unclear. For the time being South Africa's 
continued presence in the ATS poses the greatest threat to the future 
of the ATS itself. 58 Furthermore, as it is highly unlikely that South 
Africa would yield to expulsion from the ATS, the situation will most 
likely remain the same at least until 1991, when the Antarctic Treaty 
could come up for review. 
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CHAPTER V 
The Defense of and Future Prospects for the Antarctic Policy 
of the Republic of South Africa 
The future of South Africa's continued presence. in the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) will probably be, as the history of South Africa's 
Antarctic policy has been, a continued endeavour for acceptance. A 
number of factors such as timing and expected changes in South 
Africa's domestic policies will have major bearings on the final 
decision but that decision will ultimately be left to the Consultative 
Parties of the ATS. In the short term, that is until 1991, South 
Africa's position will most likely remain secure because of provisions 
in the Antarctic Treaty and the attitudes of most Consultative 
Parties . In the long term, particularly after 1991, its position will 
potentially become less certain with much depending on international 
perceptions of changes in South Africa's domestic situation, the 
possibilities of a treaty review as set down in Article XII of the 
Antarctic Treaty, and the interest of a majority of Consultative 
States in maintaining the status quo. As South Africa's presence has 
become the most divisive factor within the ATS,1 a number of questions 
will be raised over the need to keep Antarctica separate from other 
international issues and the value of keeping South Africa in the ATS. 
The short term prospects, that is until 1991 when changes to the 
treaty will be able to be enacted not by consensus but by a simple 
majority of Consultative Parties, will be mainly directed by Articles 
IX through XII of the Antarctic Treaty and the willingness of the 
other Consultative Parties to effect an expulsion at the expense of 
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potentially violat ing the treaty. With regard to the different Treaty 
Articles , a number of relevant points are addressed. Artic le IX 
paragraphs and 2 make references to the rights of full participation 
in the Treaty's administrative organ by those states named in the 
preamble, of which South Africa is one. 2 Paragraph 4 of the same 
article is the most important as its stipulation that decisions on 
those measures to be dealt with (as outlined in Article IX, paragraph 
1) by the Consultative Parties "shall become effective when approved 
by all the Contracting [Consultative} Parties whose representatives 
were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those 
measures".3 This entrenches the principle of full consensus. Article X 
of the treaty lays down that all activities in Antarctica be 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. This particular 
clause has aroused the interest of most of the United Nations members 
in relation to South Africa's presence in the ATS and has been used to 
justify its expulsion from the ATS.4 In response, the Consultative 
Parties have countered that as they have not seen South Africa's 
apartheid policies practised in Antarctica, no justification exists to 
expel it under Article X. Disputants amongst Contracting States of 
the Antarctic Treaty are required under Article XI to seek peaceful 
solutions, which ensures responsible conduct by the parties involved 
vis a vis the treaty.5 This particular article could be referred to by 
South Africa should a dispute over its presence significantly escalate 
amongst the Consultative Parties, but the final option of referral to 
the International Court of Justice for settlement would pose problems. 
As South Africa is not a signatory to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, it cannot approach the Court for relief. This was 
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pOinted out in the case of South Africa's non-designation to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in 1978 
in violation of the IAEA Statute. 6 Article XII 1a demonstrates another 
safeguard protecting South Africa's presence, namely that any 
modifications or amendments to the existing treaty must be made with 
the approval of all Contracting States: 
The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by 
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment 
shall enter into force wh~n the depository Government has 
received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have 
ratified it.(7) 
Thus, changes in the treaty including those aimed at changing South 
Africa's status could be easily blocked by South Africa. Article 
XII 1b is significant in that it provides the only means by which a 
Contracting Party could withdraw from the treaty by way of non-
ratification of a change to the treaty: 
Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force 
as to any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification by 
it has been received by the depository Government. Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is 
received within a period of two years from the date of entry into 
force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article shall be deemed 
to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date of the 
expiration of such period. (8) 
Paragraph 2 of Article XII essentially details the procedure whereby, 
after 30 years in force, a review of the treaty can be called by any 
of the Contracting Parties. Furthermore, any modifications will only 
require a simple majority. If a Contracting Party fails to ratify the 
modified or amended treaty within two years after the changes are 
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made, that state may withdraw from the treaty with effect from two 
years after notification. Thus, Article XII defines the protection of 
rights South Africa will enjoy until 1991 when the Antarctic Treaty's 
30th year in force will be reached. However, a further pOint needs to 
be made concerning any possibility of expulsion of South Africa before 
the treaty comes up for review after 1990. 
Not all international organizations have strictly adhered to the 
limits set in their constitutions when opting for the exclusion of 
South Africa. Two specific examples relevant on this point are the 
rejection of credentials and subsequent denial of participation of 
South Africa from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) since 
1974, and the non-designation of South Africa as the African member 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). In both cases legal assessments of these actions concluded 
that there had been serious violations of the United Nations Charter 
and Rules of Procedure of the General AsSembly,9 and the Statute of 
the IAEA. 10 This returns us to Jacobson's two types of organizations, 
those controlled by participant decision-making subsystems (one 
state, one vote) and those controlled by representative decision 
making subsystems (weighted or consensual voting).ll 
As noted earlier, South Africa has nearly always been excluded from 
those identified as being part of the participant subsystem where 
numerically the "Non-Aligned" states but particularly African 
countries have had a major say on the organization's agendas. On the 
other hand, South Africa has remained in many of the representative 
subsystem controlled organizations where a good number of Western 
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European, North American and the Japanese governments have dominated. 
If one then looks at the list of countries which have played major 
roles in those representative subsystem organizations (such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Vnited Nations 
Security Council, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and 
the list of countries which have repeatedly opposed the expulsion or 
suspension of South Africa from most participant subsystem 
organizations, a notable correlation can be found. 12 When these 
countries are individually identified, a significant number of these 
countries make up most of the list of Consultative Parties In the ATS 
(namely Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany).13 
In more recent developments, two are worth noting . With noticeable 
changes in Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s, pressure from that 
country and one other particular member of the Soviet bloc (Poland) to 
isolate South Africa Internationally has appeared to ease. The first 
evidence of this appeared in the non-participation by most of the 
Soviet bloc on the resolutions calling for the expulsion of South 
Africa from the ATS.14 In later sessions, some of the Soviet bloc 
countries did begin voting in favour of the South African expulsion 
resolutions, but by 1988 the Soviet and Polish governments had again 
taken to not participating on these resolutions. 15 In 1987 the Soviet 
Union showed a further change in attitude towards South African 
exclusion when they refused to support a move by African countries to 
suspend South Africa from the IAEA. The Soviet Union noted that the 
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IAEA was one organization where exclusion was not favoured. and this 
stance was repeated in 1988 at the IAEA's general conference in 
Vienna. No clear reasons were given for their opposition. but it 
succeeded in defeating the moves for suspension. 16 Thus. if one 
assumes such an attitude will continue until 1991 in a broader sense, 
then an evident majority of Consultative Parties will likely oppose 
South Africa's exclusion. 
In the long term, South Africa's position is less secure. as it will 
most likely remain dependent on internal and external factors 
potentially beyond its control. As the focus of current controversy 
over South Africa's Consultative Party status has had to do not with 
its Antarctic policy but its internal race policies, the question to 
be resolved in the ATS will be, to what extent will extraneous 
political issues, such as international opposition to apartheid. be 
allowed to influence the operation of the ATS. The historical 
precedent set by the Contracting Parties against allowing non-related 
issues to influence the ATS has been exemplary. When the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in 1980 the United States implemented a decision 
to curtail scientific co-operation with the Soviet Union but Antarctic 
research co-operation was exempted. When Argentina and the United 
Kingdom went to war over the Falkland Islands. this did not affect 
their participation in the ATS and the negotiations over Antarctic 
marine living resources and minerals. l? The general reason given for 
these examples of co-operation has been that there exists a keen 
interest "to maintain the norm that wherever possible. Antarctica not 
be linked to other issues in the international political arena.,,18 If 
this attitude can be maintained amongst a majority of the Contracting 
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Parties, then South Africa's continued presence in the ATS can be 
expected. The ambiguity remains from those states (Argentina, Brazil, 
India, China and the German Democratic Republic) which have voted in 
the United Nations to exclude South Africa, yet have argued that this 
does not affect their support for the maintenance of the ATS.19 
The apparent changes in Soviet attitudes could also be included as 
positive developments for South Africa's position in the ATS. With the 
downgrading of influence of the Soviet Union in the foreign policies 
of other eastern European states, their predictability is also likely 
to decline. Concern over keeping extraneous issues out of the ATS 
could have a greater influence in the future decisions of these 
countries but not necessarily be the only concern. Other concerns 
could include, . and have included, the implications of having South 
Africa outside of the ATS not being bound by the restraints set in the 
ATS20 and pressure from states outside of the ATS. Yet with the 
international community still watching developments inside South 
Africa, how the world will perceive the changes enacted by the De 
Klerk government will inevitably sway the attitudes of some states. 
Besides those states which could go one way or the other, those which 
have before not supported exclusion will, for the foreseeable future, 
likely maintain the same attitude. This, however, does not discount a 
possible greater concern over extraneous issues finding their way into 
the ATS for unanticipated reasons. 
Thus, the outlook for South Africa's remaining in the ATS appears more 
optimistic than pessimistic at this time. Greater concern has been 
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displayed by the Contracting Parties over the introduction of 
political issues which are not considered to directly affect the 
functioning of the ATS than over supporting calls for the exclusion of 
South Africa because of its domestic racial policies. The majority of 
members of the United Nations will be likely to continue urging the 
exclusion of South Africa from the ATS. but neither time nor general 
support from the Contracting Parties appears forthcoming. Until 1991 
South Africa will remain soundly protected by provisions within the 
Antarctic Treaty. After 1991 the future will remain less secure. 
However. with the past record of many Consultative Parties and the 
late changes in policy in others towards supporting total South 
African diplomatic isolation. not to mention precedent in relation to 
international politics affecting the Question of the ATS. it appears 
that most states may choose to leave the apartheid issue outside of 
the realm of the ATS . 
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CONCLUSION 
As the world became a smaller place through developments in technology 
and communications, places such as Artarctica became less remote than 
they once were, both physically and mentally . While this happened, 
those countries nearest or most willing to pursue interests in the 
Antarctic established footholds from which to develop and expand their 
interests . In a period of less than a century, then, interest in the 
Antarctic increased from a handful of countries at first, at the end 
of the 19th century, to virtually all countries by the 1980s. More 
specifically, before the 1980s barely a couple of dozen countries had 
shown any interest whatsoever. This attention to Antarctica developed 
for many reasons, much depending on the individual attitudes of 
governments . However, this does not mean that interest in the 
Antarctic centred on concerns over the Antarctic region, since some 
countries were looking at wider issues. 
On the one hand, most of the ear liest states involved in the Antarctic 
were there pursuing national interests, mainly economic or to enhance 
their prestige. In time, most countries' attention shifted away from 
the pursuit of individual national interests to favouring broader 
international co-operation to benefit a larger number of countries. 
This new approach was then formalized and entrenched through the 
creation of a multilateral convention, namely the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959, by the countries mutually accepted as having demonstrated 
significant interest in the Antarctic by that time. The focus here 
downplayed individual states' interests in favour of the general well-
being of the Antarctic itself. This arrangement has since been 
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maintained by the wide range of governments involved in the Antarctic 
Treaty System to what is accepted as their satisfaction. 
On the other hand, much wider interest evolved in the 1980s mainly 
from a large number of countries which found themselves outside the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) for a number of reasons . Some 
concentrated on their inability to gain an effective voice in the 
administration of Antarctica, which resulted in their criticisms 
and/or attacks on the ATS for what they felt to be its "exclusive" 
nature. Most recently, concern has increased with the ATS Consultative 
Parties' creation of a "Minerals Regime" for Antarctica, which many 
countries felt excluded them from any benefits, should commercial 
mining ever commence in Antarctica . However, other states, some with 
little direct interest in or understanding of current Antarctic 
politics have chosen to focus on issues not related to the 
administration and protection of Antarctica in order to question the 
legitimacy of the ATS. Here, then, can be identified the basis of the 
current debate over the presence of South Africa within the ATS and 
South Africa's ccrresponding policy. 
South Africa has since 1960 pursued an Antarctic policy consistent 
with the goals and objectives of the ATS and no state has openly 
questioned this. What some countries outside the ATS have apparently 
sought to do is introduce their oPPosition to South Africa's domestic 
policies into the debate over Antarctica, not necessarily for the sake 
of addressing Antarctic issues. Specifically, a majority of countries 
in the United Nations have called on the other Consultative Parties of 
the Antarctic Treaty to exclude South Africa at the earliest date 
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possible, and have done so without understanding the safeguards in the 
Treaty which protect South Africa at least until 1991. The attempt to 
introduce what some governments have felt to be peripheral issues 
unrelated to the functioning of the ATS, such as the international 
campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically, has in the past been 
rejected by the majority of the ATS Consultative Parties; yet it is 
this issue which now poses the greatest threat to the functioning of 
the ATS. But for South Africa this can be looked at in two ways. 
Firstly, international calls for South Africa's exclusion from the ATS 
can be seen as another step in the moves to isolate South Africa 
diplomatically. In this case it would be from participating in 
international organizations, with the objective of pressuring it to 
make changes in its domestic policies. As the Antarctic Treaty 
Organization (ATD) is one of the few remaining international 
organizations in which South Africa still enjoys its full 
participatory rights, it is only logical that international pressure 
would inevitably target this organization . Pressure from African 
countries, many of which have had much to do with the debate on this 
issue, could be interpreted in light of the fact that South Africa is 
the only African country in the ATS. At the same time it should be 
noted that few, if any, African countries have ever shown any interest 
in getting involved in the ATS. This question is likely to remain 
unresolved until after 1991 and in the end it will not be universal 
opinion but the decision of South Africa's fellow Consultative Parties 
which will decide. 
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Secondly, the international call for South Africa's exclusion can be 
seen as but another obstacle in the history of an Antarctic policy 
rife with obstacles long before South Africa ever faced opposition 
over its domestic policies. From the beginning, South Africa's 
Antarctic policy faced, first, internal resistance, effectively until 
the post-World War II period. Because of this South Africa was late in 
establishing visible interests in the Antarctic compared to all other 
countries adjacent to it. When the National Party came to power in 
1948 it faced international resistance to an acceptance that South 
Africa had serious interests in the Antarctic, since successive South 
African governments had effectively done little to establish tangible 
ones there. In fact, the serious pursuit and development of a South 
African Antarctic policy could be attributed mainly to the efforts of 
the National Party governments since 1948. The intention of this 
pursuit of policy, compared to previous government activity, could be 
explained not so much in terms of economic interests, but in building 
on national pride and prestige. With the almost immediate expansion of 
existing meteorological programs on surrounding sub-Antarctic islands 
and questioning South Africa's exclusion from proposed international 
talks on Antarctica in 1948, the National Party government from the 
start aimed at establishing a high profile position for South Africa. 
The extent of this was exemplified in the reconsideration of whether 
South Africa would annex a sector of Antarctica, something which 
previous governments failed to do and which almost cost South Africa 
the right to participate in the development of an administrative 
system for Antarctica. Through considerable manoeuvering, the South 
African government overcame international resistance to the 
recognition of its interests and by 1958 succeeded in entrenching 
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itself in Antarctic politics. As for the issue of national prestige. 
this may in the earliest days have focused on Afrikaner nationalism 
but. very soon after. it was quite obviously oriented towards general 
prestige for the country. This is not to say that prestige was the 
sole motivating factor; for South Africa has derived enormous 
scientific benefit. particularly In the field of meteorology. 
Scientific factors were. in fact. recognized as far back as the 1930s 
with meteorology being the main thrust of research policy until the 
1960s. From all of this. then. the calls for South Africa's exclusion 
could be seen as just another phase of resistance facing its Antarctic 
policy which originated long before any international oPPosition 
developed over its domestic policies. 
In the end. the main question over the future of South Africa's 
Antarctic policy which remains is this: Will South Africa's Antarctic 
policy and the management policies of the Antarctic Treaty System 
remain separate from the major debate over the domestic policies of 
the Republic of South Africa as they did until the 1980s. and. if not. 
to what extent will the debate over what many would argue to be an 
issue unrelated to the administration of Antarctica be allowed to 
affect the Antarctic Treaty System? The answer could go either way. as 
South Africa's domestic and foreign policies have been uniquely inter-
twined because of circumstance and. as such. one will affect the 
international community's attitudes towards the other. Notwi th -
standing. the Consultative Parties of the ATS have set and adhered to 
the precedent of not allowing external political questions to 
Intervene or to influence the functioning of the ATS. 
112 
Notes 
Introduction 
1. e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile and the United 
Kingdom, and later, France and Norway. 
2. Although consideration of establishing a territorial claim was 
mooted in the South African government in the 1930s, it was not 
until the 1950s, long after existing claims had been set, that 
the South African government seriously examined the possibility 
of staking a claim on the Antarctic continent. 
3. In its various forms since the 1950s. See Appendix K for the 
latest development. 
4. The South African National Council for Antarctic Research 
(SANCAR), later known as the South African Scientific Committee 
for Antarctic Research (SASCAR) and soon likely to be renamed the 
South African National Antarctic Research Programme (SANARP), has 
co-ordinated South Africa's scientific activities in the 
Antarctic since the mid-1950s. (See Appendix J, letter from the 
Foundation for Research Development (FRO) on "The Antarctic 
Programme and the New Mission and Strategy of he FRO", dated 
23 . 3.89.) . 
5. Sara Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations Between 
the Two World Wars (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 
1987), pp.2-3, 6-9, 21-25. 
6. Allan Peter Berman, "South Africa and the Antarctic: The 
International Aspect" (unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University 
of the Witwatersrand , 1968), pp.12-23. 
7. E W Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London: George Allen 
& Unw in Ltd . , 1951), p.51. 
B. Captain James Cook, The Journals of Captain James Cook, ed. by 
J C Beaglehole (4 vols. Cambridge: University Press, 1961), II, 
p.49 . 
9. Ibid., p.50. These discoveries consisted of what are now known as 
the Marion and Prince Edward Islands which became South African 
on 29 December, 1947 (Marion) and 4 January, 1948 (Prince 
Edward). Frank A Simpson, ed., The Antarctic Today (Wellington: A 
H and A W Reed, 1952), p.307 . 
10. Apsley Cherry-Garrard, The Worst Journey in the World (2nd ed. : 
London : Constable and Company Ltd., 1929), p.xviii. 
11. Cook, Journals of Captain James Cook, I, pp. 456-466; II, pp.45-
52, pp.653-650; IV, pp.255-258, 308-310, 437-440, 447, 509-512, 
685-686. 
113 
12. Captain Cook put in at Cape Town on the following dates: 3 March 
- 15 April, 1771; 30 October - 22 November, 1772; 21 March - 22 
April, 1775; and 18 October to the end of November, 1776. 
13. Cook, Journals of Captain James Cook, p.685. 
14. T R H Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (3rd ed.: 
Johannesburg : MacMillan South Africa Ltd., 1987), pp.42-43. 
British forces took final possession of the Cape of Good Hope in 
1806 but it was not until 1815 that Great Britain took legal 
possession by treaty with the Netherlands. 
15. After whom the Ross Ice Shelf and Ross Dependency in Antarctica 
were named. 
16. Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem p.137; Deputy Inspector-
General R M'Cormlck, Voya es of Discovery in the Arctic and 
Antarctic Seas and Round the Wor d vols.: Lon on: Sampson Low, 
Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1884), I, pp.36-44; 360-365. 
17. Captain Robert Falcon Scott, The Voyage of the "Discovery" (2 
vols.: London: Smith, Elder and Co ., 1905), I, pp.95-98. 
18. Hunter Christie, Antarctic Problem, p.180. 
19. Sir Ernest Shackleton, The Heart of the Antarctic (London: 
William Heinemann, 1910) , p.20. The ship left Cape Town on 7 
August, 1907. 
20. Rear Admiral ERG R Evans, South with Scott (London: Co lli ns 
Clear-Type Press, 1921), p.36. 
21. Cherry-Garrard , Worst Journey in the World, p.31. 
22. Ibid ., pp.21, 29, 31-32; Evans, South with Scott, pp.26-26; 
Stephen Gwynn, Captain Scott (London : John Lade The Bodley Head 
Ltd., 1929), pp.165-168. 
23. Sir Douglas Mawson, Home of the Blizzard (2 vols.: London: 
William Heinemann, 1915). I. pp.18, 20. 
24 . Commander Frank Wild, Shackleton's Last Voyage (London: Cassell 
and Company Ltd., 1923), p.6. 
25. Ibid., pp.290-293. 
26. There were not many expeditions sent in the 1920s but with the 
appointment of the "Discovery" Committee in March 1923 formal 
government involvement in Antarctic research developed which 
carried on into the 1950s and after. In 1929-1930, the British, 
Australian, New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE) 
was sent using the "Discovery" Committee vessels "Discovery II" 
and "Wi lliam Scoresby". These two ships became the focus of 
Commonwealth Antarctic research in the 1930s. As in earlier 
expeditions Cape Town "as used by the BANZARE as a stopping 
114 
point on the way to the Antarctic. 
27. This became evident in light of the fact that most Antarctic 
policy was initiated in the Department of Commerce and 
Industries, which was responsible for controlling whaling 
activities and policy. 
Chapter I 
1. Frank A Simpson, ed., The Antarctic Today (Wellington: A Hand 
A W Reed, 1952), p.22. This point was brought out in connection 
with the exploration motives of Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa owing to their proximity to Antarctica. 
2. Namely, under the Governor-General before a policy was 
established, and then the Department of Commerce and Industries. 
The choice of this department was apparently linked to its 
control of the Fisheries Survey which oversaw Antarctic whaling 
activities. From this the Department of Commerce and Industries 
came to supervise nearly all Antarctic economic, as well as most 
political activities. However, all foreign policy issues were 
handled by the Department of External Affairs. As the Department 
of Foreign Affairs fell under the portfolio of the Prime Minister 
until 1955 this meant that most of the development of Antarctic 
policy was handled by him at the ministerial level. 
3. Along with Great Britain, Canada , Australia and New Zealand. 
4. Union of South Africa, Office of the Governor-General, Fisheries 
Whale Antarctic memorandum on British policy in the Antarctic 
prepared for Imperial Conference CE101 Report of Committee of 
Imperial Conference whIch was adopted by Conference CE130 Revise 
application of Kerguelen Seal and WhalIng Company at Cape Town 
for lIcence to conduct whaling company at Cape Town for lIcence 
to conduct whalIng operations proposed aerial expedition to South 
Pole under the leadershIp of Commander Byrd. Doc. No. 
SAB 387036742, Ref. 70/311 (Pretoria: South African Government 
Archives, 1926-1930), 1926 Imperial Conference Report of the 
Committee on British Policy in the Antarctic, E.130. (Revise), 
p.1. 
5. Ibid., pp.1-2. The only areas officially claimed by 1926 were the 
Falkland Islands Dependency and the Ross Dependency, both under 
British control, and Adelie Land (France). 
6. Ibid., pp.2-3. 
7. Lars Christensen was one of the main Norwegian whaling 
industrialists whose company's activities off the "African 
quarter" coast of Antarctica formed the basis of Norwegian claim 
to that area in the late 1930s. 
115 
8. Later known as Byrd Land after Admiral Byrd's exploration of the 
area, or more commonly referred to as v/est Antarctica. 
9. Frank A Simpson, ed . , The Antarctic Today (Wellington: A Hand 
A W Reed, 1952), p.60. The practice of issuing whaling licences 
was adopted by New Zealand after the British government 
transferred administration of the Ross Dependency to them in 
1923. 
10. Union of South Africa, 
Antarctic Memorandum on 
Conference Report, pp.3-4. 
Governor-General, Fisheries, Whale, 
British Policy ... , 1926 Imperial 
11. Ibid. L S Amery, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to South 
African Minister of External Affairs, 6 October, 1928 (telegram). 
12. Ibid. "It will be remembered that Conference [of 1926} approved 
report of special committee recommending that title should be 
asserted to all areas enumerated in summary of proceedings and 
that particular area(s) now in question [in the requested 
licences} should be placed under the control of his Majesty's 
Government in the Commonwealth of Australia if they were willing 
(see Paper E.130 Revise enclosed in my despatch of the 5th 
January, 1927 Secret)." 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. L S Amery to South African Minister of External Affairs, 22 
October, 1928 (correspondence). 
15. Allan Peter Berman, "South Africa and the Antarctic: The 
International Aspect" (unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University 
of the Witwatersrand, 1968), pp.12-23. The whaling issues of 
this period are discussed here. In particular, South Africa 
signed the 1931 International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of 
Whaling and the 1938 protocol on whaling. South Africa further 
participated in the International Whaling Conferences held in 
London in 1944 and 1945, and in Washington in 1946. South Africa 
is still currently a member of the International Whaling 
CommisSion. 
16. Union of South Africa, Governor-General, Fisheries, Whale, 
Antarctic Memorandum on British Policy ... , British Delegation in 
Oslo to the Right Honourable, Lord Cushenden, 7 September, 1928 
(telegram). 
17. Ibid. British Foreign Office to A D E Gascoigne, 18 October, 1928 
~(confidential telegram). 
18. Ibid., p.3. 
19. Berman, South Africa and the Antarctic, pp.24-27. 
116 
20. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
Imperial Conference 1937 Committee on Polar Questions, New 
Hebrides, Western Samoa, The Antarctic. Doc. No. SAB 387086111, 
Ref. PS12/10/13 (PretorIa: South African Government Archives, 
1937) , Memorandum Prepared by His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom entitled "Situation in the Antarctic", E.(37) 6., 
p.7. See Appendix B map. 
21. Union of South Africa, Treasury, Miscellaneous, The Union and the 
Antarctic. Doc. No. SAB 287274806, Ref. F20/495 (Pretoria: South 
AfrIcan Government Archives, 1934-1947), Memorandum from Chairman 
of the External Trade Relations Committee to the Secretary for 
Finance, 26 March, 1935, p.1. 
22. Union of South Africa , Department of Commerce and Industries, 
Imperial Conference 1937, "Memorandum Prepared by His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom", pp.5-8 . 
23. Eastern Antarctica is the part of Anta6ctica lying east of the 
Greenwich Meridian (0 ) and west of 180 longitude. 
24. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Sector of Antarctic General, Doc. No. 387024027, 
Ref. 455 (Pretoria: South African Government Archives, 1935), 
Enclosure to Mr Dormer's despatch No. 336 of 22 September, 1934 
entitled "Whaling News: Japanese Competition in the Antarctic". 
25. Union of South Africa, The Union and the Ant arctic, Confidential 
Memorandum from the Chairman of the External Trade Relations 
Committee to the South African Secretary for Finance, pp .1-2. 
26. Ibid. , p.2. 
27. Ibid. , p.3. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., p.4. 
30 . Ibid ., p.5. 
31. Union of South Africa, South African Sector of Antarctic General, 
Memorandum from W J Lamont of the Department of Commerce and 
Industries to Dr H 0 J Bodenstein, Secretary for External 
Affairs, 18 October , 1935. 
32. Australia and the Australian Antarctic Territory; New Zealand and 
the Ross Dependency; and the United Kingdom and the Falkland 
Islands Dependency. 
33 . Union of South Africa, South African Sector of Antarctic, 
Memorandum of the Department of External Affairs, 30 January, 
1935, p.2. 
34. Ibid., p.3. The "Geographic Contiguity" principle originated with 
117 
Canada as a means of laying claim to all islands within the area 
comprising and following Canada's eastern and western boundaries' 
lines of longitude to the north pole. The Soviet Union later 
applied this principle also in the Arctic. This principle was 
then applied to Antarctica with all claims dividing the continent 
into wedge shaped sectors leading to the South Pole. The 
exception to this is Norway which in an ambiguous manner has orly 
laid claim to the coast line of its sector. 
35. Ibid., p.4. 
36. Ibid. South African High Commissioner, London to South African 
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, 14 May, 1935 
(correspondence). 
37. Ibid. Memorandum of the Department of External Affairs, 30 
January, 1935, p.4. 
38. Ibid. Minutes of a meeting of the External Trade Relations 
Committee held at Pretoria, 29 June, 1935, pp.3-7. 
39. Ibid. Confidential Memorandum from the Director of the Fisheries 
Survey to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, entitled 
"South African Sector in the Antarctic", 14 August, 1935, p.l. 
40. Ibid. , p.2. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid., p.3. 
44. Ibid. Confidential Memorandum from the Acting Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries to the Director of the Fisheries Survey, 
3 September, 1935. 
45. Ibid. R L V Shannon , Commanding Officer of the R.S. "Africana", 
~the Director of the Fisheries Survey, 12 September, 1935 
(correspondence). The R.S. "Africana" had been one of the ships 
suggested for possible use to send a South African expedition to 
the Antarctic. 
46. Ibid. Memorandum from J H Thomas to the South African Minister of 
External Affairs, 7 October, 1935. The date is listed as "on or 
about the 3rd November" and "to return to Cape Town in June 
1936". In a memorandum from W J Lamont to the Secretary for 
External Affairs, Dr Bodenstein, 17 October 1935, the date given 
for arrival is 30 November, which is about the same date used in 
a Sunday Times article, 6 October, 1935. The problem with the 
dates offered in the second two sources is that as "Discovery II" 
left Britain on 3 October, 1935, and was due in Freemantle, 
Australia on 18 December, according to the first source (J H 
Thomas) that would make the journey to Cape Town almost two 
118 
months long and to Australia, from Cape Town, around two weeks 
long. 
47. Ibid. J H Thomas, London, to the South African Minister of 
External Affairs , 1 November, 1935, (correspondence), which 
further supported his previous correspondence of 7 October 
stating that the "Discovery II" would reach Cape Town on or about 
3 November as the "William Scoresby", a ship viewed by the South 
Africans as inferior, was scheduled to arrive at Cape Town in 30 
days. 
48. Ibid. Memorandum from D G Malan of the Board of Trade and 
Industries to Secretary for Commerce and Industries, McCullen, 
27 February, 1936 . In it the question "Are we taking any action 
as regards formal annexation of the South African Sector?" was 
asked. 
49. Ibid. 
50 . Ibid. Malcolm MacDonald, Dominions Office, London, to the South 
African Minister of External Affairs, 5 September, 1936 and 14 
October, 1936 (correspondences). 
51. Union of South Africa, Imperial Conference 1937 Committee on 
Polar Questions, Report of the Committee on Polar Questions, E. 
(37) 36, pp.2-4. 
52. Ibid., p.4. 
53. Union of South Africa, South African Sector of Antarctic 
General, South African Secretary for External Affairs to South 
African High Commission in London, 9 August, 1937 (telegram). 
54. Ibid. South African High Commissioner, London, to South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 7 September, 1937 (urgent 
telegram). 
55 . Ibid. 
56. Ibid. Internal Memorandum of the Department of Commerce and 
Industries from A J Stals, me,mber of the Board of Trade and 
Industries, to the Secretary of Commerce and Industries, 20 
September, 1937, pp.1-3. 
57. Ibid., p.3 . 
58. Ibid . W H Louw, Secretary for Commerce and Industries, to J 
Schoeman, Chief Meteorologist in the Department of Irrigation, 
entitled "R.R.S."Discovery II"; Voyage to the Antarctic", 22 
September, 1937 (correspondence). 
59. Ibid. J Schoeman, Chief Meteorologist to W H Louw, Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 22 September, 1937 (correspondence). 
60. Ibid. E P Smith from the office of the Secretary for Commerce and 
119 
Industries to Dr von Bonde, Director of Fisheries, 23 September, 
1937, pp.I-2 (correspondence). 
61. Ibid. Dr von Bonde to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 
~eptember, 1937 (correspondence). 
62. Ibid. Secretary for Commerce and Industries to Secretary for 
External Affairs, 5 October, 1937 (correspondence). 
63 . Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to South 
African High Commissioner in London, 8 October, 1937 (telegram). 
64. Ibid. Secretary for Commerce and Industries to Director of 
rrsneries, 15 September, 1938 (correspondence). 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. Memorandum entitled Invitation from the Commander of the 
Royal Research Ship "Discovery II", from Cape Town, 16 September, 
1938, pp.1-3. 
67. Ibid. A J Bosman of the Office of the Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries to Secretary of the Office of the Hi gh CommisSioner 
for the Union of South Africa in London, 30 September, 1938 
(correspondence). The Commander of the "Discovery II" received 
confirmation of the selection of Mr Charter by telegraph inquiry 
of 10 October, 1938, from him. 
68. Ibid. A J Bosman of the Office of the Secretary 
Industries to Director of Irrigation, 11 
(correspondence). 
for Commerce and 
October, 1938 
69. Ibid. Director of Irrigation to Secretary to the High 
Commissioner in London, 25 October, 1938 (correspondence). 
70. Ibid. Memorandum and attached report from the Director of 
rrsneries to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 18 
November, 1938. The report is a detailed account of Mr Charter ' s 
observations on the cruise lasting from 17 October to 10 
November. The trip. in the end, did not cost the South African 
government any money as the Commander asked that Mr Charter be 
considered as having been a guest of the "Discovery" Committee. 
This was made known in a correspondence to the South African 
Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 16 November, 1938. 
71. Acting as the South African Representative on the "Discovery" 
Committee. 
72. Union of South Africa, 
Political Secretary at 
African Secretary for 
(correspondence). 
South African Sector of Antarctic. 
South Africa House in London to South 
External Affairs, 15 November, 1938 
73. Ibid. Memora ndum from an Under-Secretary for Commerce and 
IndUstries to the Secretary. 9 December, 1938. 
120 
74. Ibid. Secretary for Commerce and Industries to Secretary for 
External Affairs, 24 December, 1938, p.2 (correspondence). 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid., p. 1. 
77. Ibid. Secretary for External Affairs to South African High 
Commissioner in London, 14 February, 1939, p.2 (correspondence). 
78. Ibid., pp.2-3. 
79. Ibid. It is learnt from this document, for example, that a South 
African meteorologist named Engelbrecht did join the February 
expedition. 
80. Ibid., p.3. 
81. Ibid., pp . 3-4. 
82. Ibid. African High Commissioner in London to South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 18 March, 1939 (telegram). 
83. Ibid. Circular Despatch B No.26 from South Africa House in London 
~inister of External Affairs and the Secretary for Commerce 
and Industries, 31 March, 1939. 
84. Ibid. Department of External Affairs secret internal minute, 14 
April, 1939. 
85. Ibid. Secret Minute to the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 
18 April, 1939. See also Appendix B. 
86. Union of South Africa, Imperial Conference 1939, Memorandum 
Prepared by His Majesty's Government In the United Kingdom, E. 
(37) 6., p.7. 
87. It should also be noted that throughout this period 
J B M Hertzog, both Prime Minister and Minister of External 
Affairs, placed more attention on domestic policies than on 
foreign policies especially as by the late 1930s he was facing 
serious problems from within his own government. Forced to deal 
with this, it would appear unlikely that he was able to address 
spec ific concerns such as Antarctic territorial claims (Sarah 
Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations Between the Two 
World Wars, pp.84-95). 
88. Union of South Africa, South African Sector of Antarctica, South 
African Political Secretary in London to South African Secretary 
for External Affairs, 4 April, 1939 (correspondence). 
89. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctica General, 1) Japanese Whaling 
in AntarctIc, 2) Visit of Research ShIPS, WhalIng Grounds Doc. 
No. SAB 387024026, Ref. 455 SG (PretorIa: South African 
121 
Government Archives, 1954-1958), Memorandum entitled "The Union 
and Anta rcti ca", March, 1948, p. 4. 
90. Union of South Africa, South African Sector of Antarctic, 
Chai rman of the "Discovery"Committee to South African Political 
Secretary in London, 21 June, 1939 (correspondence) . In this, the 
Chairman argued that the use of whaling information from the 
expeditions was not intended to be used to benefit or facilitate 
whaling activities but to protect the whale stocks so that the 
whaling industry itself was protected in the long run. The nature 
of future expeditions was also discussed in relation to the 
interests of the Dominions concerned. A reference was also made 
as to the cost of a usual 20-month cruise of the "Discovery II" 
(£50,000) but specific contributions were not addressed. 
91. Ibid . , pp.2-3. 
Chapter II 
1. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Sector General Doc. No. SAB 387024027, Ref. 455 
(Pretor la : South African Government Archives, 1934-1947), South 
African Political Secretary in London to South African Secretary 
for External Affairs, 11 July , 1944 (correspondence). 
2. Ibid. E Mendelsohn, Honorary Secretary of the Geological Society 
~South Africa, to Secretary of the "Discovery" Committee, 21 
September, 1944 (correspondence). This, however, was not the 
first time a South African Antarctic expedition was proposed. In 
1930 a one Captain Joyce proposed an expedition to the part of 
Antarctica immediately south of South Africa but the idea was not 
supported by the government as the British government felt that 
it might disconcert the Norwegians. 
3. Ibid . 
4. Ibid. Acting Secretary for External Affairs to Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 1 December, 1944 (correspondence). 
5. Ibid. Acting Secretary for External Affairs to Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries, 1 December, 1944 (secret 
correspondence). At the "Discovery" Committee meeting of 6 
December, 1944, the South African High Commissioner in London, as 
were people back in Pretoria, was under the impression that the 
focus of the expedition was to be the Weddell Sea. 
6. Ibid. South African Political 
African Secretary for External 
(correspondence). 
Secretary in London to South 
Affairs, 7 December, 1944 
7. Ibid . Secretary for Transport, 12 December, 1944; Secretary for 
Defence, 12 December, 1944; and South African Postmaster-General, 
21 December, 1944, all to the Secretary for Commerce and 
122 
Industries (correspondences). These were all in response to 
inquiries noted in a secret correspondence from the Secretary for 
Commerce and Industries to the Secretary for External Affairs, 5 
December, 1944. Co-operation from the Division of Fisheries also 
appeared limited owing to a large backlo£ of work as explained in 
a correspondence from the Secretary for Commerce and Industries 
to the Secretary for External Affairs, 15 January, 1945. 
8. Ibid. Minutes of Scientific Subcommittee of the "Discovery" 
Committee meeting held 16 January, 1945, p.1. 
9. Ibid. A J Adams, Geological Society of South Africa to Dr C van 
Bonde, Director of Fisheries, .23 February, 1945 (correspondence). 
10. Ibid. J D Pohl, Acting Secretary for External Affairs to High 
Commissioner for the Union of ·South Africa in London, 16 April, 
1945 (correspondence). 
11. Ibid. Minutes of the Scientific Subcommittee of the "Discovery" 
Committee of 15 May, 1945, p.1. 
12. Ibid. 0 B Sole, Acting South African Political Secretary in 
London to South African Secretary for External Affairs, 23 May, 
1945 (correspondence). 
13. Ibid. L C King, Chairman of the South African Antarctic Research 
Committee, to Brigadier B F J Schonland, Scientific Advisor to 
South African Prime Minister, 29 May 1945 (correspondence). 
14. Ibid. Brigadier B F J Schonland, Scientific Advisor to South 
African Prime Minister, to J 0 Pohl, Acting Secretary for 
External Affairs, 8 June, 1945 (correspondence). 
15. Union of South Africa, Research Committee South Africa Antarctic 
Doc. No. SAB 387048389, Ref. M.18!8 (Pretoria: South African 
Government Archives, 1946-1956, South African Antarctic Research 
Committee (SAARC) of the Geological Society of South Africa 
(GSSA) Memorandum entitled "Memorandum Upon a Proposed South 
African Antarctic Expedition", 1946, pp.1-8. 
16. Ibid., p.9. 
17. Ibid. Geological Society of South Africa Memorandum entitled 
"Memorandum Upon a Proposed International Polar Year in the 
Southern Hemi sphere", January, 1946, p. 1 . 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid., pp.1-4. 
20. Ibid. Memorandum entitled "Memorandum Upon a 
International (United Nations) Antarctic Expedition", 
Proposed 
1946, p.1. 
21. Ibid. Minutes of the South African Antarctic Research Committee 
~e Geological Society of South Africa, 13 September, 1946, 
p.1. 
123 
22. Ibid. , p.2. 
23. Ib id. , p.3. 
24. Ibid., p.2. 
25. Ibid . Geological Society of South Africa to Director of the 
Bureau of Meteorological Research of the South African Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research, 24 September, 1945 
(correspondence). 
26. Ibid. High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to South Africa 
to Mr E Mendelsohn , University of Witwatersrand Geological 
Department , 12 October, 1946 (correspondence). 
27. Ibid. Director of the Meteorological Research Bureau to Honorary 
Secretary of the South African Antarctic Research Committee, 31 
October, 1946 (correspondence). 
28. Ibid. Minutes of the South African Antarctic Research Committee 
ror-the meeting of 6 February, 1947. 
29. Ibid., p.3. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. Minutes of the South African Antarctic Research Committee 
for the meeting of 5 November, 1947. 
32. Allan Peter Berman, "South Africa and the Antarctic: the 
Internatior.al Aspect" (Unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University 
of the \vitwatersrand, 1968), pp.41 -44 . 
33. Frank A Simpson, ed . , The Antarctic Today (Wellington: A Hand 
A W Reed, 195;:), pp.304-31Z. The statIon was set up in February, 
1948. 
34. Union of South Africa, Research Committee South Africa Antarctic, 
T E W Schumann, Director of MeteorologIcal Survey, to Professor H 
U Sverdrup, Director of Po lar Inst itute, Oslo and to Secretary of 
Royal Geographical Society, London, 9 October, 1951; Schumann to 
Dr B B Roberts, Scott Polar Research Institute, 12 March, 1951 
(correspondences). 
35. Ibid . A B Crawford, Port Meteorological Officer, Cape Town, to 
Secretary for Transport, 23 April, 1954 (correspondence). 
36. Berman, "South Africa and the Antarct ic: The International 
Aspect", pp .37-38 . 
37 . Ibid., pp.30-31. 
38. Ibid . 
124 
39 . Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South Africa Legation of Antarctic General 1) Japanese Whaling in 
Antarctic 2) Vlsit of Research Ships, Whaling Grounds Doc. No. 
SAB 38?024026, Ref. 455 SG (Pretoria: South Afrlcan Government 
Archives, 1954-1958), prepared memorandum entitled "The Union and 
Antarctica", March 1958, p.5. 
40. Berman, pp.30-31. 
41. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic General, "The Union and 
Antarctlca", March 1958, p.2. 
42. Ibid., p.5. Also, in conforming with the spirit of these 
proposals which limited access to claimant states, the United 
States considered a territorial claim, but this never 
materi a I i zed. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., p.6. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid. , p.? 
4? Ibid. , p.8. 
48. Ibid. , p.9. 
49. Ibid. Berman, p.31: Norway rejected the United States plan on 23 
November, 1948 and United States-Argentina relations had soured 
in that period. It should be noted that Australia and Argentina 
did not favour the second plan of the Condominium at the outset. 
50. Trevor Hatherton, ed., Antarctica (New York: Frederic A Praeger, 
1965), p.28; Sir Vivian Fuchs and Sir Edmund Hillary, The 
Crossing of Antarctica: the Commonwealth Trans-AntarctIC 
Expedltion, 1955-1958 (London: cassell, 1958), p.l0. 
51. Fuchs and Hillary, The Crossing of Antarctica, p.l0 . 
52. Ibid., P .254. 
53. Union of South Africa, Department of Comrrerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic General, "The Union and 
Antarctica", March, 1958, pp.9-14. This was particularly so 
after the Soviet Union asserted its rights in the Antarctic in 
June, 1950, based on discovery and exploration. 
54. Ibid., p.15. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid., p.l? 
125 
57. Ibid., pp.17-19. 
58. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand , Argentina, Chile, 
Ncrway and France. 
59. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. 
60. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, "The Union and Antarctica", March, 1958, p.1? 
61. Ibid . , pp.17-18. 
62. Ibid. , p.18. 
63. Ibid. , p.19. 
64 . Ibid. 
65. Ibid., pp.24-25. 
66. Ibid., p.25. 
67. Ibid., p.26. 
68. Ibid. , p.28. 
69. Ibid., p.29. 
70. Ibid. , pp .29-30 . 
71. Union of South Africa, South Africa Legation of Antarctic 
General, Telegram No.65 from South African Embassy, Washington 
D.C . to South African Secretary for External Affairs, 25 March, 
1958 . 
72. Ibid. Telegram No.66 from South African Embassy, Washington D.C. 
to Secretary for External Affairs, 25 March, 1958, p.l. 
73. Ibid . This point is emphasized in this document. 
74. Ibid. This is what the Aide Memoire called the proposed multi-
lateral treaty. 
75. Ibid., pp.1-2. 
76. Ibid. Telegram No.13 from South African Secretary for External 
Affairs to South African High Commissioner, Canberra, 31 March, 
1958. 
77. Ibid. Telegram No.75 from South African Secretary for External 
Affairs to South African High Commissioner, London, 31 March, 
1958. 
78. Ibid. Telegrams to South African Secretary for External Affairs 
from the South African High Commissioners, London and Canberra, 
126 
Nos.59 and 10, respectively, 1 April, 1958. 
79. Ibid. 
80. This is in light of the total breaks in relations between South 
Africa and the Soviet Union in 1956. 
81. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, South African High Commissioner, Canberra, to South 
African Secretary for External Affairs, 1 April, 1958 (telegram). 
82. Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to South 
Afrfcan Embassy, Washington D.C., 2 April, 1958 (telegram). 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
Ibid. W 0 du Plessis, South African Ambassador, Washington 
~South African Secretary for External Affairs, 2 June, 
(correspondence), and attached report from J G Stewart, 
sellor at the Embassy. 
Ibid. , p.1 of the attached report. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. , pp.1-3. 
Ibid. , p.3. 
Ibid. 
D.C. , 
1958 
Coun-
89. Ibid. Embassy of the USSR to United States State Department, 2 
June, 1958 (copy). 
90. Ibid. J G Stewart, then Charge d'Affaires at South African 
Embassy, Washington D.C., to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 6 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
91. Ibid. J G Stewart, South African Charge d'Affaires, Washington 
~, to South African Secretary for External Affairs, 13 June, 
1958, p.1 (correspondence). 
92. Ibid., pp.1-2. 
93. Ibid. South African Ambassador, Washington D.C., to South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 2 June, 1958, pp.1-3 (attached 
report to correspondence). 
94. Ibid. W C Naude for the South African Secretary for External 
Affairs to J G Stewart, South African Charge d'Affaires, 
Washington D.C., 14 June, 1958, p.3 (correspondence). 
95. Ibid. 
127 
96. J C Heunis, United Nations Versus South Africa (Cape Town: Lex 
Patria, 1986), p.161. 
97. Ibid. W C Naude for the South African Secretary for External 
Affairs to J G Stewart , South African Charge d'Affaires, 14 June, 
1958, p.3 (correspondence). 
98. Ibid. 
99. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 19 June, 1958; M J Botha for the Secretary for External 
Affairs to South African High Commissioners, London and Canberra, 
n.d. (correspondences). 
100. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII (Bristol: Keesing's 
Publications Limited, 1959-1960), December 19-26, 1959, p.17159. 
101. Union of South Africa, Parliament, Hansard's House of Assembly 
Debates, Vo1.101 (1959), cols. 5559-5565; Richard E Bissell, 
Apartheid and International Organizations (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1977), pp.16-30. 
102. Union of South Africa, Hansard's, Vol.l0l, col. 5559. 
Chapter .!l.!. 
1. Richard E Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations 
pp.16-30; A LeRoy Bennett, International OrganizatIons: 
Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1977), pp.170-171. 
2. Jan C Heunis, United Nations Versus South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Lex Patria, 1986, p. 161; Bissell, Apartheid and International 
Organizations, pp . 19-23. South Africa withdrew from particIpating 
in the UnIted Nations General Assembly sessions for three years, 
from 1955 to 1957, and withdrew from any meetings where South 
Africa's domestic policies were discussed as agenda items. 
Furthermore, South Africa "voluntarily" withdrew from the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) in 1956 over its publication of material perceived by 
the South African government to have interfered in its domestic 
affairs. 
3. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic General, 1) Japanese Whaling 
in Antarctic 2} Visit of Research ships, WhalIng Grounds, Doc. 
No. SAB 387024026, Ref. 455 SG (Pretoria: South African 
Government Archives, 1954-1958), J G Stewart, South African 
Charge d'Affaires, Washington D.C., to South African Secretary 
for External Affairs, 11 July, 1958, pp.1-2 (correspondence). 
128 
4. Bissell, pp.17-18, 25-30; Union of South Africa, Parliament, 
Hansard 's House of Assembly Debates, Vol.l0l (1959), cols. 5561-
5563. 
5. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic General, South African 
Secretary for External AffaIrs to South African High 
Commissioners, Canberra and London, 31 March, 1958 (telegram); 
and return responses, 1, 2 and 11 April, 1958; J G Stewart to 
South African Secretary for External Affairs, 19, 24, 30 June /2/ 
and 11 July, 1958 (correspondences). 
6. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 30 June and 11 July, 1958 (correspondences). 
7. Ibid. Prepared memorandum entitled "The Union and Antarctica", 
March, 1958, pp.5-6. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Ibid., p.7. 
Ibid. , p.6. 
Ibid., pp.8-9. 
Ibid., pp.19-20, 24-25. 
Ibid., pp.27-30. 
Ibid. South African Embassy, Washington 
Secretary for External Affairs, 25 March, 
contained the Aide Memoire from the United 
D.C. to South African 
1958 (telegram). It 
States government. 
14 . Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 30 June, 1958, p.2 (first correspondence). 
15. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 30 June, 1958, pp.3-4 (second correspondence). 
16. Union of South Africa, Parliament, Hansard's House of Assembly 
Debates, Vol.l05 (1960), col. 5663. MinIster of External Affairs, 
ErIC Louw, stated that in relation to South Africa's 
participation in the Washington Conference that "South Africa has 
shown its interest in what is happening in Antarctica", again 
emphasizing the "interests" issue. 
17. Namely the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, 
Chile, France, Norway, Belgium, Japan, the Soviet Union, South 
Africa and the organizer, the United States. 
18. Union of South Africa, South Africa Legation of Antarctic 
General, J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 24 June, 1958, pp.1-2 (correspondence). 
19 . Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to 
~Stewart, 14 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
129 
20. Ibi d. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
AJ1'ciirs, 13 June, 1958, p.1 (correspondence). 
21. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 24 June. 1958. p.l (correspondence). 
22. Ibid .• pp.1-2; South African Secretary for External Affairs to J 
~tewart. 14 June, 1958. p.1; J G Stewart to South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 1 July. 1958. p.5 (correspon-
dences). 
23. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
AJ1'ciirs. 24 June. 1958. p.2 (correspondence). 
24. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
AJ1'ciirs. 24 and 30 June, 1958. p.1 (correspondences). The Soviet 
representati ve' s view was noted as "the ta I ks. should be 
confined to the time and place for coference [sic}, procedural 
question and agreement on the general principlas [sic} underlying 
the Treaty". 
25. Ibid .• pp.1 -2. 
26. Ibid . J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 1 July, 1958. pp.2-3 (correspondence). 
27. Ibid., p.3. 
28. Ibid .• p.4. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid . 
31. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs. 10 July. 1958. p.2 (ccrrespondence). 
32. Ibid .• pp.2-3. 
33. Ibid .• pp.3-4 
34. Ibid .• P .4. 
35. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. XII (Bristol: Keesing's 
Publications LimIted. 1959-1950), p.17159. 
36. Union of SOLth Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries. 
South African Legation of Antarctic General. Press release from 
the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., 2 June. 1958. p.3. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs. 6 June. 1958. pp.1-2 (correspondence). 
130 
39. Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to J G 
Stewart, 14 June, 1958, p.3 (correspondence). 
40. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 13 June, 1958, p.2 (correspondence) . 
41. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 24 June, 1958, p.l (correspondence). 
42. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
~irs, 30 June, 1958, pp.1-2 (correspondence). 
43. Ibid., p.2. 
44. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 1 July, 1958, p.2 (correspondence). 
45. Ibid. South African Embassy, Washington D.C., to South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 25 March, 1958 (telegram); J G 
Stewart to South African Secretary for External Affairs, 2 June, 
1958, p.2 (correspondence). 
46. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 13 June, 1958, pp.1-2 (correspondence). 
47. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 11 July, 1958 (correspondence). See Appendix D. 
48. Ibid. Internal government memorandum from the South African 
Secretary for External Affairs to the Secretaries for Transport, 
Defence, and Commerce and Industries, and the President of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 17 July, 
1958. 
49. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 30 June, 1958, p.2 (correspondence). 
50. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
~irs, 10 July, 1958, pp.2-3 and 30 June, 1958, p.2 
(correspondences). This had been discussed earlier by Chile and 
Argentina with the United States. 
51. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
~irs, 11 July, 1958, annexures a-e (correspondence). 
52. Ibid., annexure f. 
53 . Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
ATtairs, 30 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
54. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 6 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
131 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. J G stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 11 July, 1958 (correspondence). 
57. Ibid., p.4. 
58. Union of South Africa, Parliament, Hansard's House of Assembly 
Debate, Vol. 101 (1959), cols. 5559-5560 (speech of Minister of 
External Affairs, Mr E H Louw). 
59. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic, J G Stewart to South African 
Secretary for External Affalrs, 6 June, 1958, pp.3-4 
(correspondence). 
60. Ibid . , p.4. 
61. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 2 June, 1958, p.3 (correspondence). 
62. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 14 June, 1958, p.2 (correspondence). 
63. Ibid., p.3. 
64. Ibid . J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 30 June, 1958, p.l (correspondence). 
65. Ibid., p.3. 
66. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 1 July, 1958, p.2 (correspondence). 
67. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affai rs, 11 Ju ly, 1958, p. 1 (correspondence). 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid., p.3. 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to South 
African Embassy, Washington D.C., 21 July, 1958 (telegram). 
72. Acceding states, on the other hand, do not have any obligations 
to conduct actual activities in Antarctica. At the same time it 
should be noted that Belgium and Norway have ceased scientific 
activities in Antarctica, but neither faces a down-grading from 
Contracting Party status. Thus, what has apparently developed is 
that once a state attains Contracting Party status, the status 
remains permanent. 
73 . R K Headland, "Signatory Governments of the Antarctic Treaty", 
132 
Polar Record, No. 148 (January, 1988), p.64. 
74. Union of South Africa, Department of Commerce and Industries, 
South African Legation of Antarctic General, J G Stewart to South 
African Secretary for External Affairs, 2 June, 1958, p.3 
(correspondence). 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. South African Secretary for External Affairs to 
~Stewart, 14 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
77. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affai rs, 11 Ju ly, 1958, p.3 (correspondence). 
78. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 10 July, 1958, p.4 (correspondence). 
79. Article XII of the Antarctic Treaty. 
80. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, prepared memorandum entitled "The Union and Antarctic", 
March, 1958, p.15; Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: 
Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington D.C.: Resource for the 
Future, Inc., 1985), p.90. 
81. South Africa, South Africa Legation of Antarctic General, 
prepared memorandum entitled "The Union and Antarctica" , March, 
1958, p.15 . 
82. Ibid., p.27. 
83. Ibid. South African High Commissioner, Canberra to South Af.rican 
Secretary for External Affairs, 1 April, 1958 (telegram). 
84. Ibid. Memorandum from J G Stewart to the South African Ambassador 
Tn'Washington, 2 June, 1958, p.3. 
85. Union of South Africa, Hansard's House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 
101 (1959), cols. 5559-5562. 
86. Union of South Africa, South African Legation to Antarctic 
General, South African Secretary for External Affairs to J G 
Stewart, 14 June, 1958, p.l (correspondence). 
87. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affai rs, 1 Ju ly, 1958, p.5 (correspondence). 
88. Ibid. J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 11 June, 1958, pp.3-4 (correspondence). The United 
States had similar views. 
89. R K Headland, p.64. 
133 
90. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, J G Stewart to South African Secretary for External 
Affairs, 1 July, 1958 , p.l (correspondence). 
91. Ibid. 
92. Ibid., pp . 1-2. 
93. Ibid. South African Ambassador Du Plessis to the South African 
Secretary for External Affairs, 2 June, 1958, pp.1-2 (attached 
memorandum to correspondence); South African Secretary for 
External Affairs to J G Stewart 14 June, 1958, pp.1-2; J G 
Stewart to South African Secretary for External Affairs, 24 June, 
1958 , p.2 (correspondences). 
94. Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent, p.90. 
95. Ibid., pp.90-91. 
96. Union of South Africa, South African Legation of Antarctic 
General, J G Stewart to South African Secretary for Ext ernal 
Affairs, 30 June, 1958 (correspondence). 
97. Ibid. Internal governrrent memorandum from the South African 
Secretary for External Affairs to the Secretaries for Transport, 
Defence, Commerce and Industries, and the President of the CSIR, 
23 July, 1958. 
98. Keesi ng 's Contemporary Archives, XII (1959-1960), p.17162; 
Maarten J De Wit, Minerals and Mining in Antarctica: Science and 
Technology Economics and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), p.91. "Maudheim" station was further west and not on the 
Fimbul Ic€ Shelf. 
99. Ibid. 
100. A Le Roy 8ennett, International Organizations: Principles and 
Issues (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977); 
p. 197; Peter R Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations: 
Reality and Ideal (New York: Praeger, 1984), ~. 
101. R K Headland, p.90; J A Faris, ed., The Law of South Africa: 
Cumulative Supplement 1988 (Durban: Butterworths, 1988), p.278; 
W A Joubert, ed., The Law of South Africa, Vol. 5 (Durban: 
Butterworths, 1978), p.23 . Under South AfrIcan law the process of 
entering into and ratifying a treaty has always been an executive 
function and not a legislative act. As such, the Antarctic Treaty 
was ratified by the Executive Council of Government, namely the 
Cabinet. The only involvement by the South African Parliament was 
in 1962 when, in order to have jurisdiction over its citizens in 
the international territory of Antarctica, it passed the South 
African Citizens in Antarctica Act No. 55 of 1962. This 
particular piece of legislation was officially linked to the 
Antarctic Treaty and was justified to deal with ambiguities which 
were not directly addressed in the Treaty. Henning Pieterse, 
• 
134 
"Antarct ica and South African Law" Consultus South African Bar 
Journal, Vol. 2 (1) , p.56; Republic of South Africa , Statutes of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1962, part I, nos.1-58 (Cape Town : 
Cape & Transvaal Printers Ltd., 1962), pp.628-629 ; Republic of 
South Africa, Parliament, Hansard's House of Assembly Debates, 
Vol. 3 (1962), col. 4525; Vol. 4 (1962), cols. 5562, 5644 and 
5762 . 
102. Mr J G St ewart , South African Charge d'Affaires in Washington in 
1958, South Africa's representative to the Preparatory Talks, and 
the one who communicated directly to the South African Secretary 
for External Affairs for the duration of the Preparatory Talks. 
103. Union of South Africa, Parliament, Hansard ' s House of Assembly 
Debates, Vol. 105 (1960 ) , cols. 5564 and 5667. 
104. Union of South Africa , Hansard's House of Assemb ly Debates, Vol . 
103 (1960), cols. 1934- 1935. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Union of South Africa, Research Committee South Africa Antarctic 
Doc. No. SA8387048389, Ref . M.1 8/8 (P retorla: South Afrlcan 
Governrrent Archives, 1946-1954), attached cost estimate to 
prepared memorandum entitled "Memorandum Upon a Proposed South 
African Antarctic Exped ition" , 1946. 
108. Ibid. Prepared memorandum entitled "Memorandum Upon a 
'International Polar Year' in the Southern Hemisphere", 
1946 , p.2. 
Proposed 
January, 
109. This i s not to say that no criticism developed; several Questions 
were raised over the composition of the first expedition sent to 
Antarctica and the government's handling of its organization. See 
"Afrikaans Only in Antarctic", Rand Daily Mail, 3 December, 1959, 
p.11. (See Appendix E. ) 
Chapter .!! 
1. For a general discussion of the SCAR see: 
Internat ional Research in the Antarctic 
Universi ty Press, 1987), pp . 1-8. 
Richard Fifield, 
(Oxford: Oxford 
2. Lee Kimball, Report on Antarctica: United Nations Focus: 
Recent Developments within the Antarctic Treaty 
as i ng on D. .: I, ovem er, ,pp. -; see a so 
Matthew Howard, "The Convention on the Cor:servation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources: A Five Year Review", International.and 
Comparative Year Quarterly, XXXVIII (January, 1989), pp.l04-1S0, 
for an analysis of the convention . 
135 
3. Kimball, Report on Antarctica, pp.1-2. 
4. Ibid. 
5. See Kimball, Report on Antarctica: 
Minerals Convention Negotiations 
FeEruary , 1988). 
Special Report: The Antarctic 
(Washington D.C.: lIED, 
6. See Peter J Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986); Deborah Shapley, The Seventh 
Continent: Antarctic in a Resource Age (Washington D.C.: 
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1985); Rent M Shusterich, "The 
Antarctic Treaty System: History, Substance and Speculation", 
International Journal, XXXIX, No.4 (Autumn, 1984), pp.800-827; 
Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge: Scott Polar 
Research Institute, 1987); Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment 
(Washington D.C .: National Academy Press, 1986). 
7. Peter J Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica", Polar Record, 
XXII, No. 137 (1984), pp.810-811. 
8. R K Headland, "Signatory Governments of the Antarctic Treaty", 
Polar Record, XXIV, No. 148 (January , 1988), p.64. 
Un itec! Kingdom, 31 May 1960; South Africa, 21 June 1960; 
Belgium, 26 July 1960 ; Japan, 4 August 1960; 
United States of America , 18 August 1960; 
Norway, 24 August 1960; France, 16 September 1960; 
NevI Zec:land, 1 November 1960; Soviet Union, 2 November 1960; 
Poland, 8 June 1961 (29 .7.1977); Argentina, 23 June 1961; 
Australia, 23 June 1961; Chile, 23 June 1961; 
Czechoslovakia , 14 June 1962; Denmark, 20 May 1965; 
Netherlands, 30 March 1967; Romania, 15 September 1971; 
German Democratic Republic, 19 November 1974 (5.10.1987); 
Brazil, 16 May 1975 (12.9.1983); Bulgaria, 11 September 1978; 
Germany, Federal Republic of, 5 February 1979 (3.3.1981); 
Uruguay, 11 January 1980 (7.10.1985); 
Papua New Guinea, 16 March 1981; Italy, 18 March 1981; 
Peru, 10 April 1981; Spain, 31 March 1982; 
China, Peoples' Republic of, 8 June 1983 (7.10.1985); 
India, 19 August 1983 (12.9 . 1983); Hungary, 27 January 1984; 
Sweden, 24 April 1984; Finland, 15 May 1984; 
Cuba, 16 August 1984; 
Korea, Republic of 28 November 1987; 
Korea, Democratic Peoples' Republic of, 21 January 1987 ; 
Austria, 25 August 1987; Ecuador, 15 September 1987. 
(Date) denotes Consultative Status attained 
9. Beck, International Politics of Antarctica, pp.186-206. 
10. Richard E Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations 
p.ix; D J Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation : South African 
Foreign Policy-Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, South Africa, 
1984), pp.10-16; 205-222. 
136 
11. Jan C Heunis, United Nations Versus South Africa, pp.296-301. 
12. Bissell, p.167. 
13. Ibid. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Ibid., pp.161-162; Heunis, pp.189-250, 
Heunis, pp.189-250, 473-491. 
Heunis, pp.486-491; Bissell, pp.89-90. 
Heunis, pp.480-485. 
Ibid., pp.192-193; Bissell, pp.86-87. 
Bissell, pp.91-92, 198 (note 95). 
473. 
20. Ibid., pp.86-87. It should be noted that South Africa withdrew 
from the British Commonwealth under this method. Although the 
British Commonwealth had previously guided South Africa's 
Antarctic policy, it did not affect South Africa's position in 
the ATS after its withdrawal in 1961. 
21. Harold K Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence; International 
Organizations and the Global Political System (2nd ed.; New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1984), p.128. 
22. Richard Fifield, International Research in the Antarctic, p.5. 
23. Beck, International Politics of Antarctica, pp.154, 157. 
24. S G Brown, "Notes: Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting of the 
International Whaling Commission, 1983", Polar Record, XXII, No. 
136 (1984), p.79. 
25. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, p.284. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., pp.284-285. 
28. Ibid. p.286. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., pp.203, 286. 
31. Ibid., p.203. 
32. See Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica" Polar Record, XXII, 
No. 137 (1984), pp.139-140. 
33. Ibid., p.141. 
137 
34. South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Antarctica, A 
Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by South 
South Africa on Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty System", 
International Affairs Bulletin, IX, No.1 (1985), pp.49-65. 
35. Ghana, for example, argued that while measures should be taken to 
bring about broader international co-operation in Antarctica, in 
the following sentence it called for the exclusion of South 
Africa from the Antarctic Treaty. 
36. As all decisions require consensus amongst all Contracting 
Parties, South Africa could easily block any move of this nature . 
This is not to mention that a good number of states opposing 
South Africa's exclusion in other IGOs constitute a large number 
of the Contracting Parties in the ATS . 
37. United Nations, General Assembly, 39th Session, 31 October, 1984, 
Study Requested Under General Assembly Resolution 38/77: Report 
of the SecretarY-General, A/39/583. Part I, pp.35-36. 
38. Ibid., p.36. 
39. 8eck, "The United Nations and Antarctica", Polar Record (1984), 
pp.141-143 . 
40. Peter J. BECk , "The United Nations Study on Antarctica, 1984", 
Polar Record, XXII, No. 140 (1985), pp.501-503; "Antarctica and 
the United Nations, 1985: The End of Consensus?" Polar Record, 
XXII, No.143 (1986), pp.160-165; "The United Nations and 
Antarctica, 1986", Polar Record, XXIII, No . 147 (1987), pp.684-
686, 688-690; "Another Sterile Ritual? The United Nations and 
Antarctica, 1987" Polar Record, XX IV, No. 150 (1988), p.210. 
41. Beck, "The United Nations Study on Antarctica, 1984", Polar 
Record (1985), p.501. 
42. Ibid., p.502. 
43. Ibid., pp.502-503. 
44. Ibid . , p.502. 
45. Beck, "Antarctica at the United Nations, 1985", Polar Record 
(1986), p. 162. (See Appendix F; it was passed as 40/156C in the 
General Assembly.) 
46. Ibid., p.163. 
47. Ibid. 
48. "Aussie Thwarts Plan to Expel S.A.", Daily Dispatch, 28 November, 
1985, p.25. 
49. Ibid. 
138 
50. "The Antarctic Treaty System and Global Interests in the 
Antarctic", Australian Foreign Affairs Record LVIII, No. 3 
(March, 1987), P .138. 
51. Beck, "Antarctica at the United Nations, 1985", Polar Record 
(1986), pp.161-163. 
52. Ibid., pp.164-165. 
53. Beck , "The United Nations and Antarctica, 1986" , Polar Record 
(1987), p.687; Lee Kimball, Report on Antarctica (Washington 
D.C.: lIED, 19 June, 1987), p.3; Lee Kimball Report on 
Antarctica (Washington D.C.: lIED, December, 1987), pp.21-22. 
54. Beck, "Another Sterile Ritual? The United Nations and Antarctica, 
1987", Polar Record, XXIV, No. 150 (1988), p.210. (See Appendices 
G-I. ) 
55. Along with these two countries of the Soviet Bloc, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Ukraine also did not participate 
in the 1988 vote; United Nations General Assembly, 43rd Session, 
7 December, 1988, Status of South Africa as a Consultative Party 
to the Antarctic Treaty, A/RES/43/83 IB/. 
56. Beck, "Another Sterile Ritual?" Polar Record (1988), pp.208-209. 
57. Emphasis on the apartheid issue has been clearly identified in 
the preambulary clauses of all the resolutions pertaining to 
South Africa and the focus of intent in the operative clauses 
directly refers to the apartheid issue. 
58. Beck, "Another Steri le Ritual?" Polar Record (1988), pp.210-211. 
Chapter V 
1. 
2. 
Peter J Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica, 
Record, XXIV, No.150 (1988), pp.210-211. 
International Institute for Environment and 
Antarctica: A Continent in Transition (Washington 
1982), AppendIx t, p.2. (See AppendIx C.) 
3. Ibid. 
1987", Polar 
Development, 
D.C.: II ED , 
4. Jan C Heunis, United Nations Versus South Africa, pp.296-301. 
5. International Institute for Environment and Development, 
Antarctica : A Continent in Transition, Appendix I, pp.2-3. 
6. Republic of South Africa, Parliament, Hansard's House of Assembly 
Questions and Replies, Vol. 76 (1978), cols. 374-375. 
139 
7. Internationa l Inst itute for Environment and Development, Appendix 
I, p.3. 
8. Ibid . 
9. Heunis, pp . 189-250. 
10. Ibid., pp.473-480; George Barrie, "The Non-Designation of South 
Africa to the IAEA Board of Governors", Topical International Law 
(Durban: Butterworths, 1979), pp.1-9 . 
11. Harold K Jacobson, Network of Interdependence: International 
Organizations and the Global Political System, p.128. 
12. Heunis, pp.200-221; Barrie, p.l. 
13. R K Headland, "Signatory Governments of the Antarctic Treaty", 
Polar Record, XXIX, No. 148 (January, 1988), p.64; Barrie, p.l. 
14. Two notable absences were Cuba and Mongolia, two states which 
would later support the resolutions against South Africa; United 
Nations , General Assembly, 40th SeSSion, 16 December, 1985, 
Status of South Africa as a Consultative Party to the Antarctic 
Treaty, A/RES/40/156 lc/ . 
15. Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica, 198]1', Polar Record, 
XXIV, No. 150 (1988), pp .210-211; United Nations, General 
Assembly, 42nd Session, 7 January, 1988, A/RES/42/46, pp.3-4. 
16. Republic of South Africa. Bureau for Information, South African 
Digest, 30 September, 1988 , pp.7, 15 . 
17. Kurt M Shusterich, "The 
Substance and Speculation", 
(Autumn , 1984), pp.810-811. 
18. Ibid., p.810. 
Antarctic Treaty System : History, 
International Journal, XXXIX, No.4 
19. Beck, "The United Nations and Antarctica, 1987" , p.210. 
20. "Aussie Thwarts Plan to Expel SA", Daily Dispatch, 28 November, 
1985, p.25. 
40' 
16 
SO' 
13 
..., 
120' 
12 
140' 
APPENDIX A 
o 
\ c 
7 
(' 
" 
'" 
/ 
c 
o c 
EXPLORERS' ROUTES 
Palmer 1B20 I I I I I I I [ I I I " , I I I I 
AmundsenJ9JO-T2 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
S<oH 1910-13 _________ -,-__ 
Byrd 1928·30 _______________ _ 
c 
E 
E A N 
A 
E 
BooTet 1. o .. (IIo,.) 
0 
N 
Fuchs J957-58 000000000000000 00000000 00000000 
By ship ..... 8y sJedg"e ~ By airpJane 1 .It 
By snow froctor " 
11 
L 
140 
ANTARCTICA 
AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION 
SCALE OF MILES 
800 
". 
SCALE Of KILOMETRES 
? 200 400 600 BOG l&vo 
\M.oquaria J 
(AII. tnd((f.j 
.Y. 
40 
3 
60 
4 
sa 
5 
100 
7 
14() 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Ii 
'j 
141 
APPENDIX B: THE NORWEGIAN CLAIM/ SOUTH AFRICAN SECTOR 
? · ... "0 nI . 
\::.-. 
142 
AJ?J?E~DIX C 
-
The Antarctic Treaty 
The Governments of Argentina. AusU'illia. Belgium. Chile. the 
French Republic. Japan. :-lew u:Uand. :-lorway. the Union of 
South Africa. Ihe Union of Soviel Socialist Republics. Ihe 
Unued Kingdom of Great Britain and :-Iorthem Ireland. and 
the United Scates of America: 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of aU mankind that 
. J.ntJ!C[tC:l shaH continue forever to be used ~xdusivel!, for 
p<:u:eiul purposes and shall nOl bc<:ome Ihe ",ene or object of 
international di",ord: 
, Acknowledging the substantial conaibutions to scienrific 
knowledge resulting from international coopetiltion in s.cientitic 
invesci2.:u.ion in Antartticx. 
' Con~jnced that the establish.ment of :I firm foundation for 
the continuation and development of such cooperation on the 
basis of fre:dom of sciemific investigation in AnW'Ctica as 
applied during Ihe International Geophysical Year accords with 
"'" inlerests of scieDCe and Ihe pnoglt'ss of all mankind: 
Convinced :uso that a m::uy ensuring the use of AnwctiCli 
ior pe""eful purposes only and the continuance of int.cmational 
harmony In An"""rica will fuMer tile purposes and principle> 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations: 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
I. AntarCtica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There 
. shaH be prohibited. inr('r alia. any measures of a miliwy narure. 
such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications. 
the caI'l!ing out of military manoeuver'S. as well as the testing 
Of Jny type of we:lpons. . 
~. The present Treaty shall nOl prevent the usc of miliwy 
personnel or equipment for scientific reseuch or for. any other 
peaceful purpose. 
ArtIcle II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in AnW'C'tic3. and cooper· . 
auon toward that end. as applied during the Interna(ionaJ Geo-
pn~' slc:li YeJI. :ihall ~on[inue . . subJect to the provisions or the 
'pcrsenr Treaty. 
Artfcle III 
I. In order to promote international cooperation in scienufic 
investigation in Antan:"tica. as provided for in Article II of the 
present Treaty. the Contracting Parties agree that. to the greatest 
~:ttent fe:lSible and prACticable: 
a. information regarding plans (0;. scientific "programs Ir 
Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit ma:timum econom' 
and efficiency or" operations: . 
b .. scientific personnel shaH be exchanged in Anwc[ic:a be 
tween expeditions and st:Uions: 
c. scientit1c obser.'ations and results (rom Antarctica shal 
be I!;tchan~ed and made fred\' a.va.ilable . 
!. In implemenling tIlis Article: everY eneoura.emenl shall b< 
given to the establishment or" coopcr:l[ive wOcidng relations wid' 
those Specialized Agencies of the Uniled !'lations and othel 
international organizations having a scientific or technical in· 
terest in Antarctica. 
Article IV 
I. Nothing contained in Ihe present Treaty shall be in lerprelcc 
as: 
I. a renunciaticn by any Contracting Party of previousl :r 
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica; 
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting P:uty 01 
any basi~ of claim to territorial sovereignty in Anwaic:J 
which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those 
of its nationals in Anuretica. or otherwise: . 
c. prejudicing Ihe position o(any Contracting Party as re · 
gards its recognition or non·recognition of any other State's 
right of or claim or basis of claim to territOrial sovereimev 
in Antarctica. - . 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Tre3.tY 
is in force shaH constitute a basis for asserting. supporting or 
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or cre:ue 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. ~o new claim. or en· 
largement of an existing claim. to temcoriaI sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be :lSscrted while the present Trt:aty is in force . 
Article V 
I. Any nucle3I explosions in Ant.arcticJ and the di sposal there 
or r.1dioactive waste mouerial shaH be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of intern3.uonaJ ag:reerr,ents 
concerning the use of nuclear energy . including nuclear explo~ 
sions and the disposal of radioactive wasre material, to which 
all of the Concracting Parties whose representaIlVes are enmled 
. to panicipate in [he meetings provided for under Article IX are 
parries. the rules established. under such agreements shall apply 
in Antarc[ic~. 
\nicl. \"I 
Tnl! ?ro\ i)iun~ ot (he: pres.en( Tre~y )hail apply [0 (he area 
... ,ulh tIt' flO; South L:U:l[ude. including: JJI ice shelves. but 
11\(hln~ In [he pre>!!nt Tre:HY shaH prejudice or in any W:l~' 
.l{rl!;:r me: n~h(~. ur the C:Xc:tcl)C of the nghLS. of any Stale under 
Imc:mauonaJ la'W Uollh regard to the hl!~h :)C:~ within thaL area. 
Article \'II 
I. In order to promote the objectives and ensUl"t' the observilllce 
or" the proVIsions or" the present Tre~. c::u:h Contt:lCting P:uty 
.. ·ho~ representanves :1ll: enrided to participate in the meeting! 
~rem:d to in Article [X of the Trearv shall have the ri~ht to 
J.eslgn:&tc \lbscrvers to carry out JJ1Y· inspection provid;d for 
b~ the present Article. Observe" shall be n:uionals of the Con-
O"Xtmg Patties which designaIc them. The n:unes of observers 
,hail be commumcateu to c\'c:r:-' other Contr.lCting Pur)" havin~ 
the right to Jest~ observer>. and [iu notice sh:>ll be given 
or the tenninarion of their appoinanent. 
::. ~h observer designared in accordance with the provisions 
of par:tgr.lph ! of this Article shall have complete freedom of 
access OIl :my time to any or ozll areas of Antat'Ctic~. 
3. All =>.S of Anwctic". includin~ :>ll swions. inst:>llarions 
:!lid equipment within those =. ';'d :>ll ships and oircr.ft :u 
points of Uischarging or embarking cargoes or pe=nnel in 
.>.J\t"",tic". ,hall be open ol all time w inspection by any ob-
;ervers designated in accordance with paragraph I of this Article. 
.&.. Aerial observation may be carried aU! 3t :1l1V time over :my 
or ;ill OleOS of AntamiQ by any of the Co~=ting Poni'; 
having the right to designate observer>. 
!. ~h Contracting Party shall. :u the time when the present 
T~lry entm into force for it. infonn the other Contra.cting 
meso and then:aiter shall give them notice in :><ivance. of 
•. :>l[ expeditions to and within Anw-:tica. on the part of 
its ships or nationals. and :>lI expeditions w Anw-:tica or-
~""ized iD or proceeding from its tcritory: . 
b .. all swions in Anw-ctiC2 occupied by its nationals: and 
.:. any military personnel or equipment intended to be in .. 
troduccd by i[ into Anta.rctic:l subject to the conditions pre· 
scnbed in par:1graph 1 of Article [ of the present Treaty. 
Article VIn 
1. In order to faciliQ[e the ~xcrl:ise of their functions under 
the present Tre:uy. and without prejudice to the respective 
posltlons or" [he Contr.lCting: P~es relaung to jurisdiction over 
JIl utner pcr.ions tn Ant:lrCtica. ",bservers J~stgna[ed under par.J.. 
P"""ph I of Article V[[ and scientific per>onne! e,changed under 
subpazagnph I .bl of Article [)[ cjf the Treaty. ""d member> 
of the staffs ""companying any such penons. shal! be subject 
only to the jurisdiction of the ConlI1lCting Party of which they 
are n:lllonals in respect of.:111 :lcts or omLSsions occurring while 
they:u-e in Antan:t1C:l for the purpose of ex.e~ising their functions. 
~. Without prejudice to me proVisions of pl..C01gt;lph 1 of this 
Amclc:. :rna pending the J.doption ur me:lSU~S In pUl'5uJ.t1ce of 
)uopJ.r.l!!r:lph I (~, of ArticJc: IX. the Contr.l.Cting P:lItles ,,:on· 
..:er.1ed In :lll)' 1.;'.:l.SC: uf Jispute wuh n:gw to the ~.'\en:j~ Ilf 
~un~dicl1on 10 .-\n~l1c~ ~haU immediately ..:onsult together 
\~ Ilh a \'ICW to reachIng a mutua.lly Jl.:cr.:pI:lbk -.uiulion. 
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,\rticle [X 
I , RepresentJ.lives of [he CunCraCtin2 Patties named in the 
prt::unble to the pres~:u Treat'" shall me~[ at the Cit\' or' C.Il1~rT":l 
within tWO month) after [h~ d:ue of entI"V Into" force or' [he 
Treat~'. and thereafter al ~uHJble inlerv:lb 'and pial.:t:). for the 
purpu~c: of c:xc hJnglOg IOr'ormation • ..:onsultlng togc!hcr on 
m.mers of ~ommon mteres( pe:rtltnlng co Ancarctil.:a. and for. 
muiacinll ::ltld considerinll, and recommendinll to their Gu\e:-n. 
menu. me:uures in furth~rance or the principles and objectivcs 
of [he Tre:J.[v. includinll meJ.Su.res rellwinll: 
J. use o{ Antan:ticJ.-for peaceful purposes only: 
b, facilitation or scientiric rescOltCh in Anwctic:J.: 
c, facilitation of international :ic1entific ..;ooperJlion in 
. Antarctic04 
Ii, f;lCilitJ.tion oCme cxe!"CiSc! of the rights of inspet'tion pro. 
vided for in Arttcle VII t,)f the Treaty: 
c. t.:juestlons ref aCing to the c.'\crCl.sc or' )uri~Jktion in 
Anta.rctic:J.: . 
f. preserv~ion J.l1d conservation of livinll resources in 
Ant.:lrCtica. -
1. ~h Con =ring Party which has become. party to the 
present Tre:uy by ,",cesSion under Article XIII shall be entitled 
to appoint represent:l.tives to participate in the met:ring:s refernd 
to in parngraph I of the present Article. during such time :l5 
that Con~ting P:uty demonstrates its interest in AntarCuca 
by conducting SubSWlUJ.! scientific TCSC3!t:h ~[ivity there. such 
:l5 the establishment of a scientific station or the desp:uch oi 
;a scientific expedition. . 
3. ReportS from the observer> referred to in Article VlI of the 
present Tre:uy shaJl be transmitted to the representarives or the 
Contracting Parties participating in the meetings refetTed to in 
paragraph I of the present Article. 
... The measures referred to in paragraph ! or this Article shoJI 
become effective when approved by all the ContraCting Parties 
whose ~pre.senw.ives were entitled to participate in the me::t· 
ings heJd to conside:r those measures. 
S. Any or:>l[ of the rights established in the present Tre:uy may 
be exercised as from the date ot cncry into torce of the Tre:1C)' 
whether or not J.ny mezures facilitating the c::<ercise of such 
rights have been proposed. <onSidered or approved :l5 provided 
In this Article. 
Article X 
~h or the Con=ri·ng Parties undertakes to exert .ppropnate 
erforts. ~onsis[ent with the Chaner or" the United ~auons. to 
the cnt! [hac no nne: ~ngagl!) In any .lCU"'lty in Ant~[ical.:on[I·Jry 
to the princlpics or purpoSI!S (jf the presc:nr T~a{y, 
Artid. XI 
I, If any dispute arises between two or more: of the Ct,)ntr.lCun! 
P:ltties concerning tnc interpn:t:ltlon or appiiC::lllOn .of the prescnt 
Treacy . [hose Cuncr.lCung PJttles ~hall consult among chern· 
~Ives with a view to haVtn2 the c.iisoute resolved bv ne2oti:mon. 
inquiry. mcdi:Ulon. I.:onclli~non. ~ttr:l,lIon. Judi~i:.Ll ~~ttll!me!l[ 
or orher ~accr"ul means nr" thelf own chOIce. . 
~, Any Jbpule of {hi:, I.:hJ.r.lCter not:,o resolved shall: WI~ th~ 
~on!'ll!nt. in ~;.u:h ~:..I.)<: . ll{ aU oarnes to Ihe dbpule . be n:rerrct1 
to the Intem:.ltJonal C\Iun tJI Ju:,nl.:c for .. ~nleml.!n[: but (:lIlure 
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to reach 19rcemcnt on n::rc.rencc to the (ntemarianal Court shall 
not 3b~ul ... c panics 10 the tJisputc from the responsibility of 
continuing [0 seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful 
ml!ans referred to in parJgrilph I of this Article . 
Article XII 
101. The prestot Treaty may be modified or amended at any 
lime by unJnimous agreemc:nt of the Contracting Panies whose 
rl!['Irescntal ivcs are entitled to piltticipatc in the meetings pro-
\oiJccJ for under Article IX. Any such modification or :mend· 
nlt,:nl shall enter into force when the dCp<')silJ.ry Government 
ha~ n.."1:civcd "Olice (rom J.II such Contracting Parties th<lt they 
have r.,l(ificu it. 
h . Such mcxJitic:uion or amendment shalltherc'after enter into 
force as 10 any other Contracting Party when not ice of ratifi· 
calion by it has been received by the depositary Govemmem. 
Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification 
is received within a period of two years from the date of entry 
. inU1 force or the modification or ~mendment in accordance with 
the provisions of subp:.:r-.graph 1 (a) of this Artic!e shall be 
deem«.:d to have withdrown from the present Treaty on the d:!;tc: 
of th~ expirotion of such period. 
2 •. If .ftcr the expir"tion of thirty years from the date of entry 
into forte of the present Treaty. any of the Contracting PaniC's 
whO"e representatives Olre cntitled to participate in the meetings 
pru ... idcd for under Article IX so requests by a communic:uion 
.1lJdrcsscd to the depositary Government. a Conference of all 
the Contr.1Cting Parties shalt be held as soon as pracricilbfe to 
review the opcr.ltion or the Treaty. 
b. Any mooific<ltion or J,mcndmenr to the present Treaty which 
is approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Con· 
tr.il.;ting Parties there represented, includins a majority of those 
whose representarjves are entitled to panicipate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the 
depositary Government to all the Contracting Panics immedj~ 
ately after the termination of the Conference and shall enter 
into force in accordance with the provisions or paragraph 1 of 
the prescnt Article. 
c. If any such modification or amendment has not entered into 
force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I (a) 
of this Anicle within a period of twO yeMS after the datc of its 
c;nmmunic:Jtion to all the CuO[rJcling Partics. any Contr.lcling 
Pany may at any time ;Jfter th«.: «.:xpir.uion of that periofJ give 
not;":e to the depositary Government of its WilhdrJw:J1 from the 
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present Tre:lty; and such withdr:lwJI shall take effect two yean 
after the receipt of the notice by the depositJI)' Government. 
ArtIcle XIll 
I. The present Tre:lty shall be subject to r:l! ific3tion by the 
signatory States. It shall be open (or accession by any State 
which is a Member of the United !'lations. or by any other S.ate 
which may be invited to accede (0 the Treaty with the consent 
of an the Contracting Parties whose represent<ltives are entitled 
10 panicipate in the mcetings provided for under Article IX of 
the Treatv. 
2. Ra[ifi~,:Hion of or accession to the present Tre:lty shall be 
effectcd by e:lch State in :1ccordance with its constitutional 
processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession $hall 
be deposited with the Governml!nt of the United St:ucs of 
America, hereby design<lted as the depositary Government. 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and 
acceding Stones pf the d:1le of eJch deposit of an instrument of 
ntification or accession. and the d:1te of entry into force of the 
Treaty ilnd of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of r:Jtific>tion by all the 
signiltory States, the present Treaty shall enter into force for 
those States and for States which have deposited instruments 
of accession. Thereafter the Tre:J,ty shall enter into force for 
OUly O1Cceding StOlte upon the deposit of its instrument of aCl:ession. 
6. The present Treoty ,h.1I be registered by the depository 
Government pursUilnt to Article 102 of the Ch:lrter of the United 
Nations. 
Article XIV. 
The present Treaty. done in the English. French, Russian. and 
Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic. shill! 
be: deposited in the arthives of the Government of the United 
States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies 
thereof to the GovernmenlSofthe signatory ~d acceding States. 
IN Wm<ESS WHEREOF. the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly 
authorized. have signed the present Treaty:. . .. 
DoNE at Washington this first day of December one thousand 
nine hundred ilnd fifty.nine . 
(Hat' falloUl/ht J(~/fUtllrts of I},( Pltnipa/t.'llfillriu.] 
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APPENDIX D: AUSTRALIAN DRAFT ANTARCTIC TREATY (10 JULY, 1958) 
"9·'t 
IatornatloRAl Agree •• nt rela'1A& '0 
Mluo)1o!J. 
'!'hAl OOvaruMn'. at .u-aonUna • .l.ua;rlllia. :hl pwa, Oh1le, 
Fran.a. lapan, Ja. "aland. J{orwq. the tlniOJl at Sou;h .l.tr1C1a. 
;he UBion ot Soviat 300ial1et Bapublio •• t ha On1,.4 I1D&4oa mn4 
thl On1~.d Stat ••• 
Bog04g1e1pg ~hat l' 1. 1n thl tnt.re.~ ot all aaniind 
that .1ntaroUoa ahall oontinue '0 be uaad oxolua1v8lT tor 
p.&Gotul purpo •••• 
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1lllgogp1 d!!,(t the Dub.bntial oontribuUon. to . ohntifio 
knawlod&G roo~t1118 troa 1n\ornat1onal oo-opora,ton 1n 001QDtit1o 
nl!lt!aroil in .l.ntuotioa 1n tho International Geophysioal Year, 
COD§1ier1S( that i' i. deair abl e to aako proTiaion tor 
lho oontinuanca ot o01 ent1t10 rocaaroh in .l.ntuot10a on the baa18 
ot t .torna'iona! oo-GperatloD, 
Have aaroc4 •• tallow •• 
l1!UQL!l I. 
Ant&ret10a .hall b, uaed exaluo1valy tor pe aootul purpose. 
and . hAll ... and r ... ain anUrel;y c!olBil1 tart .. 4 • 
.l.l!TICLK II. 
The S~.t •• par~1a. to th1. a«r8e.ent, th~1r nal10nal. &A4 
orcan1 •• 'iona . hall enjoy tre.dom ot 8011ntlt10 r aa.aroh in 
~nt&ratioa and ahell oo-operatl wlth eaoh other 1n the oo-ordinat1on 
at. an4 1n thl IxohlUlg l ot lntor"litlon r •• ulUfl8 troll, such 
r ••• aroh. 
J.HICLIi! III I · 
!ht. Q8T •• lIl.nt "hltll b. ~lit1rol'y wlthout preJudioe to thl 
polition ot nny of tho Stateu puXt1s8 to the agr.ement 1n regArd 
to qu.atlon. of t . rrltorlul aov~r.l.llt.Y 1n Antarotla •• 
2/ .. 
2. 
III }IOlMlo ular -
(a ) 30 .1~te ahall b. requirad 10 renousea, or ahall, ~;r 
ra • .on ot b~oo.uDg 1& par';r to th1a 88reo •• nt , Dol 'SlUIIl .. 
haY1~ r,noUD4 ad, ~ t,rritor1al right or olai. 1A !ntarotioa 
(b) 1(0 .tate ahall, bJ' reuon ot b, oolll1nc a pari;r to \hia 
&,Jneant, bo tuan a. haTing raoogn1ud ~ telT1torl&l rlaht 
or al&1. in Antarotloa ~t any othar atat ., 
(0) fbe aotly111 •• dur1ng the ourrenoy ot thia ~ ••• nt ot 
aRT .1 t he par110D or ot th,1r national. or oraan1 •• tiona ahall 
not, .. be~ •• n th. p~l •• to the ~om.nt, . 1iher while thD 
a&rOlS4ni 1. 1n toro., or at &nJ' tl" atter ~o terain.tion ot 
the saroaaent, oonatl1ut. a b&810 tor ~~.ri., ex1D~DC 
"rr1~rial rijgh·h or olai •• , or tor &4l'anol~ IWIW t.rrUorl&l 
olaims, in Antarotica, but t ho l ,«al .tatuo qU4 in re_paot ot 
t.lT1 torh.l ~veril1an$J' 1n Antarotica . hllll, whila ;htl o,gruuZlt 
18 in toroo, DO eni1rel,. pr •• srYQd. 
ARTICLE IV, 
:I&oh ahia pll.J'i;r to thh qr ..... ni ahall havo nil GlIollla1.,. 
right, in relaU on to 1 i, own naUonlllll and organla.-110ll.ll, W 
eXlroi.t juriadl0110n tor the pun1~ni ot otteno •• A4a1n.t 
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It. l~. oomAitied b1 It. nat10nal. or organiaati enD in Antarotl0 • • 
P' n4ing l h. lIUllt1ng ot . uoh oth~r arTOJl,lIJDontll &.II ills }larUo, DDT 
auaaeqU4nU;r ~11 upon, IUtiora lnl'olTill6 olc.1u 111 h'l10Zl4l.. 
Dr orilani lat1on ll ot on .. party arla111,C out ot &018 01' OII1i1nDJlD 
1n ADlarat1011 ~1 national. or or,~uat1lJn. ot ~iher ~ 
ahAll ba dot9rm1n.d 1n ouoh aannar ~ aay ~o acr-o. upea ~1 the 
»ar11oa 'oZlo&rnod • 
.tl!'l'tC IJl· 'II 
D1111'U~1lI ~lItw.1lI IZ11 .t Ula partlu h ~1I a.,Jntll.nt 
arls1D4 o~t ot ~. inierpr,tilt1on .r app11o.t1 .. ot IA1 arii.l. 
ot the ap-uaent elall lio within the ooal'allo17 jurh41oUoZl 
3/ ••• 
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of ~a In'.r~tion&l Co~t of Ju~\ioo and m~ a4oor4i~IT. ttnl ••• 
til. par·Ho. ha.." .1 t hin a ro •• onabl . period ~!lad UPIlD lorn 
o~her fora of •• ttlem.nt, be brought before 'ho Oour~ ~T an 
applioati on .ada ~1 any party to the diopui •• 
AHICLX VI I 
Within ••• ••••• of the oozing lnto f oros of ,hi . acre ... nt 
and tharoafter al say from tl~. to tlm~ b. naoa •• ar,r, 
r.pre.an'.'iv •• of the . tat •• raforrad to in tha preamble to thl 
acreoment and of a uoh othe r atat •• '" hava aco adad t o tha 
~.~.nt &hall .ea t for tha purpo • • at adopting, bl majority 
vote, ~propr1ata arrangemonta 1n r.l ation to Antarotioa for 
. n . ur1ng It. uaa for paaooful purVo ooa , tor enoouraging and 
oo-ordinating . 01 0ntltl0 rom,aroh, tor oo-ordina ting aupport 
operatl ona, tor the oxohange of lnfo~atlon and ob ,orTera, for 
•• t.bllahi~ work1ng relatlonahipa wlth spaolali . ed Alonola. of 
the U~t.i Rat1on~, and f or suoh othar purp088 = a . 2~ 0. 
n,c'5a~ tor g1T1ng eftaat to t ha ~ream.nt. 
J.R!I CLZ TIl I 
lor the purpolao ot thi a &&rQ~m.nt, Antaratioa ao~prlBoa 
the arIa batw •• n tho 60th degr •• aouth latitutd a und tho South 
Pole , inoluding Oontinental Antarotioa, the adjlLOllnt 1. 1and 4l , 
wat er. and l ubaarin o aroaa, and tho l uporlnoumbont airspao e • 
.utTICLl!: VIII I 
fhi. A<>nollont 1 .. uubJ ' Q~ to ratifioation. 
ot raUt10 u.lion oh,,11 b. dopo.1t .J with -
AR'I'IOU: IX I 
Tho ina tcrun.ont a 
fbi , &&r.~m.nt .hall oamo 1nto foroo thirty daya afier tho 
date Wh l D the lnstrument . or ratifioation at ~1 of the govornmant a 
roferrt d to in tho priamblo to tho ograem.ut ah~l haye be.n 
./ ... 
SlICHil' 
"~s1 U4 191 ~h -
J.l'fIOLZ XI 
4. 
!lI1. acruPllt shall be OpO<l for &40 .. 5101l 111 .tahll MlII"irq 
of the United Hatione or of &n7 of th •• P401al1a~4 acenoio., 
boiac .tat •• tbat .udertak. aoi.nt1110 rlliloareh in JDtaro'i.a. 
Tho in.tru4.n~ . of aoo •• oion shall ba depolll'.d with -
ARfIar.:!: XII 
null ~.tont ahall oonUnu<J in foroGi foJ' a period of 
glh JIlJ.7. 1958. 
S l: 0 R II ! 
148 
APPENDIX E 
RAND DAILY MAIL, 3 DECEMBER, 1959, p. 11. 
Afrikaans only 
Antarctic • In 
STAFF REPORTER THE firot Soulh African national expedition to the 
Antarctic ]eaves Cape Town today in an atmosphere 
of 8cepticism voiced by leading acienliats in the country. I 
The expedition haa been crttlc- SMALL CONTRIBUTION 
iaed u beIng insufficiently Belen- matter out or the hands of the 
Uflc. It fa also said to be repre- co~ttee and members o~ the The whole nason for sendlni an 
aentative of only one section ot conunittee did not e"en know who expedition to the AntarctJc Wa3 to 
the community. had been chosen to go to the prove to the world that South 
Every member ot the ten-man Antarctic tmtU the official. a.n- !;~:tn:~n~~:rel~ ~het&k~e:' 
team 'who wlll llve In the An- nouncement was made to the SCAR pointed out that up to now 
tArcUc for H. months b Ald- Press. South Africa', contribution had 
ka kl Th • The committee was not ans spea ng. e men are: been m&lnl~ meteorological. 
called together once and the Mr. J. J . Ie Gra.."lge, Mr. D. J. I b th G Because of the compoo,ltJon of 
Bonnema, Mr. V. von Brunn. Mr. reason g ven y e avemment the party, it 1& believed that It 
for this 18 that there was too ill trib t G. F. Strauss, Mr. W. T . de Ute' time 'II can u every llttle to a 
Swardt. Mr. M, H. van Wyk, Mr. .8 , wider sclenut1c knowledge of the 
M. J. du Pree%, Mr. C. de Weerdt IIID 'I1:.e team wa., chosen In the area. 
van Lummel, Dr. A. Ie R. van otIlces of the Department of NezotJations for the take-over 
der Merwe and Mr. N, W. Transport and, In addItion. the were also taken comple~ly out of 
. Erasmus. expedition was financed out ot the hand! of the natIonal commit-
AFRIKAANS ONLY Trea.sury funds. Industry was not tee. Mr. H. P. Smit. Under-8ecre-
liven an opportunity to contrI- tary tor Tra..lUport, wu sent to 
It 1. understood that the only bute towa.rd.s the co,st.s, although Norway to make arrangements tor 
language to be used in official It 1& under&tood. that 6everal otters the take-over. He waa not attom-
communications will be AtrI~ were ma.de to provide equipment panted by a member ot the com-
kaans. tree or charge. m1ttee or by & sclenUllc adviser. 
Scientists allege that the • ThJs me8.04 that the exped.1- BUNGLED 
elI:.pedltlon seems to have been Yon is purely & Government . 
chO:seD QO sectional ground.1, with expeditIon and && such does not to The aov~.mment W~.ll attempt! 
preference being gtven to Atr!. conform to the requIrements 01 crlt~c~:~ i~a:~~bl:01n~llw~e: ; 
kaanll~.lIIpeak1ng South AfrIcan. , 8C~, that It had about .six weeQ In , 
Crltlclwl or the expedition 1.a A.T A PARTY which to complete the take-over 
aupporttd by the following facta: : Mr. D. J. Joubert, the Secretary ,appoint the members or the team' 
• South Africa 15 repreaented lor na.n.sport, &IlDounced at a and equip the expedition, I 
on the Special Committee for private pa.rty in Pretoria, to which But, even In the face of any ruch · 
Antarctic Research (SCAR) by Afrikaans newspapermen were explanation, the allegaUon is atill 
a national committee of a.c1enUsts invited. that .. oeveral hundred" made that the planning was 
specIally set up for thi.s purpOM. appUcatloIl& were received for the bungled. Organlled science 1n the 
Thb committee 111 made up or peats. UnIon was not consulted and, in 
representa.tiws of var10us sclen- '·Must. we Infer from this," saId fact, t.~e advJce otrered to the 
tlfic insLitutions. a leadIng sclentlst. "that not one Government waa com pie tel y 
• SCAR 15 a non-governmental of thue 'aeveral hundred' was a Ignored. 
and a non-pol1t1cal body. Yet, suitably Qualified Engl1sh-speak- Certain people have outspokenly 
this national committee ",as not tng penon?" .stated thlt the expedition u 
consulted by the Government Crttklsm has also been ! preaently constituted, 13 not ~orth 
when the team was chosen. The directed at the Government's ! the expenditure involve-<t 
Department of Transport took the choice of & leader. Although Mr. . . 
Hannes Ie Grange has had Ant-
arctic experIence and has proved I' 
his ablUty to stand the concUUoru. 
he 1& not .. aclenUat. 
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APPENDIX F 
RESOLUTION 40/156C OF 16 DECEMBER, 1985. 
c 
Jbt c.n.n1 a" .. blr, 
lou. y Uh D'at. t.bat tbe ncht n'rtht14 ri,la. 01 so.atb "'ric •• whIch b.. Mea 
....-,d.s lroa part1c:.lp.Uon 1A t.be Cen.ral ... ~lJ ot tbe Unlle4 •• llona, h • CGnhlhU .. 
hrt.r to the Ant.arc:Uc 'J'r-tr. nil 
I!s.allln& t.b. Int'l"e.t of AIde-an st..tu in Antarctiea ... bowa bJ t..h. n,olut!oa 
1I6ofte4 b.)' tbe council of JUnhura ot tbe Or&anlut.lon of "'dean unit., a t it. tort,-" c.0a4 
wCJ.rwat-:J .. &lon, held at .&4dh Abab. traa 10 t.o 17 Ju11 1985, ill' 
_alUn, (urtMe that' the .&ntarctlc. Treat., b. b, it. t.enu. lnt..u4e4 to further U. 
"""" ... a4 principl •• eabodlt4 la t.hII Cblirtu of th. Unit..cS hUon • • 
1. fl..,. vah C9nurn u.. contlftU..:I .hlwl of t.b. 'Part.h.ld ",1 .. of South Africa .. 
• eoa.ultatlw. ',rt, t.o tba Antarctic Yreat,; 
2. l!a.!..t th • .&ntat"C.Uc: t'raatr Conault..tlve •• rtl .. to ..,edud. the racial ' PUtbelf 
1'4&1- of Sowt..h Afric. traa p.rl.ldp.t1cn 1a the ... lln,. ot t.H Con~lt.t.lv. "rtl ••• t. t.M 
.. di .. t. po.dbl. d.h. 
,. .In.!ll.!!. th. Stat. .. partl •• to the Ant.ucUc Trull t.o !nfora the s.c.ret..ry-c.nu.l 
_ u.. aeUoa. tak.n ",.rdln, t.ba provIslona of t.h. pr.~ant. r.~olut.lon. 
III fUOUr: Albania , .&lltlria. An,oh, Ant.1l u. an4 Jlarbu4a. ~, aabmD. laft$hd."'. 
lct'twSo', ..,..In, abut..n. kllYl • • aot.nan., Inane! b&Naul_. Ilurktna Fa.eo. luna , 
JIu.nlndi. cara.roon. cap. , ...... CWItnl African l .-publle. Chad. ChI,... Colc.al11a, ec.oroa, 
CWp. Coata l iea , C)'pn.la. tIemoerat.1e z...:puebM. c.-ocrat.1e. r~. Djibouti, Dclainleaa 
a.pu.bl1~ . Icua.dor, &&nt, 11 IaIva40r. IqlUltorlal o.ainaa. ItbJ.oph. CoboD. Ocsbia, 
Cbana. OUa t .. l a. OUIMs. OIdQu·Jl .. tu , CUrena. Haiti. India, IndOlllaa1a. IreD, JrMI, 
J -tea. Jot'du. Iran,a, 1Uwalt.. Labanon , lA.otho. Liberia. Uh,., ILIdquur. 1Ial.,..ia. 
IIIldh ... KaU I Kana. aaurit.anh, Jlexlco. llaroc:eo. JIouabll\u • • -.pal. 11c.an&ua, Ii,.,.. 
lI1,ul •• aun, Pakhtan. p~, faru, Qa t.ar , .ac..nla. 1wD4a., :ao rc- and Ir1llcl,.. 
Ieu41 Arabh. Sena,aI. siam t..ona. Sln,.,o", ao..Ua, Id Lanka. l&Idan. liut'la.a . 
IJria. Thalland. T010. Tr1Dldad and 'fobslo, 'fUnlala. U,anda, lhlt..d arab Ralrataa, 
UDlled laptlbl1e ot Tan.ania. Yanuat.w. Yaneauala, lht. .... r __ , ru,oalavla. %al,.., 
z..bla, Zl.b.~. 
Ultdo'o,: Auet.ria. Canada. Fiji. Ireland, ~l"I, llalavl . Porw,al, labt. %Meta. 
IaiDt 'incant., SOlo.on l.lande. swasiland, TUrka,. 
Duol.: .f, tnblan , .. lb., CUba, Dcolnlc., 11001°11 •• '-Pua ... OUines. Pbll1ppln.a. 
"rebdl .. , It. Qrl.t.ophar and "vb. 
£r&.nt!ns, .lu.t.calla, "lll~, Aracil, Jul,eria, . f_loru •• l a, Chil •• cat.. "Iwolre, 
~bo.lov.kl •• o.naark. ,lnlan«. rranct, Oaraan o..ccrat.ie lepubllc. rad.ral Iepub11c 
of 0."""1, Cre.c., erend. , Honduras, Hun,t,.,., Iceland, hcae1. Ital" .Ja-pu. Lao 
r.oph'. o..ocratlc b-plJbUe. BaurlUu ••• atherla.n4a. lev I .. land. IJorwr. Pa.ra&Ut,. 
Poland, Saaoe, Sp&\n, SwM¥. Ukrs lMl. USSR, UnIt" I"ln,d~, United Stst .. and Un.J&Ut, 
lIl1aCM.ItIud t.he, ,..,.. .lIot partlclpsU,n, 1n the yot •. 
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APPENDIX G 
RESOLUTION 41/88C OF 4 DECEMBER, 1986. 
c 
The Genual i'tuembJy, 
R«allingils resolution 40/1,6 cor 16 December 1985, 
Having considu~d the item entitled "Question of Anl-
arctica", 
NOljng wi,h ngrel that the racist apaTflwid regime of 
South Africa. which has been suspended (rom participa-
tion in the Genua! Assembly of the United Nations. bas 
continued 10 participate in the meetings or the Anlarelic 
Treaty Consuhative Parties, 
Rualling the resolution adopted by the Council orMin-
islets of the Organization of African Unity a' its forty-
second crdinary session. hc:ld al Addis Ababa from 10 to 
17Ju1y 1985,'" 
Rtcalling also the relevant pa;ragraphs of the Political 
Declaration adopted by the Eighth Con(cren~ of Heads 
o(Stateor Government of Non-A1iancd Counuies. held at 
Harare from I to 6 Seplember 1986.ltn 
Recalling further that the Antarctic TreatylQ) is. by its 
terms, intended to further the purpos.es and principles em-
bodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 
Noting further that the policy of ap4r,heid practised by 
the racist minority regime of South Africa. which has been 
universally condemned. constitutes a threat to regional 
lind international peace and security. 
I. JlieW]: wilh concern the continuing participation of 
the apartheid regime of South Africa in the meetings of the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties; 
2. Appeals onu again to the: Antarctic Treaty Consul-
tative Parties to take urgent measures to exclude: the racist 
apartheid regime of South Africa from participation in the 
meetings orthe Consultative Panies at the: earliest possible 
date; " 
3. In'litel the States parties to the Antarctic Treaty to 
inform the Secretary-General on the actions taken regard-
ing the provisions of the prescnt resolution; 
4. RequeslS the Secretary-General to submit a report 
in this regard 10 the General Assembly at its fort),-.second 
session; . 
S. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
. forty-second session Ihe: item entitled "Question or Ant-
arctica". 
96tll plfnary mtftin, 
" December 1986 
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Forty-second session 
"genda item 10 
RESOUl'l'IONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(on the report ot the Firat COmmittee (11/42(758») 
The General Assembly, 
l 
42/46. Question of Antarctica 
Recalling its resolution 41/88 C of 4 Decerrber 1986, 
Having considered the item entitled -Question of Antarctica-, 
152 
Noting with regret that the racist apartheid regime of South Africa, ~hich has 
been suspended from participation in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
has continued to participate in the meetings of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties, 
Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the 
Organization of African Unity at its forty-second ordinary session, held at 
Addis Ababa from 10 to 17 July 1985, !I 
Recalling also the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by 
the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 
held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, 31 
Recalling further that the Antarctic Treaty !/ is, by its terms, intended to 
further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 
Noting further that the policy of apartheid practised by the racist minority 
regime of South Africa, which has been universally condemned, constitutes a threat 
to regionai and international peace and security, 
1. . Views wi th concern the continuing participation of the apartheid regime 
of South Africa in the meetings of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, 
2. APeeals once again to the Antarctic Treaty ConsultatiVe Parties to take 
urgent measures to exclude the racist apartheid regime of South Africa from 
participation in the meetings of the ConsultatiVe Parties at the earliest possible 
date, 
3. Invites the States parties to the Antarctic Treaty to inform the 
Secretary-General on the actions taken regarding the provisions of the present 
resolution) 
4~ Requests "the Secretary-General to sutinit a report in this regard to the 
General Assembly at lts forty-third session} 
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session 
the item entitled ~Ouestion of Antarctica~. 
85th plenary meeting 
30 November 1987 
APPENDIX I 
RESOLUTION 43/83B OF 7 DECEMBER, 1988 . 
• 
lb , Genu.) Au",bJ x, 
8,c,'11"9 Its r.solutlon 42/46 A of 30 Hoveeb.r 1987. 
Haying Cp"sld. r.d the iteM , ntitl.d "Qulstion at Ant.rclic,", 
Ha1i~i.th_LaQrJ1 that the rlcist 1Rl!i~ rfglne 0' South Afrlc., which hiS b,.n 
suspended 'roa p~rttclp.t;on In th, Gen.r.l AIS~ly of th, Unlt,d "-tions. hiS contlnu.d to 
partlelpat. In the ... llngs of the Ant.rctlc Tr.~ly Consultatlv. P, rtl,s. 
!I$&]ling the r.solullon .dopt.d by th, Council of "I"',l.rs of the Organ".tlon of 
Afrteln Unity .t Its fort1~J.cond ordln.ry JISllon, h.ld It Addis Ab.ba 'ra. 10 to 17 July 
19115. illl 
•• c.11ing . 1$0 th' r, l , v,nl paragr.phs of t~ Politlc.l 0.,1",tloo . dop1,d by the 
[tghth Conf,renc. of H'ld, of St.le or Gov.r~nt of Non-Allgn.d Counlri.s, held at Harar. 
In. 1 \0 -6 s.ptftllbtl" 1986, illl __ 
RtsJlJiDD-fKr1htr. th~t the Antarctic Tr.a ty Zl11 j" by 1t, t~~. intend.d to furthel" 
the purposes .nd prlnclpl.s .-bodi.d In the Chart. r of tht United NAttons, 
Npting fyethel" that the policy of Iplrthrtd practls.d by the racist .Inortty 1".511 .. of 
South Afrt c., which has be.n universally cond~.d, constltutts a thr.~t to regional and 
internatto",l p .. ce and security, 
1. VI,", with concern the continuing participation of thl ID,rth,ld r'gfme of South 
Africa In the .eetings of the Ant.rctlc Tr.aty Consultative Partl.s; 
2. ~ one, Igaln to the Ant.rctlc Trl.ty Consultatlv. P.rtl.s to tak. urg.nt 
... sur.s to exclude lh . racis t 'p.rth,ld r'gi~ of South Africa frO; participation In the 
..-tlngs of lh, Consultative Parties at the .arli,st posslb1. date; 
3. lnli1li the Stat.s p.rtt,s to the Ant.rctlc Tr.aty to infor. the S.cretlry-Gentral 
oa the actions taken regarding the provisi ons of th. pru.n t resolution; 
•. AlQyest' tht S,cr'.hry-G.n.ra1 to subliit • r.port In tMs regard to tt.. Gen.ra' 
Ass~l, ~t its forty-fourth session; 
5. ~ to Includ. In the provisional . g.nd. of It. forty-fourth s.ssfon,the it .. 
Intithd '"Quesllon of Antarctican • 
ROlL-tALL VOTE O~ RESOLUTION 43/83 B: 
In fayou r: Afgh.nlstan, Albania. Algeria. Angola, Antlgu. and earbuda. Argenllna. 
Bah~s, Bahr.in, Bang1.d.sh. B~rb.dos , B.,II • • et ntn, Bhut«n . Bolivi a . 8r&&I', 8run41 
Darus~l~. Burkina Faso. Bunna, Burundt, C~roon. C.pe Yerd •• C.ntral African 
R*9ubltc. Chad. China, Col~i a. CODOros. Congo. Costa ~fc •• Cub~. Cyprus, D..ocrlttc 
Kaapuch •• , D~cr.tlc Y~n, Dj ibouti. Da.lnic.n R.pub1ic. Eculdor. Egypt, [1 S.lvador, 
Ethlopt . , Fill, Gabon, ~ia, G.rMan D..ocr.tlc Republic. Gh~ •• Go.t,..la , GuIRea, 
Guy.na, HAlt , Honduras. IndiA, Indonesl.,_ Ir.n . IrAq. J ... tca. Jordan, Klnya . Kuw.tt, 
l.o People's Denocratlc Republic, L.b.non, liberi., libya, Hadlg.scar, Mal'Jsla . 
",Td'~IS, Hall. Hauritani •• Hexlco. HongollA. Horocco, Hola-blque. Nepal. Nicaragua, 
Niger , Nigeria. ONn, Pakist.n. P~aN. Peru, Phil ippfnes. Qatar, RONtIla. Rw&llda. Satllt 
Lucl., Saint Vlnv.nl. Sao 1~ .nd Pr incip" Saudi Arabia. S.nega1. Seychell.s, st.rra 
Leone, Sln9apor~ SolOMOn Islands, $0-.11., Sri l.nka. Sl. Kitts . nd N.vis, Sudan, 
Surin .... $yrl •• Thailand. Togo. Trinld.d and Tobago. Tunlsl., Uganda, Unlt.d Arab 
t.lr.tes, United Republi c of ranl~i •• Vanuatu, Venelu. l., Vi.t ~, Y,..n. Yugoslavfa, 
l.ir • • Z~bia. ZIMbibw •. 
&J&.1..n1.t,.: Non • . 
Abstt'nlng: 8otswan~. Cot. d' lvotr., Ir.l.nd. l.sotho. HlliWf. Halt., Mauritius, 
P.r.gu~y. Portugal, S~aztl.nd. 
!Wnl: Domtntci. Gr. nldl, Gulnu-lhuu, SUIOI. 
AustrAlia, Austria. " BtlgiuM. 8u1g.ria, 8y.lorussl., C.n.d., Chllt. Cltchoslov •• '" 
D.nNrk, Equltorl.l Guinu, flnh.nd, fr.nce, f,d,r.l -R.publlc or Gt ..... ny, Gre.ce, 
Hung.ry. Ic.h.nd, Isrul, It.ly, Japan. lux",baurg, N.lh.rhnds, N .. Z.,1and. Mont'Y' 
PapUI: N~ Guinn, Pohnd, SpoIln, S ..... d.n. Turk. y, Uknin., USSA:. Unit.d klngda.. UnItt4 
St.t.s .nd Urugu.y announced that w.r. not p.rtlclp.tlng In the vote. 
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Foondation 'or Research Development 
PO Gl.~ 11):) Pr':',)I . ..! !;rj() 1 $ol;!h Alr.c.l 
rl!lef:· o.X:.~ 11) 121;1Jl ~'Jll 
!(J!C/'·;llon.11 • 27 12 8J ' ·2911 
r"""J' IOl2JflJ! 2·118<)(862850 
J!~rem'Jl,r:f'.11 ·27 1284 J ~..\ 18 or 136·2856 
r~rl!:C 321312SA 
Telete_ 350 180 ",CSIR 
Our Reference 
Dr A ·W V Poole 
841-3725 
NP14iS6/4 
NPI4/ S6/2/9 
Hermann Ohlthaver Institute 
Rhodes University 
POBox 94 
GRAIIAlfSTOWN 
6140 
Dear Allan 
!Sas -Qa- 0 3 
'!lII! MTAlICTlC I'I!OCI!.!1OO! AI'IIl '!lII! \lEV HlSSlOlI AIID SllIA= OF '!lII! l'RD 
Attached is a copy of a 'communique' about FRD that is going out to the 
scientific community via the FRO newsletters, a special edition ot the 
SASCAR Newsletter included. At the same time a letter by Dr Arndt, with 
the same content as the attached. will be forwarded to institutions. 
At first sight, aspects of the attached may appear'alarming to some in the 
Antarctic research community. For this reason. and because I shall be 
away at the XX SCAR meeting from mid-August for five weeks thus being 
unavailable to discuss the attached with you 9 I am sending out this 
communication in order to place the future of the Antarctic Programme into 
context with the attached. Undoubtedly this circular will not answer all 
your questions, but I hope it will help with the most important of these. 
The important information is. I think 9 the followi~: 
1. FRD provisionally foresees that it can continue to deal with the 
scientific component of the Antarctic Pro&ramme. The DfA has been 
advised of this. 
2. The organizational framework (or the scientific component of SANARP 
will have to change to fit with the new mission and strategy of the 
FRO. The 'SASCAR system' will probably disappear, to be replaced 
by a better, more appropriate organizational framework. This is 
presently being worked on by a group comprising the chairmen of the 
present SASCAR Programme Committees and myself. It is a bit too 
early to provide succinct detail about the new or~anizatjonal 
frame~ork envisaged, but in essence it will replace the present 
tour 'discipline-orientated' programmes (i.e. biolosical. earth, 
physical and· Southern Ocean sciences) with a suite of 'core 
thrusts'. each one being appropriate to a modern Antarctic 
endeavour. To&ether. these thrusts will comprise the new SA 
National Antarctic Research Prolramme (SANARP) - this name will 
probably replace the name 'SASCAR'. £ach core thrust will be led 
by a research leader or leaders. 
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J. The thrusts to be incorporated into the new special prQsrammc(Le. 
SANARP) tor its first 5-year term trom 1990 will. obviously. need 
to be appropiatei (Le. to the J!.Yrposl! of the pro~ramme, which is 
under consideration at present), feasible (i.e. tiven existin& and 
anticipated short term financial circumstances and losistical 
capabilities), an~ accommodate the projects in the present SASCAR 
system that are not already due for compLetion by the end of the 
1989/90 financial year. If the tinal choice of 'thrusts' is such 
that some of the present projects, ongoing to beyond 1990, cannot 
be accommodated in a thrust from 1990, commitments to these 
projects will be honoured pending the usual conditions (e.s-. 
satisfactory progress. etc.). 
4. The present ISASCAR organizational framework' has ~orked quite ~ell 
so far. However. it does have some serious shortcomings (e.g. the 
problem of how to apportion tunds betyeen the present discipline-
orientated programmes) which. even without the new FRO mission and 
strategy coming into the picture. need to be resolved. The 
solutiQn to most of these shortcomings seems to be the 'core 
thrust I model. Given any set of 1Antarctic' circumstances (e.,. 
current political and/or legal developments in the Antarctic Treaty 
system, scientific developments in Antarctica; research interests 
nationally; other national interests viz a viz Antarctica such as 
economic. strategic, environmental. etc.; available funds and 
manpowerj logistic capabilities; etc.) it should be possible to 
identify a suite of scientific thrusts appropriate to these 
circ~~tances and which also meet the mission of FRD. into which 
,all available resources (e.g. funds. logistics) can be directed for 
a pre-determined (e.g. 5 years) period. Towards the end ot this 
period. but also sooner if a new need arises. it should be possible 
to evaluate the performance and re-assess ,the appropriateness at 
these thrusts. to identify ne~ thrusts it changed or chan:inx 
'Antarctic' circumstances require this, to prioritize proposed new 
and existing thrusts and to proceed with those that are selected 
fro~ these for the next pre-determined period. 
This is the thinking behind the key thrust ~odel. 
-5. Proposals (NPIOs) tor new and onx01n:; \Iork submitted this year tor 
1989/90 will be assessed in the usual 'old' way by the SASCAR 
Programme Co~ittees. at their meetings in the second half of this 
year. However. it will be necessary to undertake this assessment 
also in the light of the developing ideas on what core thrusts 
should make up the new special programme for its first 5-year tero 
fro~ 1990. At some stage. probably the first half of 1959. 
project~ for 1989/90 will have to be 'batched' into the selected 
thrusts in order to phase in the core thrust concept. Froo that 
point on. the research leader(s) of a thrust. plus the project 
leaders of the projects initially brou~ht together in that thrust. 
~i11 comprise the thrust's research team . This team will need to 
&et its act together. so to speak, so the objectives of the first 
suite of thrusts .... i11 be met five years on from 1990 - e.:. 
initially this may entail some revision of project objectives to 
line up bet'ter \.lith thrust objectives, etc. 
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6. Befol"e the ne'.l SA~ARP special progral:'l:1e. with its suite of X(?) 
thrusts can be tormally launched, a description ot the pro posed ne~ 
programme and its core thrusts will need to ,0 through FRO's 
evaluation system . The present aim is to have the paper \Jork ready 
for this initial evaluation in the first hal! of 1989. The SASCAR 
Chairman's group is trying to do the groundwork of identifying ~hat 
the thrusts for a modern SANARP should be over the 1990-1995 
period. Their ideas will in due course be made known to you 
(hopefully at the SASCAR sub-committee meetings later this year) so 
that. as a comrr,uni ty. 'We can sort these out I decide on research 
leaders for them. and have them described for the evaluation 
process. Because ot the peculiar nature of an Antarctic Programme 
(see 4 above)? we feel this approach is a more appropriate one than 
simply calling for suggestions from the interested scientific 
community. When the envisaged set of proposed thrust.L-!.QI:. 
1990-1995 is made known later this ea ou will of course be free 
to sugg a n or im roveme tio'p~~ t;:Q: 
those elng pro ~s . ope that the upcoI!ling SCAR meetings 
WrfrtlirtlIet help us to ·identify appropriate thrusts for 1990-1995. 
7. As part of the process of identifying the scientific thrusts for 
the first term of , the new protramme from 1990. evaluations of the 
present four discipline-orientated SASCAR programmes ~ill be under-
taken. by independent experts. between now and early 1989. ~ 
~~C~-£hysica l sciences proqra:nme undervent th.i,~.Jl!-lY.!y ~ 
The SASC.~ earth sciences programme will undergo this in October 
19&8 by an overseas expert. The SASCAR biolo&ical and Southern 
Ocean sciences programmes will under~o this later this year or 
early 1989. The SASCAR Chairman's group has identified an 
appropriate person for the latter. who. \,/'i11 be approached during 
the SCAR meetings in Hobart. 
The Yay we are going about these . evaluations is to let the 
evaluator visit every group in the progra~e, and to ask each group 
to prepare their own written submission to the evaluator. Further 
details will be supplied to relevant project leaders in advance of 
t he evaluator's visit to South Africa. 
8. To sUfr.:ilarize. it seems like l y th3t the scientific co;:pollent 
(S~~ft~P) Antarctic Pro&rawce will beco~e one of FRO's special 
pro:ra~~es. By 1990. as indicated in the attaChed, it will replace 
the 'SASCAft national progra:nme ' of today. The phasing period will 
be 1989. Every five years fro:n 1990 the neY pro~rarrJlle Yill go 
through an evaluation. It yill also be evaluated initially (in 
198~) before FRO is able to commit itself to the proposed new 
pro,trar:lr.le. The idea is that the proposal tor the new pro&ra:n::.e be 
'Jockeyed' through this initial FRO evaluation by the present 
SASCAR Chairman'S group on behalf of the community. the latter by 
then having had full opportunity to assist this a:roup desi:;.n the 
proposed new programme. To this end you are invit~d to contac~~ 
chairman of the SASCAR pr:og-ramme committeeun"dcr ~hose 'auspices I 
--VOiIf--pr~e:~jrit - invo"l v~~~.~~. ·.~t~j.L~·~ ·-in --order~ -fo-discuSs-~i th. hiCi 
possi"Srliti""es-fo"r ···· tnrusts to be considered for incorporation Into 
the new programme for 1990. As soon as the initial evaluation is 
complete and. A~suming a gre~n light is &iven. I would envisage 
that the research leaders of the thrusts that t~t approved. plus 
possibly a few others {e.!.. DEA},· would replace the SASl:.AR 
Cha1man's ,roup as the 'leader ,roup' tor the scientific cor.tponent 
ot the pro&ramme. 
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9. Quite how funding will be handled is difficult to envisage at 
present. Ultimately the object is that the selected thrusts would 
be blocktunded annually over their duration. and the research 
leaders would be the grantholders. The latter would. of course. be 
free to fe-disburse. or arrange with FRD for the direct re-disburse-
ment of the thrust"s grant amongs~ its participants. Thus. I would 
imagine that. in practice. each research leader would~ his 
own little 'thrust steerins committee' to help him deal ~itll 
financial and other managerial aspects. as well as inter- or intra-
thrust workshops, symposia, etc. FRO's programme manager for 
SANARP would, of course. be available to facilitate and assist such 
committees and their activities, but these yould not be FRO-appoin-
ted committees. Overall scientific programme (or inter-thrust) 
coordination will require the assistance of at least all the thrust 
research leaders, in the form of same sort at programme coordina-
tion 'forum' as mentioned above. which meets 2 to 4 times annually 
and which might also give rise to inter-thrust York sessions, 
seminars. etc. etc. Again, FRO's programme manager tar SA~ARP 
would nave to facilitate this. 
10. On the matter of ADs I would imagine that. although the name Yilt 
probably disappear. a thrust research team (or research leader or 
thrust steering committee) would be quite within its rithts to 
establish one or more suchlike positions to assist with intra-
thrust continuity. organization, etc . Since a thrust would have a 
5-year lifespan between evaluations (the evaluation might end it or 
tive it another 5-year term), the te~ of such p05ts would be 
directly connected to the term at the thrust. AO's tenws are 
already 3 to 5 years. Possibly two or ~ore thrusts might jointly 
sponsor such posts for their mutual benefi~1 A ney guideline for 
such posts would probably need to be drawn-up by research leaders 
Jointly. 
L 
II. SASCAR will in all likelyhaad disappear. The role that SASCAR has 
played viz a viz the Antarctic prograr..I<i.e i.e. the national 
-»rogra~e committee will probably be assur.ed by the above-
mentioned Ipro&ru~e coordination fO~'. SASCAR ' s other role. 
that of national committee for SCAR. has already been assuoed by a 
new SA Natl0nal COfi'1111Ltee tor SCAR being established and .operated 
by the South African ICSU Secretariat of the ney fRO. This ne~ 
c:om:1ittee has its first meeting la.ter this year .. 
12. Although all available S~~ARP support (i.e. finances. logistics) 
will be shared between the existing thrust tcams over any given 
betYeen-evaluations term. I can see no reason "",hy a researcher. 
funded through FRO's Core Pragra~~e, CQuld not also participate. 
However. such participation would have to contrihute . in real 
terms. to the objects of a thrust - i.e. a thru5t research le.lder 
could incorporate a self-funded (e.g. core progra~r.e funds) 
researcher into the thrust team tor a once-off. or thrust-duration. 
period. As in the past, there would nevertheless have to he strict 
control with regard to 'givin& opportunities for visits' - real 
participation in the thrust \i'ould have to rem~lin a condition for 
this. 
13. All thrust research leaders (i.e. the &rantholders) will have to 
have been individua.llY evaluated by f&D. 
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I . hope the above-mentioned has been ot some assistance to you in assessing 
the attached as it might apply to the Antarctic Programme, and also in 
inCon=1ng you ot pro,ress with and plans for the • swing inc f ot the old 
'nationaL programme I (SASCAR) into a new 'special pro&ramme l (SANARP), tor 
its o_~ benefit as well as to meet the new mission and strate&y of FRO. 
Please do not hesitate to discuss your remalnins queries or problems with 
me or with one of the SASCAR Programme Committee Chairmen. A new 
ortanizational framework is necessary tor the scientific component ot the 
Antarctic Programme. We are tryi~ to develop the most sensible and 
appropriate one. that is also co~patible with FRO's new system. and to 
introduce it as smoothly and calmly as possible. 
Yours sincerely 
P R Gandy 
SCI~~TIFIC COORDINATOR ANTARCTIC PROGRAMME 
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Telex 3-21312 SA 
Telclex 350180 ::: CSlfl 
Dlfcct TLI(:pltuI10 i.ulLl , 841 372 5/4280 
Dr A W V Poole 
Hermann Ohlthauer Institute for Aeronamy 
Rhodes University 
POBox 94 
GRAHAMSTOWN 6140 
Dear AIIon 
(~~ FRD 
(.;~ 
:1,:1, 1989 -10- 0 2 
TRANSFER OF SANARP TO DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AFFAIRS 
By now you may know that the final decision has been taken to transfe r the 
management of research in the Antarctic Programme to the DEA. Most of the FRD 
records (e.g. files, Antarctic literature collection , SAJAR, etc.) have been 
transferred. 
My Secretary (Mathilda de Beer). Liaison Officer (Maureen Allingham) and 
myself may be re-assigned within FRD or CSIR, or failing this w.ill be s eeki ng 
new employment elsewhere. What ever the outcome we hope we may still cross 
paths with you, even if on ly occasionally. We t hank you most sincerely for 
your co-operation, support and fr iendship over the years that we have been 
involved with the Antarctic programme. 
I pe rsonally have thoroughly enjoyed working wit h you in the Antarctic 
programme. For me it has been an ext reme ly s timulating, enriching and 
r ewa rding experience. 
With kind regards and best wishes for the future . From this point on you 
should now dea l directly with the DEA on all mat ters concerning the Antarctic 
Progranune. 
Yours sincerely 
P R CONDY 
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